On the Coexistence of Banks and Markets*

We examine the coexistence of banks and financial markets by studying a credit market where the qualities of investment projects are not observable and the investment decisions of entrepreneurs are not contractible. Standard banks can alleviate moral‐hazard problems, while financial markets operated by investment banks can alleviate adverse‐selection problems. In competition, standard banks are forced to increase repayments, since financial markets can attract the highest‐quality borrowers. This, in turn, increases the share of shirkers and may make lending unprofitable for standard banks. The coexistence of financial markets and standard banks is socially inefficient. The same inefficiency may occur with the entrance of sophisticated banks, operating with a combination of rating and ongoing monitoring technologies.     

Competitive risk sharing contracts with one-sided commitment

This paper analyzes dynamic equilibrium risk sharing contracts between profit-maximizing intermediaries and a large pool of ex ante identical agents that face idiosyncratic income uncertainty that makes them heterogeneous ex post. In any given period, after having observed her income, the agent can walk away from the contract, while the intermediary cannot, i.e. there is one-sided commitment. We consider the extreme scenario that the agents face no costs to walking away, and can sign up with any competing intermediary without any reputational losses. We demonstrate that not only autarky, but also partial and full insurance can obtain, depending on the relative patience of agents and financial intermediaries. Insurance can be provided because in an equilibrium contract an up-front payment effectively locks in the agent with an intermediary. We then show that our contract economy is equivalent to a consumption-savings economy with one-period Arrow securities and a short-sale constraint, similar to Bulow and Rogoff [1989. Sovereign debt: is to forgive to forget? American Economic Review 79, 43-50]. From this equivalence and our characterization of dynamic contracts it immediately follows that without cost of switching financial intermediaries debt contracts are not sustainable, even though a risk allocation superior to autarky can be achieved.     

Agents as Empirical Macroeconomists: Thomas J. Sargent’s Contribution to Economics*

Thomas J. Sargent has fundamentally changed and, in the words of Art Rolnick, who interviewed him in 2010, “irrevocably transformed” the field of macroeconomics—whether as sole author, as co‐author with collaborators, as an author influenced by others, or as a teacher of the profession, influencing others. This paper is about his contribution to our field. The Nobel Memorial prize to Thomas J. Sargent and Christopher A. Sims has been awarded for the “empirical research on cause and effect in the macroeconomy” or, more broadly, for macroeconometrics. One often likes to distinguish between theorists, on the one hand, and empiricists and econometricians, on the other. Thomas J. Sargent holds a unique position in between. A key theme in a large part of his work has been to put the agents in his model on equal footing with the econometrician who is observing data from the model (i.e., to assume that agents are themselves empirical macroeconomists or macroeconometricians). In this paper, I use this theme to examine his work and his contributions to the study of economics.     

An Analysis of the Stability and Growth Pact

We use a stylised model to analyse the Stability and Growth Pact for countries that have formed the European Monetary Union (EMU). In our model, shortsighted governments fail to internalise the consequences of their debt policies for the common inflation rate fully. Therefore, while governments have no incentive to sign a stability pact in the absence of a monetary union, they do so with monetary union to restrain this externality. With uncertainty, a monetary union combined with an appropriately designed pact will be strictly preferred to autonomy. With differences in initial conditions, conflicts of interest arise. We study the Nash bargaining solution.     

A law of large numbers for large economies

Summary LetX(i),i[0; 1] be a collection of identically distributed and pairwise uncorrelated random variables with common finite mean and variance ². This paper shows the law of large numbers, i.e. the fact that ₀ ¹ X(i)di=. It does so by interpreting the integral as a Pettis-integral. Studying Riemann sums, the paper first provides a simple proof involving no more than the calculation of variances, and demonstrates, that the measurability problem pointed out by Judd (1985) is avoided by requiring convergence in mean square rather than convergence almost everywhere. We raise the issue of when a random continuum economy is a good abstraction for a large finite economy and give an example in which it is not.I am indebted to Hugo Hopenhayn. Furthermore I would like to thank Dilip Abreu, Glenn Donaldson, Ed Green, Ramon Marimon, Nabil Al-Najjar, Victor Rios-Rull, Timothy van Zandt and the editor for useful comments. The first version of this paper was written in 1987.     

The choice of technique in a batch production industry: Some lessons from a study of bolt and nut manufacture

In a batch industry the characteristics of an establishment's output (scale, batch size, product dimensions) are critical determinants of the least-cost technique. In bolt and nut manufacture the least-cost technique draws selectively on different technologies for different parts of the product mix. Sensitivity analysis suggests that factor prices alone are relatively unimportant in determining the least-cost solution. Three technologies widely used in engineering industries - machining, hot forging and cold forming - are considered at four scales of output for a specified product mix comprising bolts and nuts conforming to an international standard. (For each technology a range of different machines is included.)     

Should We Be Afraid of Friedman's Rule?

Should one think of zero nominal interest rates as an undesirable liquidity trap or as the desirable Friedman rule? I use three different frameworks to discuss this issue. First, I restate H. L. Cole and N. Kocherlakota's (1998, Fed. Res. Bank Minn. Quart. Rev., Spring, 2–10) analysis of Friedman's rule: short run increases in the money stock—whether through issuing spending coupons, open market operations, or foreign exchange intervention—change nothing as long as the money stock shrinks in the long run. Second, two simple Keynesian models of the inflationary process with a zero lower bound on nomianl interest rates imply either that deflationary spirals should be common or that a policy close to the Friedman rule and thus some deflation is optimal. Finally, a formal baby-sitting coop model implies multiple equilibria, but does not support the injection of liquidity to restore the good equilibrium, in contrast to P. Krugman (1998, Slate, August 13). J. Japan. Int. Econ., December 2000, 14(4), pp. 261–303. CenER, Tilburg University; Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany; and CEPR Copyright 2000 Academic Press.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E31, E41, E50, E51, E52.     

Industrial cooperation as an instrument of development policy

The spectacular opening of the People’s Republic of China to the capitalist world market and the flourishing state of East-West cooperation—up to the Afghanistan crisis—show that cooperation with more advanced industrial countries in selected fields is seen as a promising means of speeding industrial progress. Essential for the industrialization and modernization of less developed economies are—apart from convertible finance—the transfer and diffusion of technical and organizational know-how from countries in a more advanced state of development. The opportunities for industrial interstate and interenterprise cooperation between partners from developing and industrialized countries are analysed in the following article.     

A model of a systemic bank run

This paper provides a model of the view that the 2008 financial crisis is reminiscent of a bank run, focussing on six stylized key features. In particular, core financial institutions have invested their funds in asset-backed securities rather than committed to long-term projects: in distress, these can potentially be sold to a large pool of outside investors at steep discounts. I consider two different motives for outside investors and their interaction with banks trading asset-backed securities: uncertainty aversion versus adverse selection. I shall argue that the version with uncertainty averse investors is more consistent with the stylized facts than the adverse selection perspective: in the former, the crisis deepens, the larger the market share of distressed core banks, while a run becomes less likely instead as a result in the adverse selection version. Therefore, the outright purchase of troubled assets by the government at prices above current market prices may both alleviate the financial crises as well as provide tax payers with returns above those for safe securities.