Implications of the minimum access rice import on supply and demand balance of rice in Japan

The recent development of rice policies in Japan are summarized. The impact of the minimum access (MA) import on the supply and demand balance of rice, and the rice diversion areas in the future is also predicted.     

Structural Change in Current Account and Real Exchange Rate Dynamics: Evidence from the G7 Countries

Previous studies decompose the current account and the real exchange rate into temporary and permanent shocks and argue that a temporary shock creates the combination of a current account surplus (deficit) and real exchange rate depreciation (appreciation). The present paper extends their framework by examining a possible structural break in current account and real exchange rate dynamics. Using G7 country data for 1980–2007, we find structural changes in two‐variable dynamics for all G7 countries during the 1990s. Temporary shocks have not been the main source of fluctuation in the current account since the 1990s. Our empirical results imply that the conventional mechanism has played a limited role in explaining the dynamics of the two variables.     

Time reversal and last passage time of diffusions with applications to credit risk management

Finance and Stochastics - We study time reversal, last passage time and $h$ -transform of linear diffusions. For general diffusions with killing, we obtain the probability density of the last...     

Profit Based Efficiency Measures,with an Application to Rice Production in Southern India

Using non‐parametric methods, we estimate the foregone rents due to credit, allocative, and technical inefficiencies of subsistence farmers in Southern India. The lost rents are estimated directly from the Nerlovian efficiency index, and the results suggest the largest foregone rents derive from allocative inefficiencies and then credit inefficiencies. Also, results suggest that farms without well access experience larger losses than those with well access. Econometric results suggest education, the presence of tank water management efforts, and well access influence the level of foregone rent due to allocative and Nerlovian inefficiencies. Educational activities and policies to encourage better management of tanks are considered important for lowering the foregone losses.     

A framework for the study of expansion options,loan commitments and agency costs

We consider a firm that operates a single plant and has an expansion option to invest in a new plant. This setup leads to two-sided optimal stopping problems. We analyze optimal expansion timing and quantify the value of the loan commitment that the equityholder obtained from the lender and associated agency costs incurred on the lender's side. Moreover, we incorporate construction period for the new plant, which throws another layer of uncertainty into the model: the parties cannot tell price level of the firm's product when the construction completes. This analysis contrasts with the conventional one-sided stopping models in corporate finance literature. We can study expansion options by viewing a firm's existing operation, bankruptcy threat, and financing decisions all together.     

The Premium–Dividend Competition in the Prewar Japanese Life Insurance Industry: A Game-Theoretic Interpretation

Between 1917 and 1935, Japanese life insurance companies competed with each other on a premium–dividend basis. We propose that such competition took the form of product differentiation, exploiting differences in discount rates or price expectations among policy-holders. Our model shows that under some conditions the introduction of such competition can be beneficial to the competitive companies. It is shown that these conditions were satisfied at that time, and that more detailed factors are also consistent with the model.
JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D43, G22, N25.     

Business process semi-automation based on business model management

It is important to respond to customers' requirements more rapidly than ever before due to the recent trend in e-business and its technologies. In order to achieve an agile response, we have to manage business models, to reflect the changes in the models and to develop or modify IT systems for further chances. This paper proposes a management framework of layered enterprise models. The proposed framework consists of a business model repository and a software repository, and defines three different grain sizes of modeling layers, namely business modeling, business process modeling and business application modeling, in order to support business modeling and application development. This framework helps us to develop business application in incremental deployment of analysis, design, and implementation to execute business processes. We have implemented a prototype environment using Java. Each repository's contents are described using XML so that the repositories are interoperable. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Information, Incentives, and Option Value: The Silicon Valley Model

This paper analyzes the Silicon Valley model as a novel economic institution in the domain of technological product system innovation. We analyze the informational relationship as well as governance relationships between venture capitalists and a cluster of entrepreneurial firms. The informational conditions that make the Silicon Valley model efficient are identified, leading to an understanding of the significance of standardized interfaces, modularization, and information encapsulation. We then examine the governance/incentive aspect by integrating the models of Aoki (Towards a Comparative Institutional Analysis, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001) and Baldwin and Clark (Design Rules—Vol. 1: The Power of Modularity, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000). The paper concludes by evaluating the applicability of the model to other localities and industries. J. Comp. Econ., December 2002, 30(4), pp. 759–786. Department of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305, and RIETI, 1-3-1 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-0013, Japan; and Faculty of Economics, Toyo University, 5-28-20 Hakusan, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 112-8606, Japan. © 2002 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D21, L23, O32, P51, P52.     

Managerialism revisited in the light of bargaining-game theory

This lecture proposes to view the modern firm as a coalition of shareholders, employees, and business partners, rather than to identify it with a single maximizer such as an entrepreneur. This view may be thought of as a revival of the original thought of managerialism, but tries to go further by analyzing implications of the interactions of those agents on the behavior of the firm in a bargaining-game theoretic framework. The lecture reviews the literature on game theoretic approaches to the theory of the firm, and discusses a few important theoretical and institutional issues.     

Competitiveness of Firm Behavior and Public Policy for New Technology Adoption in an Oligopoly

Economic growth requires that firms adopt new technologies. However, it may be insufficient or excessive in less competitive industries from the social welfare point of view. In this case, a government subsidy or tax is necessary. We analyze the optimum subsidy or tax policy for new technology adoption by firms when firms maximize the weighted average of absolute and relative profits. We do not consider that firms really maximize the weighted average, but the weight on the relative profit is used as a parameter indicating competitiveness of firm behavior. We show that the optimum policy is likely to be subsidization (or taxation) when the set-up cost for new technology adoption is large (or small). It is likely to be subsidization (or taxation) when competitiveness is large (or small), that is, it is near to perfect competition (or joint profit maximization).