Urban Crime and Labor Mobility

Two municipalities within a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) determine the level of local law enforcement. Enforcement reduces and diverts crime. The former confers a spillover benefit; the latter a spillover cost. When labor is mobile, welfare necessarily declines: if enforcement is too high (low) under labor immobility, it is raised (reduced) further under mobility. If municipalities have different enforcement costs, mobility reduces welfare for the high‐cost municipality and for the MSA, but the effect is ambiguous on the low‐cost municipality. Finally, when residents choose between productive and criminal activities, enforcement is more likely to be overprovided.     

Accounting Conservatism and the Temporal Trends in Current Earnings’ Ability to Predict Future Cash Flows versus Future Earnings: Evidence on the Trade‐off between Relevance and Reliability*

This research reports that an increasing level of accounting conservatism over the 1973–2005 period is associated with: (1) an increase in the ability of current earnings to predict future cash flows and (2) a decrease in the ability of current earnings to predict future earnings. We also find that usefulness of earnings for explaining stock prices over book values is positively related to reliability but not to relevance. Our results hold for the constant and full samples in both in‐sample and out‐of‐sample analyses and are robust to the use of alternative measures for relevance, reliability, earnings usefulness, and conservatism. Our findings about the relations among conservatism, relevance, reliability, and usefulness suggest a trade‐off between relevance and reliability and seem to indicate that the adoption of an increasing number of conservative accounting standards has a possible adverse impact on earnings usefulness through a negative effect on reliability.     

POLITICAL ASYMMETRY AND COMMON EXTERNAL TARIFFS IN A CUSTOMS UNION

This paper examines the effect of political and economic asymmetries in the formation of common external tariffs (CETs) in a customs union (CU). We do so by introducing possible cross‐border lobbying and by endogenizing tariff formation in a political economic model for the determination of CETs. The latter allows us to consider asymmetries among the member nations in their susceptibilities to lobbying. We also consider asymmetries in the influence of the member nations in CU‐wide decision‐making. A central finding of this paper is that, in the absence of economic asymmetry, the CET rises monotonically with the degree of asymmetry in country influences if the two countries are equally susceptible to lobbying. If influences are the same, the CET also rises monotonically with the degree of asymmetry in susceptibilities. These results hold irrespective of whether the lobby groups in the two member countries cooperate or work non‐cooperatively.     

Prosecutorial Retention: Signaling by Trial

We examine how retention motives affect prosecutor behavior under different evaluation criteria. In particular, we analyze how prosecutors of differing capabilities respond in choosing which cases to take to trial and which to plea bargain. We show how different criteria distort the mix of cases chosen for trial and that the direction of the distortion depends crucially on the evaluation tool used. Optimal evaluation metrics are derived that combine multiple signals of performance and are shown to achieve the first‐best outcome.     

Prudence comptable et évolution temporelle des propriétés prévisionnelles des résultats de l’exercice en ce qui a traitaux flux de trésorerie futurs et aux résultats futurs: constatations relatives au compromis pertinence‐fiabilité

Selon les observations des auteurs, l’augmentation du degré de prudence comptable au cours de la période s’échelonnant de 1973 à 2005 est associée aux facteurs suivants : 1) les propriétés prévisionnelles croissantes des résultats de l’exercice en ce qui a trait aux flux de trésorerie futurs et 2) les propriétés prévisionnelles décroissantes des résultats de l’exercice en ce qui a trait aux résultats futurs. Les auteurs constatent également que l’utilité des résultats pour expliquer le cours des actions par rapport aux valeurs comptables est en relation positive avec la fiabilité, mais non avec la pertinence. Les résultats de l’étude se vérifient pour l’échantillon constant et l’échantillon intégral, à la fois dans les analyses sur échantillon et hors échantillon, et ils résistent à l’utilisation d’autres indicateurs de pertinence, de fiabilité, d’utilité des résultats et de prudence. Les conclusions des auteurs au sujet des relations entre la prudence, la pertinence, la fiabilité et l’utilité semblent accréditer l’existence d’un compromis entre pertinence et fiabilité et paraissent indiquer que l’adoption d’un nombre croissant de normes comptables prudentes pourrait être préjudiciable à l’utilité des résultats en raison d’une incidence négative sur la fiabilité.     

