The influence of crop insurance agents on coverage choices: The role of agent competition

We examine how competition among crop insurance agents affects coverage choice in the federal crop insurance program. Agents may influence producers’ insurance decisions to maximize their total compensation. We develop a theoretical model of producer–agent interaction to examine how loss potential, agent compensation mechanisms, and market competition affect the coverage level selected. Using crop insurance unit-level datasets from five states, we find evidence that agent market concentration and agents’ market share matter in the insurance coverage decisions of producers but that the economic significance of the influence is relatively small. Agent influence over coverage level, premium, and liability choice is generally positive but inconsistent across states, which may be attributable to differences in loss risk and agent compensation mechanisms.     

Auctions with and without the Right of First Refusal and National Park Service Concession Contracts

The National Park Service has struggled to improve the quality of service provided by concessioners for decades. To address these concerns, the Park Service eliminated the right of first refusal from the largest revenue-generating concession contract auctions beginning in 2000. This article provides models of concession contract auctions with and without the right of first refusal. The optimal bidding strategies and expected level of service are found. The results confirm the auction without the right of first refusal leads to bids that include a higher level of service.     

Product quality,advertising intensity and market size

We develop a model of product differentiation in which firms strategically compete in product quality and advertising intensity. Products exhibit a combination of vertical and horizontal differentiation. A consumer’s utility has a stochastic relationship with quality, but they are more likely to prefer a higher quality good. Consumers face a trade-off between higher quality goods and price. Increased competition leads to less advertising, but may result in higher or lower quality products offered in the market.     

Interest group incentives for post-lottery trade restrictions

The rights to use publicly-managed natural resources are sometimes distributed by lottery, and typically these rights are nontransferable. Prohibition of post-lottery permit transfers discourages applicants from entering the lottery solely for profitable permit sale, so only those who personally value the use of the resource apply. However, because permits are distributed randomly and trade is restricted, permits may not be used by those who value them most. We argue that restrictions on permit transfers is a policy response designed to limit entry when interest group membership is not distinguishable ex ante, and characterize the economic/informational conditions under which post-lottery prohibitions on trade are likely to arise. We develop our model using the specific case of the Four Rivers Lottery used to allocate rafting permits on four river sections in Idaho.     

Identifying consumer preferences for nutrition information on grocery store shelf labels

Nutrition labels can potentially benefit consumers by increasing product knowledge and reducing search costs. However, the global increase in obesity rates leads one to question the effectiveness of current nutrition information formats. Alternative formats for providing nutrition information may be more effective. Shoppers at a major grocery chain participated in choice experiments designed to identify preferences for nutrition information provided on grocery store shelf labels. Shoppers demonstrate a strong affinity for shelf-label nutrition information and the presentation of the nutrition information significantly affects their preferences as well. Several demographic variables help to explain differences in preferences.