排序方式: 共有12条查询结果,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This paper reinterprets the evidence on lying or deception presented in Gneezy (Am. Econ. Rev. 95(1):384–394, 2005). We show that Gneezy’s data are consistent with the simple hypothesis that people are one of two kinds: either a person
will never lie, or a person will lie whenever she prefers the outcome obtained by lying over the outcome obtained by telling
the truth. This implies that so long as lying induces a preferred outcome over truth-telling, a person’s decision of whether
to lie may be completely insensitive to other changes in the induced outcomes, such as exactly how much she monetarily gains
relative to how much she hurts an anonymous partner. We run new but broadly similar experiments to those of Gneezy in order
to test this hypothesis. While we also confirm that there is an aversion to lying in our subject population, our data cannot
reject the simple hypothesis described above either.
Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. 相似文献
Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. 相似文献
2.
We formally incorporate the option to gather information into a game and thus endogenize the information structure. We ask whether models with exogenous information structures are robust with respect to this endogenization. Any Nash equilibrium of the game with information acquisition induces a Nash equilibrium in the corresponding game with an exogenous structure. We provide sufficient conditions on the structure of the game for which this remains true when ‘Nash’ is replaced by ‘sequential’. We characterize the (sequential) Nash equilibria of games with exogenous information structures that can arise as a (sequential) Nash equilibrium of games with endogenous information acquisition. 相似文献
3.
Esther HaukSjaak Hurkens 《Journal of Economic Theory》2002,106(1):66-90
We analyze which normal form solution concepts capture the notion of forward induction, as defined by E. van Damme (1989, J. Econ. Theory48, 476-496) in the class of generic two player normal form games preceded by an outside option. We find that none of the known strategic stability concepts (including Mertens stable sets and hyperstable sets) capture this form of forward induction. On the other hand, we show that the evolutionary concept of EES set (J. Swinkels, 1992, J. Econ. Theory57, 306-332) is always consistent with forward induction. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72. 相似文献
4.
5.
This paper examines the effects of mobile termination rate regulation in asymmetric oligopolies. It extends existing models of asymmetric duopoly and symmetric oligopoly where consumer expectations about market shares are passive. First, demand and product differentiation parameters are calibrated using detailed data from the Spanish market from 2010. Next, equilibrium outcomes and welfare effects under alternative scenarios of future termination rates are predicted. Lowering termination rates typically lowers profits of all networks and improves consumer and total surplus. 相似文献
6.
Secret information acquisition in Cournot markets 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Summary. Two-stage game models of information acquisition in stochastic oligopolies require the assumption that firms observe the
precision of information chosen by their competitors before determining quantities. This paper analyzes secret information
acquisition as a one-stage game. Relative to the two-stage game firms are shown to acquire less information. Policy implications
based on the two-stage game yield, therefore, too high taxes or too low subsidies for research activities. For the case of
heterogeneous duopoly we briefly discuss comparative statics results.
Received: August 9, 1999; revised version: May 31, 2000 相似文献
7.
Endogenous price leadership 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
We consider a linear price setting duopoly game with differentiated products and determine endogenously which of the players will lead and which one will follow. While the follower role is most attractive for each firm, we show that waiting is more risky for the low cost firm so that, consequently, risk dominance considerations, as in Harsanyi and Selten (A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1988), allow the conclusion that only the high cost firm will choose to wait. Hence, the low cost firm will emerge as the endogenous price leader. 相似文献
8.
This paper investigates which equilibria of a game are still viable when players have the opportunity to commit themselves. To that end we study a model of endogenous timing in which players face the trade-off between committing early and moving late. It is shown that mixed (resp. pure) equilibria of the original game are subgame perfect (resp. persistent) in the timing game only when no player has an incentive to move first. Consequently, mixed equilibria are viable only if no player has an incentive to move first. One needs strong evolutionary solution concepts to draw that conclusion for pure equilibria.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C72. 相似文献
9.
Games with Imperfectly Observable Commitment 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
[1]claims that, in models of commitment, “the first-mover advantage is eliminated when there is aslightamount of noise associated with the observation of the first-mover's selection.” We show that the validity of this claim depends crucially on the restriction to pure strategy equilibria. The game analyzed by Bagwell always has a mixed equilibrium that is close to the Stackelberg equilibrium when the noise is small. Furthermore, an equilibrium selection theory that combines elements from the theory of[7]with elements from the theory of [6], actually selects this “noisy Stackelberg equilibrium.”Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C72. 相似文献
10.
Dr. Bart Nooteboom Roy Thurik Sjaak Vollebregt 《International Journal of Research in Marketing》1986,3(4)
The paper considers general trends of structural change in terms of averages in the general food trade. It gives an international comparison of trends concerning average shop size, number of shops per 1,000 inhabitants, the share of independents and concentration. On the basis of the evidence, three stages are proposed for the development of retail structure. 相似文献