The effects of network groups on minority employee turnover intentions

Companies in the United States are concerned with retaining minority employees to maintain or increase the diversity of their workforce. Here we assess the value of one approach companies have used to retain minority employees: “network” groups. Based on data obtained from a large company with extensive network groups, this study compares the turnover intentions of minority employees who have joined one of the company's network groups to those who have not joined one of the company's network groups. The data show that employee network groups can be useful in helping companies retain managerial‐level minority employees. Extensive recommendations are provided to help organizations maximize the effectiveness of network groups. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Stock market volatility,the news,and monetary policy

The dynamic relationship linking the volatility of equity prices with “the news” and the expected path for monetary policy is investigated. Previous results that link the impact of the news about real activity to changes in current and future interest rates are employed in developing a positive link between changes in volatility and the news. Empirically, our results uncover a positive and statistically significant response of the CBOE volatility index, VIX, to unanticipated changes in employment, but not to inflation. Hence, agents' expectations for the policy response to news have an important influence on the expected volatility of stock prices. (JEL E44, E52)     

A generalized theorem of the maximum

Summary This paper generalizes the Theorem of the Maximum (Berge [2]) to allow for discontinuous changes in the domain and the objective function. It also provides a geometrical version of the (generalized) theorem.This research was supported in part by National Science Foundation Grant SES-86-19012. Financial assistance was also provided, for Lawrence Ausubel, by the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, and for Raymond Deneckere, by the Kellogg School of Management's Beatrice/Esmark Research Chair. We thank Alejandro Manelli and Israel Zang for many helpful conversations.     

Estimation of household preferences for long distance telecommunications carrier

The competitive environment in long-distance telecommunications markets changed considerably with the divestiture of AT&T in 1982. A variety of providers appeared, offering myriad services. In this environment, customer selection of preferred long-distance carrier became more complicated and more important.In this paper, we analyze and quantify the determinants of this choice. To our knowledge, this focus is distinct. By contrast, the literature to date has analyzed the behavioral determinants of calling volume (local and long-distance) and the selection of local service options.In our analysis, we allow the alternative carriers to differ in terms of tariffs, reputation, quality, access, and specialized customer services. We quantify the interactive effects of these carrier attributes and customer demographics upon the selection of carrier. Price and income elasticities are estimated. A distinguishing feature of our analysis is that it examines behavioral differences among households in equal-access and unequal-access areas. We find that households assured of the convenience of 1 + dialling for their chosen carrier in equal-access areas display more rational and sophisticated decision making. On the other hand, households in unequal-access areas display greater status quo effects in their decision making.     

Small Leading Firms*

We formally analyze the question of whether a price leader must control a large share of the market. Our main result is that if other producers have rising marginal costs and behave as price takers, even the smallest firm in a competitive industry with a rising supply curve can enhance its profits by cutting output and raising price, becoming a price leader. Therefore, we would expect pure competition to be destroyed under these technological conditions.     

Selection dynamics and adaptive behavior without much information

This paper uses the experimental method to investigate behavior in a coordination game when the information available to subjects is limited to their feasible choices and their experienced payoffs. In the experiment subjects converge to an absorbing state at rates that are orders of magnitude faster than reinforcement learning algorithms, but slower than under complete information. This state is very close to a mutual best response outcome. All cohorts converged to the market statistic predicted by the interior equilibrium regardless of the information conditions or the stability conditions. Eric Battalio programmed the graphical user interface. The National Science Foundation and Texas Advanced Research Program provided financial support. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation or the Texas Advanced Research Program.