POLICY EVALUATION IN THE PRESENCE OF OUTSOURCING: GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS VERSUS POLITICAL FEASIBILITY

We analyze the effects of outsourcing in the presence of a minimum wage by presenting a general-equilibrium model with an oligopolistic export sector and a competitive import-competing sector. An outsourcing tax is politically popular because it switches jobs to unemployed natives. It is also economically sound because it raises national income. An export subsidy may or may not be justified on welfare grounds. Increased international competition has no effect on the level of outsourcing, but the direction of its effect on unemployment and national income depends on the relative factor intensities of the two sectors.     

Market Structure and Audit Fees: A Local Analysis*

This study conducts a local analysis of the relation between market structure and audit fees. The research question of interest to us is how audit fees are determined by each practicing local office, after taking into account the auditor's own position in a local market and the influence exerted by his or her clients. Appealing to the economic theories of monopoly and monopsony power, we hypothesize a positive audit fee‐concentration relation, and a negative audit fee‐client influence relation. Results indicate that auditor market concentration is positively associated with the non‐Big 6 audit fees but is unrelated to the Big 6 audit fees. Evidence is mixed concerning the client influence hypothesis. When this construct is proxied by the number of rival auditors operating within a geographic area centered on the municipality, the prediction of negative audit fee‐client influence relation is strongly supported for both groups of auditors. Results are much weaker using measures developed based on the relative importance of a municipal client to its auditor's audit portfolio. The issues addressed in this study are important at a time when the Canadian municipal sector is undergoing major changes because of municipal amalgamation, altering the underlying market structure for audit services and the bargaining position of a municipality vis‐Ã‐vis its auditor. More broadly speaking, our analysis implies that when assessing an auditor's report for signs of client pressure, the professional oversight bodies and regulatory authorities need to consider the relative, rather than the absolute, bargaining position of the client in question.     

Competition and Big 6 Brand Name Reputation: Evidence from the Ontario Municipal Audit Market*

The 1991 amendment to the auditor appointment requirement of section 86 of the Ontario Municipal Act removes certain barriers to entry into the Ontario municipal audit market. The purpose of this study is to provide evidence that the amendment has enhanced competition in this market. The results indicate that there is a general reduction in the real municipal audit fees compared with the pre‐amendment levels, and that the market has become more contestable following the amendment. Notwithstanding the heightened competition, the Big 6 audit firms continue to command audit fee premiums over the non‐Big 6 audit firms. This suggests that Big 6 audit fee premiums possibly reflect brand name reputation rather than monopoly/oligopoly rents.     

Note on Self‐Selection of Auditors in the Municipal Sector*

The objective of this article is to revisit the literature on Big‐N audit fee premiums in the municipal setting using a methodology that controls for self‐selection bias. Because auditor choices can be predicted based on certain client characteristics, using standard one‐stage ordinary least squares regressions to draw inferences about the presence or absence of such a premium in the extant public‐sector audit fee studies may not be appropriate. Results indicate that, after controlling for a self‐selection bias, Big‐6 (non‐Big‐6) municipal clients on average pay a fee premium, compared to the case if they were to retain a non‐Big‐6 (Big‐6) auditor. Results continue to hold when we conduct further analyses on a subset of municipalities with access to both Big‐6 and non‐Big‐6 auditors in a local market defined by a 60‐km radius, rather than over a province‐wide audit market. The existence of non‐Big‐6 audit fee premiums has not been documented previously in the private‐ or public‐sector audit fee literature. We surmise that it may be caused by the dominance (79.4 percent) of non‐Big‐6 auditors in the Ontario municipal market, compared to most private‐sector audit markets where their market share generally does not exceed 20 percent. The strong market position of non‐Big‐6 firms in turn may have allowed these auditors to command a fee premium for the subset of municipalities that self‐selects to be audited by them. An implication from our study is that Ontario municipalities often choose to be audited by more costly auditors, even though they could have paid lower audit fees by switching to an alternative auditor type. These results do not support those reported by Chaney et al. (2004) , who find that U.K. private firms are audited by the least costly auditor type. The conflicting findings may be attributable to the fact that the Ontario municipal audit market is subject to regulation by not just the audit profession but also the Ontario government and that, unlike business corporations, municipalities receive funding from provincial governments to fulfil much of their financial requirements. Thus, municipal clients may be relatively more willing to accept higher audit fees provided their chosen auditor (or auditor type) matches their needs.