Managerial Opportunism? Evidence from Directors' and Officers' Insurance Purchases

We analyze a sample of 72 IPO firms that went public between 1992 and 1996 for which we have detailed proprietary information about the amount and cost of D&O liability insurance. If managers of IPO firms are exploiting superior inside information, we hypothesize that the amount of insurance coverage chosen will be related to the post-offering performance of the issuing firm's shares. Consistent with the hypothesis, we find a significant negative relation between the three-year post-IPO stock price performance and the insurance coverage purchased in conjunction with the IPO. One plausible interpretation is that, like insider securities transactions, D&O insurance decisions reveal opportunistic behavior by managers. This provides some motivation to argue that disclosure of the details of D&O insurance decisions, as is required in some other countries, is valuable.     

Corporate governance and firm cash holdings in the US

Using governance metrics based on antitakeover provisions and inside ownership, we find that firms with weaker corporate governance structures actually have smaller cash reserves. When distributing cash to shareholders, firms with weaker governance structures choose to repurchase instead of increasing dividends, avoiding future payout commitments. The combination of excess cash and weak shareholder rights leads to increases in capital expenditures and acquisitions. Firms with low shareholder rights and excess cash have lower profitability and valuations. However, there is only limited evidence that the presence of excess cash alters the overall relation between governance and profitability. In the US, weakly controlled managers choose to spend cash quickly on acquisitions and capital expenditures, rather than hoard it.     

Information asymmetry,information dissemination and the effect of regulation FD on the cost of capital

This paper considers the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) on firms’ information environments and costs of capital. For NYSE/Amex firms we find little evidence of a change in the cost of capital attributable to Regulation FD. For Nasdaq firms we find that Regulation FD increased firms’ costs of capital by 10–19 basis points per annum though the statistical significance of this change is modest for some of our models. We also show substantial cross-sectional variation in the cost of capital changes. We find that cost of capital changes were negatively related to both pre-regulation firm size and PIN. In addition to the findings regarding Regulation FD, this research contributes to a growing literature that documents links between firms’ information environments and their costs of capital.     

Do insiders time management buyouts and freezeouts to buy undervalued targets?

We provide evidence that managers and controlling shareholders time management buyouts (MBOs) and freezeout transactions to take advantage of industry-wide undervaluation. Portfolios of industry peers of MBO and freezeout targets show significant alphas of around 1% per month over the 12-month period following the transaction. These returns are not explained by a battery of risk factors or empirical methodologies, but exhibit significant heterogeneity across deals. Additional tests show that, on average, abnormal returns to industry peers are a reliable proxy for those to the target firm. Further, MBOs and freezeouts are announced during troughs of industry profitability.     

Monitoring: Which institutions matter?

Within a cost–benefit framework, we hypothesize that independent institutions with long-term investments will specialize in monitoring and influencing efforts rather than trading. Other institutions will not monitor. Using acquisition decisions to reveal monitoring, we show that only concentrated holdings by independent long-term institutions are related to post-merger performance. Further, the presence of these institutions makes withdrawal of bad bids more likely. These institutions make long-term portfolio adjustments rather than trading for short-term gain and only sell in advance of very bad outcomes. Examining total institutional holdings or even concentrated holdings by other types of institutions masks important variation in the subset of monitoring institutions.     

Distribution and Market Share

This paper presents findings from a census of more than 79,000 stock-keeping units (SKUs) in 37 consumer packaged goods categories totaling $55 billion in annual revenue. It shows that, in 86 percent of product categories, the relationship between market share and retail distribution is increasing and convex at the SKU level. The degree of convexity is greater in categories with higher revenues and more concentration in market shares. The relationship is also typically convex within leading brands’ SKU portfolios, showing that the “double jeopardy” phenomenon of low share and distribution not only affects small brands competing against market leaders, it also affects low-share SKUs within a category leader's product line. Holdout evidence shows that the distribution/share relationship within a brand's portfolio of existing SKUs usually holds for new SKUs as well. We explain how knowledge of the distribution/share relationship can help to improve a brand's go-to-market decisions for new SKUs.     

Poverty analysis using small area estimation: an application to conservation agriculture in Uganda

This article demonstrates the utility of small area estimation of poverty (SAEp) methods for researchers wishing to conduct a detailed welfare analysis as part of a larger survey of a small geographic area. This study applies SAEp methods as part of an impact assessment of a conservation agriculture production system in Eastern Uganda. Using SAEp, we estimate Foster–Greer–Thorbecke rural poverty indices, estimate the effects of per‐acre farm profit increases to poor households on the indices, and compare the findings to estimates of net returns from a field‐level evaluation of conservation agriculture for maize farmers. Results suggest that increasing the farm profits of the bottom 30% of households by $1.60 per‐acre per‐season would reduce rural poverty incidence by 1 percentage point. Available data on the net returns to conservation agriculture indicate that even these modest increases are achievable for few adopting households.     

Effects of subsidized wheat consumption by state in India

This paper reports the results of a study of the effects of the Indian government's consumer subsidies on wheat demand. Results indicate consumption of subsidized wheat is higher in urban areas than in rural areas. The public distribution of wheat in most states had little effect on demand in the commercial market, which suggests the government is effective in targeting subsidized wheat to poor consumers.