首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
相似文献
 共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 140 毫秒
1.
Conservation auctions for payment for ecosystem services (PES) are useful to identify the levels of incentives that will cover the opportunity costs of farmers supplying ecosystem services. Although auctions are increasingly used for allocation in PES schemes, the factors that lead to their successful implementation and eventual environmental outcomes are poorly understood in developing countries. We investigated the socio-economic and institutional contexts that led to smallholders' auction winning and eventual compliance using linear mixed-effects models, and post-auction and post-contract surveys. We employed a case study of a conservation contract preceded by a sealed-bid, multiple round, uniform price auction for watershed services from coffee farmers in Lampung, Indonesia. The auction participants presented low education levels, low asset endowments and small plot sizes. The study obtained evidence that farmers with larger plot areas were more likely to win the contracts, suggesting economies of scale. Most farmers considered the auction a fair self-selection mechanism to allocate contracts where allocation was not influenced by power or social rank. Non-compliance was associated with labor availability constraints, short duration of land ownership and existence of previous conservation applications, suggesting lax of capability to invest in applying conservation agriculture. Final bids were however not good predictors of compliance, among other factors, calling into question the potential of auctions to elicit the actual incentive from the farmers. Ensuring that farmers understand the purposes of auctions for effective contract allocation beyond a mere game and identifying farmers that might encounter difficulties fulfilling the contract could increase the likelihood that such a PES scheme would be successful.  相似文献   

2.
曹淑敏 《水利经济》2017,35(5):39-41
阐述了合同节水管理与市场机制的内涵特征,分析了实施合同节水管理的外部环境与内生动力,提出了运用市场机制推行合同节水管理的路径:(1)推动水价改革和水权交易;(2)培育节水服务产业;(3)开拓节水服务市场;(4)规范节水服务产业发展。  相似文献   

3.
孙晓燕  苏昕 《农业经济问题》2012,(8):102-108,112
目前兼业种粮户仍是我国重要的粮食种植主体。比较效益低是兼业农户选择"粗放种粮、少种粮、抛荒不种粮"的直接诱因。土地托管服务可以帮助兼业农户种粮,在提高兼业户种粮净收益的同时,更为农户腾出时间务工增加收入,"种粮+务工"的总收益增加,兼业农户在务工的同时会选择请人继续种粮、种好粮。为提高土地托管服务能力,必须坚持农民土地承包权、使用权、收益权等权能不变;必须处理好各方利益关系,让利于民;必须选好龙头企业;加大政府扶持。  相似文献   

4.
我国养殖渔业权制度问题探讨   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
养殖渔业权制度是我国渔业权制度的重要组成部分。本研究在回顾60多年来我国渔业发展历程的基础上,分析了我国水产养殖业制度创新、管理创新和技术创新的经验,指出我国水产养殖业高速发展过程中出现的一系列问题:养殖渔业权物权属性的民法根据有待明确,土地及养殖水面承包经营权有待稳定,土地及养殖水面承包经营权流转有待规范,养殖渔业权补偿制度有待完善,养殖户承包经营负担有待减轻,管理服务体系有待健全,等等。为尽快稳定与完善水产养殖业的制度基础,必须坚持水产养殖基本经营制度不动摇,完善法律法规体系;坚持科学规划,实施严格的用途管制制度;明确水面所有权主体,解决所有权缺位问题;明确物权属性,确保养殖权长久不变;明确政策界限,确保承包经营权流转沿着健康轨道进行;建立健全管理服务体系,夯实保护养殖权的基础。  相似文献   

5.
Contract violations are critical issues determining the success and sustainability of contract farming (CF). This paper challenges the common portrayal of the “powerful” company versus the “powerless” landowners/smallholders by using the literature on labour agency in global value chains to understand minor contract violations of contract farmers such, as side-selling, refusal to harvest, and burning/felling of oil palm trees. This paper conceptualizes these violations as acts of minor agency or everyday acts of resistance. The analysis highlights how CF has created chains of dependency, in which smallholders are integrated into the modern market economy through new relations of debt and power. In response, contract farmers attempt to influence and shape the CF relation by using these different acts of minor agency. This paper finds that acts of minor agency, in the aggregate, can have important effects on contract relations, governance, and organizational structure of the chain and has the potential to lead to broader changes in the underlying social relations of contract. It highlights how individual acts of minor agency may contribute to the development of a consciousness of collective opposition to the contract relation.  相似文献   

