A note on cheap talk and burned money

Austen-Smith and Banks [Cheap talk and burned money, J. Econ. Theory 91(1) (2000) 1-16] study how money burning can expand the set of pure cheap talk equilibria of Crawford and Sobel [Strategic information transmission, Econometrica 50(6) (1982) 1431-1451]. I identify an error in the main Theorem of Austen-Smith and Banks, and provide a variant that preserves some of the important implications. I also prove that cheap talk can be influential with money burning if and only if it can be influential without money burning. This strengthens a result of Austen-Smith and Banks, but uncovers other errors in their analysis. Finally, an open conjecture of theirs is proved correct.     

Herding with collective preferences

This paper studies a simple model of observational learning where agents care not only about the information of others but also about their actions. We show that despite complex strategic considerations that arise from forward-looking incentives, herd behavior can arise in equilibrium. The model encompasses applications such as sequential elections, public good contributions, and leadership charitable giving.     

Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion

This paper reinterprets the evidence on lying or deception presented in Gneezy (Am. Econ. Rev. 95(1):384–394, 2005). We show that Gneezy’s data are consistent with the simple hypothesis that people are one of two kinds: either a person will never lie, or a person will lie whenever she prefers the outcome obtained by lying over the outcome obtained by telling the truth. This implies that so long as lying induces a preferred outcome over truth-telling, a person’s decision of whether to lie may be completely insensitive to other changes in the induced outcomes, such as exactly how much she monetarily gains relative to how much she hurts an anonymous partner. We run new but broadly similar experiments to those of Gneezy in order to test this hypothesis. While we also confirm that there is an aversion to lying in our subject population, our data cannot reject the simple hypothesis described above either.

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Credulity, lies, and costly talk

This paper studies a model of strategic communication by an informed and upwardly biased sender to one or more receivers. Applications include situations in which (i) it is costly for the sender to misrepresent information, due to legal, technological, or moral constraints, or (ii) receivers may be credulous and blindly believe the sender's recommendation. In contrast to the predictions obtained in the benchmark cheap talk model, our model admits a fully separating equilibrium, provided that the state space is unbounded above. The language used in equilibrium is inflated and naive receivers are deceived.     

Post–Uruguay Round price linkages between developed and developing countries: the case of rice and wheat markets

The Uruguay Round Agreement on agriculture attempted to lower distortions in global agricultural markets. However, the significant fall in commodity prices in the late 1990s may have reduced the incentives for both developed and developing countries to better integrate into world markets. This study analyzes price linkages and adjustment between developed and developing countries during the post–Uruguay Round period. Prices of two key commodities, long‐grain rice and medium‐hard wheat, are assembled for major exporters and producers. Results of multivariate cointegration analysis suggest partial market integration between developed and developing countries in the post–Uruguay Round period. Developed countries are found to be price leaders in these two markets, and in most cases, changes in their prices have relatively large impacts on those of the developing countries. Developing countries (e.g., Vietnam and Argentina) have faced considerable price adjustment due to changes in the developed countries' prices.     

Digital based media design: the innovative contribution of design graduates from vocational and higher education sectors

Design is increasingly being recognised as a key source of competitive advantage in the innovation economy of many countries. The key objective of this research was to understand the contribution by design graduates to creative industries innovative activities. Primary research was conducted to understand barriers and limitations of graduate contributions to such activities. The attributes and skills of graduates from the university and Vocational Education and Training sectors were the subject of the study. Two focus groups, one with the education sectors and the other with representatives from design firms, government institutions and design associations were held. Though each group of graduates was praised for having certain skill sets graduates from both sectors were found to be lacking in three key areas: problem solving, communication skills and commercial knowledge. A range of suggestions for systemic improvement were proposed as a result of the study.     

Investment in concealable information by biased experts

We study a persuasion game in which biased—possibly opposed—experts strategically acquire costly information that they can then conceal or reveal. We show that information acquisition decisions are strategic substitutes when experts have linear preferences over a decision maker's beliefs. The logic turns on how each expert expects the decision maker's posterior to be affected by the presence of other experts should he not acquire information that would turn out to be favorable. The decision maker may prefer to solicit advice from just one biased expert even when others—including those biased in the opposite direction (singular)—are available.     

Trade‐offs in the performance of alternative farming systems

Numerous alternative farming systems are proposed as solutions to the sustainability challenges of today's conventional farming systems. In this paper, we review the production, environmental, and socioeconomic performance of three widely discussed and promoted alternative farming systems—organic, smallholder, and urban agriculture. We show that both organic and smallholder agricultures have some benefits, but also entail important trade‐offs; organic has environmental benefits, and also livelihood, health, and nutritional benefits for producers and consumers, but is hampered by lower yields and higher prices. Smaller farms have higher yields and host higher biodiversity, but are hampered by lower incomes to farmers. Urban agriculture can take some pressure off rural landscapes, provide nutritional benefits to the urban poor, and engage urban dwellers in addressing food system challenges, but it simply cannot scale up to be a substantial solution in and of itself. We suggest that instead of focusing on alternative systems, we should identify pathways to sustainable farming for all systems, reforming conventional systems where they perform poorly, and transitioning to alternative systems in contexts where they perform best.     

Going out of the Great Recession? Contrast between the United States and Europe: Proposed work from economic history, 1960–2014

In recent work, the authors have proposed to the United States a model that explains the trend behavior of the rate of profit from share surplus, capital productivity, and the coefficient of financialization. The main results of the explanatory model allow the authors to affirm that with the change of control of Keynesianism to neoliberalism since 1980, there has been a substantial fall in the profit rate to half the values achieved in the years of Keynesian regulation (1945–1973). This significant fall in the level of benefits is due to a substantial fall in capital productivity. The authors are currently working on adapting the explanatory model for the U.S. economy to the main countries of the European Union (Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom, and Spain). The results show that the pattern of behavior of the variables described in the reference country—the world capitalist economic system, the United States—is repeated more or less precisely in the main countries of the European Union; Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom, and Spain.     

A note on undominated Bertrand equilibria

This note shows that the conventional outcome associated with Bertrand competition with homogenous products and different marginal costs is obtained in every Nash equilibrium in which firms use undominated strategies. This strengthens an existence result due to Blume (2003).