A model of wage and employment effects of service offshoring

This paper develops a two‐sector model of trade in goods and intermediate tasks that differ in tradability and skill intensity. A skill‐abundant country with high productivity is shown to offshore more unskilled tasks than skilled tasks, without relying on a particular correlation structure between tradability and skill intensity. With putty‐clay technology that allows retraining in the long run, transition from the non‐offshoring to the offshoring equilibrium generates wage and employment effects that switch from negative to positive as tradability declines, with the switches occurring at a higher degree of tradability for skilled tasks. This is consistent with the empirical literature.     

Lobbying as a potent political marketing tool for firm performance: A closer look

This study endeavors to enhance political marketing literature about the impact of lobbying on firm performance. Our sample is composed of 140 U.S. firms and spans the years 2007–2014 to encompass the 2007–2009 recession and the subsequent recovery period. Our findings indicate that lobbying expenses positively contribute to firm performance. Also, government contracts in both ways, dollar amount and number of government contracts, act as mediators between lobbying expenses and firm performance. In addition, organizational slack moderates the relationship between lobbying expenses and government contracts. The managerial implications suggest that lobbying expenses can be leveraged as a potent tool for firm performance. Firms with larger lobbying efforts acquired both, higher dollar amounts and a greater number of government contracts.     

Real Exchange Rate Misalignments in the Euro Area

Open Economies Review - Building upon a Behavioural Equilibrium Exchange Rate model, estimated at a quarterly frequency since 1999 on a broad sample of 57 countries, this paper assesses both the...     

Gentlewomanly capitalism? Spinsters,widows, and wealth holding in England and Wales,c. 1800–1860

This article examines the demographic and geographical importance of wealthy middle-class women. It argues that in certain towns and cities, notably London, such women were of sufficient importance to merit attention in their own right. Drawing upon a sample of wills, it describes the types of wealth owned by these women. By examining women's investment in government securities, it argues that women's wealth was of crucial importance to the British state. Its findings challenge conventional understandings of the relationships between gender ideology, wealth holding, and economic development.     

Family income and child outcomes in Canada

Abstract.  A positive relationship between income and child outcomes has been observed in data from numerous countries. A key question concerns the extent to which this association represents a causal relationship as opposed to unobserved heterogeneity. We use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Youth to implement a series of empirical strategies for estimating the existence and size of the effect of income on three measures of cognition. Our results indicate that the effect of income on these outcomes may well be positive, but that it is likely to be smaller than conventional estimates. JEL Classification: I10     

COLLUSION IN LOCAL PUBLIC WORKS*

A hierarchical model of collusion in local public works is presented. A local authority plans to undertake a project, delegating its construction to a construction firm. Both of them know the project's cost. However, the federal government decides whether to subsidize the project without knowing its cost. Therefore, the local authority and the constructor may agree to misreport their private information, in order to benefit from the allocation of federal grants. We show that different collusive behaviors may emerge. Then, we characterize the optimal federal grant policy. Finally, we investigate when constructing (shutting down) useless (valuable) projects is optimal.     

Overcompensation as a Partial Solution to Commitment and Renegotiation Problems: The Case of Ex Post Moral Hazard

In a Costly State Verification world, an agent who has private information regarding the state of the world must report what state occurred to a principal, who can verify the state at a cost. An agent then has what is called ex post moral hazard: he has an incentive to misreport the true state to extract rents from the principal. Assuming the principal cannot commit to an auditing strategy, the optimal contract is such that: (1) the agent's expected marginal utility when there is an accident (high‐ and low‐loss states) is equal to his marginal utility when there is no accident; (2) the lower loss is undercompensated, while the higher loss is overcompensated; and (3) the welfare of the agent is greater under commitment than under no‐commitment. Result 2 is contrary to the results obtained if the principal can commit to an auditing strategy (higher losses underpaid and lower losses overpaid). The reason is that by increasing the difference between the high and the low indemnity payments, the probability of fraud is reduced.