6.
研究目的:明晰家庭承包经营权主体和农户内成员权利关系形式,为农户内成员变动后权属的界定提供满足法律内部逻辑自洽的解决方案,同时维护家庭承包经营权的多功能性。研究方法:文献分析法,法律文本分析。研究结果:家庭承包经营权的主体为农民,农户内成员间权利关系形式为准共同共有。研究结论:家庭承包经营权的制度多功能性在很长一段时间内难以消解,但原有的模糊立法模式已不能适应快速城市化、土地增值和农民权利意识觉醒的现实。因此,应当采用明确权利主体及农户内部权利关系的权利本体制度,附加针对特定问题的配套特别规则的模式,实现家庭承包经营权的彻底物权化,并在凸显权利财产功能的同时,兼顾其社会保障和生产及粮食安全等功能。  相似文献   

7.
产权保护不力是制约当前非公有制林业发展的重要因素。通过实际调查,在阐述东北林区发生的一桩林业刑事案件的基础上,从事实认定、案件定性和适用法律等角度对案件进行了评析。对该案件引发的有关非公有制林业产权保护问题加以探讨,包括个人承包林地上天然林木权属的确认、林业行政执法的科学性、处置权和收益权的有效保障以及林业中介服务机构的建立与健全。  相似文献   

8.
Choice experiments and experimental auctions have become popular mechanisms for estimating willingness to pay (WTP). However, these methods have primarily been used for estimating WTP for single units of goods. We analyze the results from experimental auctions and choice experiments in the context of multiple quantities of a quasi‐public good (animal welfare product). We show that the use of WTP values for a single unit of a product, a common practice in experimental valuation literature, can result in underestimation of aggregate demand. We use and compare open ended choice experiments (OECE), second price Vickrey auctions, and random Nth price auctions as mechanisms for valuing WTP. Our results also suggest that individual level demand estimates from OECE are less elastic than demand estimates from uniform price auctions.  相似文献   

9.
Despite increased use of experimental auctions, a myriad of different procedures are being employed without formal consideration of how the procedures might affect results. This study investigates the effect of several procedural issues on valuation estimates from experimental auctions. Results indicate the second price auction generates higher valuations than English, Becker–DeGroot–Marschak (BDM) , and random n th price auctions, especially in latter bidding rounds, and that random n th price auction yields lower valuations than English and BDM auctions. We find that endowing subjects with a good prior to eliciting bids can have an impact on valuations, but the effect varies across auction mechanism.  相似文献   

10.
Most evaluations of payments for environmental services programs focus on immediate environmental impacts, and do not measure the effects on socioeconomic outcomes or on other land use activities (leakage). Efficient allocation of land use contracts, through auctions for example, may help mitigate concerns about adverse livelihood or leakage effects. This study reports on a field experiment that varied the allocation of afforestation contracts to smallholder farmers in Malawi. Households were randomly assigned to participate in an auction or in a lottery for the contracts, which provided three years of payment based on tree survival outcomes. Households that did not receive a contract as a result of the lottery form a pure comparison group. The results show evidence for within-farm leakage for households that received a contract at random, in the form of additional land clearing. Randomly contracted households are also more likely to report household labor shortages. These effects are mitigated to some degree when contracts are assigned through an auction. Together, the results point to leakage and livelihood impacts from payments for environmental services that are often overlooked in standard evaluations, but which may be reduced through improvements in contract targeting.  相似文献   

11.
哥伦比亚拥有丰富的煤炭、石油、铀矿和绿宝石等矿藏资源,但勘查、开发、利用程度较低,找矿潜力巨大。当前哥伦比亚经济处于可持续发展阶段,实行政府监管的市场经济,法律法规较为健全,因实行矿山特许合同制度等矿业管理政策,投资机会较多,权益有保障,是我国企业"走出去"较为理想地区之一。  相似文献   

12.
Conservation tenders − or procurement auctions − are a competitive mechanism, in which payment for ecosystem service contracts are allocated to landholders based on their submitted bids. These encompass a price and sometimes a measure for the environmental services the landholder offers to provide. This special edition comprises a set of papers from a workshop on conservation tenders across developed and developing countries. These papers assess the status quo, and the challenges and prospects of tendering approaches. Four high level lessons emerge: 1) Conservation tender performance has been robust; 2) Developed − developing country conservation tender differences are modest; 3) Conservation tender prospects are dependent on political and institutional support; and 4) Optimal conservation tender design is circumstance specific.  相似文献   

