Market Liquidity and Trading Activity

Previous studies of liquidity span short time periods and focus on the individual security. In contrast, we study aggregate market spreads, depths, and trading activity for U.S. equities over an extended time sample. Daily changes in market averages of liquidity and trading activity are highly volatile and negatively serially dependent. Liquidity plummets significantly in down markets. Recent market volatility induces a decrease in trading activity and spreads. There are strong day-of-the-week effects; Fridays accompany a significant decrease in trading activity and liquidity, while Tuesdays display the opposite pattern. Long- and short-term interest rates influence liquidity. Depth and trading activity increase just prior to major macroeconomic announcements.     

Forced Versus Voluntary Dividend Reduction: An Agency Cost Explanation

We examine whether the agency cost arising from shareholder‐bondholder conflict is an important determinant of the timing of dividend reduction decisions. Firms forced to reduce dividends owing to bond covenant violations experience lower earnings, more frequent losses, and greater earnings declines around the dividend reduction year than do firms that voluntarily reduce dividends. Relative to voluntary‐reduction firms, forced‐reduction firms have higher debt‐to‐equity ratios and managerial holdings. These findings coupled with the increased dividend payout ratios and lower announcement period returns suggest that financially distressed firms that anticipate poor performance have greater incentives to delay reducing dividends to avoid a wealth transfer to bondholders.     

Capacity Constraints and Hedge Fund Strategy Returns

Hedge funds have generated significant absolute returns (alpha) in the decade between 1995 and 2004. However, the level of alpha has declined substantially over this period. We investigate whether capacity constraints at the level of hedge fund strategies have been responsible for this decline. For four out of eight hedge fund strategies, capital inflows have statistically preceded negative movements in alpha, consistent with this hypothesis. We also find evidence that hedge fund fees have increased over the same period. Our results provide support for the Berk and Green (2004) rational model of active portfolio management.     

Trading Volume and Cross-Autocorrelations in Stock Returns

This paper finds that trading volume is a significant determinant of the lead-lag patterns observed in stock returns. Daily and weekly returns on high volume portfolios lead returns on low volume portfolios, controlling for firm size. Nonsynchronous trading or low volume portfolio autocorrelations cannot explain these findings. These patterns arise because returns on low volume portfolios respond more slowly to information in market returns. The speed of adjustment of individual stocks confirms these findings. Overall, the results indicate that differential speed of adjustment to information is a significant source of the cross-autocorrelation patterns in short-horizon stock returns.     

Have capital market anomalies attenuated in the recent era of high liquidity and trading activity?

We examine whether the recent regime of increased liquidity and trading activity is associated with attenuation of prominent equity return anomalies due to increased arbitrage. We find that the majority of the anomalies have attenuated and the average returns from a portfolio strategy based on prominent anomalies have approximately halved after decimalization. We provide evidence that hedge fund assets under management, short interest and aggregate share turnover have led to the decline in anomaly-based trading strategy profits in recent years. Overall, our work indicates that policies to stimulate liquidity and ameliorate trading costs improve capital market efficiency.     

True Spreads and Equilibrium Prices

Stocks and other financial assets are traded at prices that lie on a fixed grid determined by the minimum tick size. Observed prices and quoted spreads do not correspond to the equilibrium prices and true spreads that would exist in a market with no minimum tick size. Using Monte Carlo Markov Chain methods, this paper estimates the equilibrium prices and true spreads. For large stocks, most of the quoted spread is attributable to the rounding of prices and the adverse selection component is small. The true spread and the adverse selection component are greater for mid-sized stocks.     

Liquidity Dynamics Across Small and Large Firms

In this paper, we analyse cross‐sectional heterogeneity in the time‐series variation of liquidity in equity markets. Our analysis uses a broad time‐series and cross‐section of liquidity data. We find that average daily changes in liquidity exhibit significant heterogeneity in the cross‐section; the liquidity of small firms varies more on a daily basis than that of large firms. A steady increase in aggregate market liquidity over the past decade is more strongly manifest in large firms than in small firms. Absolute stock returns are an important determinant of liquidity. We investigate cross‐sectional differences in the resilience of a firm's liquidity to information shocks. We use the sensitivity of stock liquidity to absolute stock returns as an inverse measure of this resilience, and find that the measure exhibits considerable cross‐sectional variation. Firm size, return volatility, institutional holdings, and volume are all significant cross‐sectional determinants of this measure.
(J.E.L.: D82, G10, G14).     

Bilateral Merger a Note on Salant-Switzer-Reynolds Model

The SSR (1983, QJE) paper shows that in an oligopoly industry of kfirms (k > 2) with linear demand and identical (constant) average cost of production, a bilateral merger is never profitable when all firms choose their quantities simultaneously. In this paper we re-examine the issue when some firms have first-mover advantage. We find that in a leader-follower structure a bilateral merger is always profitable when a leader and a follower merge together and the merged firm behaves like a leader. But, a bilateral merger between leaders or between followers may not be privately profitable.