SMEs and public procurement policy

In this paper, we characterize an optimal procurement policy as a mechanism design problem when an allotment of the contract is available, i.e., when a government faces both SMEs and large firms for carrying out a heterogeneously divisible project. Our model allows us to analyze all procurement policies (set-asides, favoritism, non-discriminatory rules), taking into account both efficiency and distributive arguments and derive a normative framework. We show that set-asides are not generally optimal, whatever the industrial preferences of the government are, while the optimal preferential treatments of firms implies complex non-linear rules. We prove that the optimal policy can be implemented using a modified Vickrey-type auction. We also consider that the firms can reduce their cost by a non observable effort, and exhibit the specific impact of cost reduction incentives on the optimal policies.Received: 24 September 2001, JEL Classification: D44Pierre-HenriMorand : I am grateful to the anonymous referees for comments. The usualdisclaimer applies.     

Determinants of Urban Vacant Land

It is a planners’ common argument that one of the main sources of vacant land is developers’ speculation. Consequently, in order to reduce vacant land, it is also a common policy to charge extra taxes to this kind of lots as a way to force development. Using a rich data base from Santiago, Chile, this paper investigates on the determinants of urban vacant land. We find that amongst the most important elements driving unused sites in Santiago are public regulations. Hence, practitioners must be aware about this issue before implement a policy to reduce vacant land because it could have the opposite result.     

First-price sealed-bid auctions when bidders exhibit different attitudes toward risk

When bidders have different risk aversion levels, we determine in a first-price auction, the asymmetric equilibrium strategies. We analyze the impact of asymmetric risk aversion levels on bidders’ markups and on the expected revenue and allocative efficiency of the auction.     

“Equality Theory” as a Counterbalance to Equity Theory in Human Resource Management

This conceptual paper revisits the concept of equality as a base of distributive justice and contends that it is underspecified, both theoretically and in terms of its ethical and pragmatic application to human resource management (HRM) within organizations. Prior organizational literature focuses primarily upon distributive equality of remunerative outcomes within small groups and implicitly employs an equity-based conception of inputs to define equality. In contrast, through exposition of the philosophical roots of equality principles, we reconceptualize inputs as de facto equal and consider the systemic application of distributive equality in the form of status leveling practices. Ethical ramifications of distributive equality so viewed are explored. We conclude by arguing that, to implicitly insert a stronger ethics focus into the study and practice of HRM, perhaps there should be ??equality theory?? competing with equity theory for recognition in managerial and scholarly discourse.     

Politeness and the clash of interaction orders in cross‐cultural communication

This conceptual article suggests that crosscultural variation in politeness behaviors, that is, differential culture‐specific norms for treatment of face, comprises an important dimension of crosscultural organizational behavior. The gentle and respectful handling of others' face is a vital social behavior in any cultural context. However, research shows that cultures have evolved differential norms for treating face. These differential norms are at the heart of many crosscultural communication problems. This article provides a conceptual framework explicating the above, reviews empirical literature on crosscultural variation of politeness norms, and suggests important implications for organizational theorists and for managers interested in crosscultural communication. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Endogenous Fertility, Income Distribution, and Growth

This article analyzes the interaction between growth and fertility via income distribution in a model in which fertility decisions are motivated by old-age support. It provides an explanation of the demographic transition of an economy from a stage of increasing fertility and low growth to a stage of low fertility, high human capital investments, and high growth.     

The public release of information in first-price sealed-bid auctions

We determine the conditions under which the seller in a first-price sealed-bid auction has an incentive to reveal his private information about the mean of bidders’ valuations in order to increase his expected revenue. With risk-neutral bidders, we show that the seller’s expected revenue is higher when information is revealed. However, when bidders are risk-averse, this result does not necessarily hold; it depends on the bidders’ risk-aversion level and on the number of bidders.