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Absolute polarization indices remain unchanged under equal absolute augmentation in all incomes. This paper identifies the class of absolute polarization indices whose orderings of alternative income distributions agree with the rankings generated by nonintersecting absolute polarization curves. We explore the possibility of using the Kolm (1976) – Blackorby‐Donaldson (1980) ethical absolute inequality index in polarization measurement. We establish that although inequality and polarization are dissimilar concepts, different absolute inequality indices can be employed to design alternative absolute polarization indices. A numerical illustration is provided using Indian data and it is shown that inequality and polarization are different issues in income distribution analysis. 相似文献
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The foreign exchanges operate in markets that are widely distrusted as unpredictable and destabilising for international trade. Roy Batchelor and Geoffrey Wood argue that history and argument show that it is government that makes the exchanges more volatile, because it adds a range of uncertainty which is the most unpredictable. 相似文献
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HENRY W. CHAPPELL ROB ROY MCGREGOR TODD A. VERMILYEA 《Journal of Money, Credit and Banking》2014,46(4):665-692
Committees may make better monetary policy decisions than individuals; however, the benefits of group decision making could be lost if committee members cede power to a chairman. We develop an econometric model to describe intracommittee power‐sharing across members. Estimation of the model permits us to classify monetary policy committees into the typology developed by Blinder ( 2004 , 2007 ). We estimate our model for the United Kingdom's Bank of England (BOE) and Sweden's Riksbank. Results for the BOE suggest that the Governor has little influence over other committee members, while those for the Riksbank indicate that the Governor is highly influential. 相似文献
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ELENA ASPAROUHOVA PETER BOSSAERTS NILANJAN ROY WILLIAM ZAME 《The Journal of Finance》2016,71(6):2727-2780
We study the Lucas asset pricing model in a controlled setting. Participants trade two long‐lived securities in a continuous open‐book system. The experimental design emulates the stationary, infinite‐horizon setting of the model and incentivizes participants to smooth consumption across periods. Consistent with the model, prices align with consumption betas and comove with aggregate dividends, particularly so when risk premia are higher. Trading significantly increases consumption smoothing compared to autarky. Nevertheless, as in field markets, prices are excessively volatile. The noise corrupts traditional generalized method of moment tests. Choices display substantial heterogeneity, with no subject representative for pricing. 相似文献
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This paper examines the effect of political and economic asymmetries in the formation of common external tariffs (CETs) in a customs union (CU). We do so by introducing possible cross‐border lobbying and by endogenizing tariff formation in a political economic model for the determination of CETs. The latter allows us to consider asymmetries among the member nations in their susceptibilities to lobbying. We also consider asymmetries in the influence of the member nations in CU‐wide decision‐making. A central finding of this paper is that, in the absence of economic asymmetry, the CET rises monotonically with the degree of asymmetry in country influences if the two countries are equally susceptible to lobbying. If influences are the same, the CET also rises monotonically with the degree of asymmetry in susceptibilities. These results hold irrespective of whether the lobby groups in the two member countries cooperate or work non‐cooperatively. 相似文献