13.
通过对农村土地内部产权关系进行解构,将承包经营权的权利构成分为承包权和经营权两部分,并界定承包权和经营权的取得和灭失条件.现行的征地补偿政策没有针对征地时涉及户内各成员享有的承包权和经营权情况做出相应的补偿,这种补偿方式存在承包权补偿无依据,经营权补偿无科学的确定方法等问题,因此,科学的征地补偿标准,要对因征地而造成权利人受损的各项权利充分的补偿.通过研究提出了5种对下轮承包权的补偿方法,针对现金补偿的情况,又提出了收益还原法和年产值倍数法两种具体计算方式,对于经营权的补偿采用年产值倍数法,且补偿倍数与剩余承包年限相挂钩.  相似文献   

14.
研究目的:对国有建设用地使用权出让合同的性质争议进行分析认定。研究方法:历史分析、社会实证和法律规范分析。研究结果:从统一行使自然资源所有者权益、建设城乡统一的建设用地市场、国有建设用地使用权出让的本质特征和发展方向、民事和行政法的基本法理4个方面分析,应当将国有建设用地使用权出让合同的性质认定为民事合同。研究结论:基于出让合同的民事合同属性,应当完善出让合同条款、相关法律规则和争议解决方式,达成土地善治,实现国有自然资源产权制度改革的目标。  相似文献   

15.
当前国际上海外耕地投资状况及其评析   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
研究目的:梳理当前国际上海外耕地投资的基本状况,为中国粮食安全与耕地保护战略提供参考。研究方法:文献资料法。研究结果:海外耕地投资的主要驱动因素是保障粮食安全及获得丰厚利润;政府是海外耕地投资的主要推动者;通过政府与政府、私有部门与政府或私有部门与私有部门的模式参与直接投资;投资者以购买、租赁或优惠经营的方式获取耕地。研究结论:当前的海外耕地投资存在投资项目缺乏透明度、土地产权存在争议及合同履行难以保障等问题。  相似文献   

16.
福建猫儿山森林公园森林旅游开发与环境保护的研究   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
在充分调查、发掘猫儿山森林公园旅游资源的基础上 ,本着“以保护为主 ,保护、发展和开发利用相结合”的原则 ,就公园功能区的划分、旅游路线安排、景点、景物、服务设施、道路建设等方面进行规划研究 ,并提出了开发利用与环境保护建议。  相似文献   

17.
研究目的:探究土地承包权调整方式的决策及其影响规律,以期为完善农村土地承包权调整政策提供参考。研究方法:实证研究法,熵值法,层次分析法,分层线性模型。研究结果:采取不同土地承包权调整方式的农户和村集体具体表现不同;土地承包权调整方式决策受到农户和村集体两个层面的共同作用,但两个层面对不同土地承包权调整方式决策的影响程度不同;不同土地承包权调整方式决策的影响因素存在差异。研究结论:土地承包权调整方式适应不同的社会环境,要因村而异,尊重村民意愿;要提高公众参与度,充分了解民意,综合考虑村集体和农户两方面的需求,选择适应本村的土地承包权调整方式。  相似文献   

18.
"三权分置"是农地制度改革的重要成果,为提升农业经营效益提供了制度保障。农业经营的实践形态显示,土地经营权的设立并未提升资本化耕种的农业经营收益,也难以提升村集体范围内农地产权正式转移的水平。农业经营体制在"统"的层面缺乏可操作性的产权制度方案,阻碍了农地产权设置在"分"的层面发挥出高效的制度效能。切实回应农地利用中实际耕者的地权诉求,解决农地细碎化、村集体内土地经营权流转价格过高、土地经营权配置不充分、土地经营权流转后的社会纠纷等问题,需要围绕农地高效利用,在"三权分置"下充分发挥集体土地所有权的管理权能,以集体土地所有权统合土地承包经营权和土地经营权。  相似文献   

19.
矿权招标出让是矿权出让的首选方式 ,在实践中矿权招标出让合同的法律效力问题是解决矿权出让纠纷的关键所在。本文从合同的成立与生效的角度分析矿权招标出让合同的效力 ,并就司法实践中可能遇到的问题提出建议。  相似文献   

20.
矿业权管理是矿产资源行政管理的核心内容。就矿业权本身而言,包含行政关系和民事关系两种法律关系,结合行政合同的行政性和合同性两大特点,可以考虑引入合同管理的方式来进行矿业权管理。用合同的手段规范矿业权管理,不仅有利于繁荣勘查业,进一步规范我国的地质勘查管理工作,而且还会为地勘单位创造公平的竞争环境,有利于建立"统一、竞争、有序、开放"的矿业权市场。  相似文献   

设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号