Structural Change in Current Account and Real Exchange Rate Dynamics: Evidence from the G7 Countries

Previous studies decompose the current account and the real exchange rate into temporary and permanent shocks and argue that a temporary shock creates the combination of a current account surplus (deficit) and real exchange rate depreciation (appreciation). The present paper extends their framework by examining a possible structural break in current account and real exchange rate dynamics. Using G7 country data for 1980–2007, we find structural changes in two‐variable dynamics for all G7 countries during the 1990s. Temporary shocks have not been the main source of fluctuation in the current account since the 1990s. Our empirical results imply that the conventional mechanism has played a limited role in explaining the dynamics of the two variables.     

Capital controls and welfare

This paper computes welfare levels under different degree of capital controls and compares them with the welfare level under perfect capital mobility by using the methodology of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007). We show that perfect capital mobility is not always optimal and that capital controls may enhance an economy’s welfare level. There exists an optimal degree of capital-account restriction that achieves a higher level of welfare than that under perfect capital mobility, if the economy has costly financial intermediaries. The results of our analysis imply that as the domestic financial intermediaries are less efficient, the government should impose stricter capital controls in the form of a tax on foreign borrowing.     

On farmland prices and rents in Japan

Historically, the Japanese farmland market has been strongly regulated, although fundamental changes in policy were introduced in 1967 and 1980. This article examines the relationship between farmland prices and rents in Japan for 1955–2000 using the cointegration procedure of Johansen et al. (2000) , which admits structural breaks. Results show the presence of a cointegrating relationship with a significant break in 1980. There is Granger‐causality from prices to rents, which suggests that rents are determined within an institutional setting according to farmland prices. The rent–price elasticity is unity, which supports the notion of efficiency in the farmland market.     

Capital Controls,Public Debt and Currency Crises

This paper examines the possibility that, contrary to conventional wisdom, capital controls accelerate currency crises. Theoretical analysis shows that capital controls can constitute an additional burden on government budget and so bring forward the onset of crises. Since perfect capital mobility does not occur, domestic interest rates may deviate from world interest rates. High interest rates under capital controls create an additional cost of servicing outstanding domestic public debt, precipitating crises. Even though the government can delay crises with capital controls, welfare may be less than in a situation with perfect capital mobility.     

The historical significance of the revaluation of fixed assets in Japan's state-owned railway system, 1955-6

The Government Railways of Japan (GRJ) established a fixed assets accounting system on the accruals basis after the Second World War. The revaluation of tangible fixed assets was indispensable for GRJ's introduction of depreciation in 1948. GRJ scheduled the revaluation to secure a reasonable depreciation expense, because the company had applied the replacement method to all tangible fixed assets since its foundation in 1869. At the same time, GRJ assumed the balance of the revaluation reserve account to be a means of dealing with possible future accumulated losses.     

A Model of Balance‐of‐Payments Crises due to External Shocks: Monetary vs. Fiscal Approaches

This paper develops a model for balance‐of‐payments (BOP) crises triggered by an external shock. Whether an external shock induces a BOP crisis depends crucially on the sequence of policy actions taken by the government's monetary and fiscal authorities. If the fiscal authority moves first and imposes an exogenous constraint on the monetary authority, an external shock can lead to a BOP crisis. However, if the monetary authority moves first and imposes an exogenous constraint on the fiscal authority, the same shock does not cause a BOP crisis.     

Nominal debt and inflation stabilization

The “fiscal theory of currency crises” ( Daniel 2001 ; Corsetti and Ma?kowiak 2005, 2006 ) claims that with long‐term nominal debt, a government can delay the timing of an inevitable currency crisis that results from a fiscal shock. The present paper shows that, in contrast, long‐term nominal debt might have destabilizing effects when a government introduces an inflation stabilization policy. It is shown that a stabilization policy that is successful in the absence of long‐term nominal debt can cause a crisis when long‐term nominal debt exists. The model implies that a government with a large stock of long‐term nominal debt must overcome a high fiscal hurdle for a successful stabilization policy. This difficulty is avoidable if long‐term debt is indexed to inflation.     

Macroeconomic effect of capital controls as a safeguard against the capital inflow problem

Concerns that a rapid surge in capital inflow leads to loss of autonomy in macroeconomic policy, and that its reversal has significant negative effects on an economy, have motivated capital controls during the 1990s. Under a fixed exchange rate system without capital-account restrictions, a decrease in world nominal interest rates causes in a small open economy a deterioration in the current account, real exchange rate appreciation, and inflationary pressure, as pointed out by Calvo et al. (, ). This paper examines macroeconomic effects of capital-account restrictions as a policy response to the capital inflow problem under fixed exchange rates. Theoretical analysis shows that capital-account restrictions not only stem the capital inflow but also reverse the associated macroeconomic effects. The model implies that capital-account restrictions are effective measures against the capital inflow problem of emerging markets in the 1990s.     

The Government's Foreign Debt in the Argentine Crisis

Though the government had adopted a currency board regime since 1991, the Argentine economy suffered a currency crisis in 2002. It is shown that currency crises can arise, even under currency board systems in which the central bank has enough international reserves to respond to arbitrary withdrawals by individuals. The model implies that a government's rapid accumulation of foreign debt should be included as a major predictor of currency crises.