Integration managers: special leaders for special times

Although the integration of an acquired company with the parent organization is a delicate and complicated process, traditionally no one has ever been responsible for that process--for charting how the two companies will combine their operations, for seeing to it that the integration project meets its deadlines and performance targets, and for educating the new people about the parent company and vice versa. Some enlightened companies have recognized this gap and have appointed a guide--the integration manager--to shepherd everyone through the rocky territory that two organizations must cross before they can function effectively together. The authors have interviewed a number of these leaders in depth, as well as some of the people with whom they've worked. They've determined that integration managers help the merger process in four principal ways: they speed it up, create a structure for it, forge social connections between the two organizations, and help engineer short-term successes. In this article, the authors detail five acquisitions--at TI, General Cable, Meritor Automotive, Lucent, and Johnson & Johnson--and discuss the role that integration managers played in each. They describe exactly what sort of person should do this job. The integration manager must be able to jump into complex situations quickly, relate to many levels of authority smoothly, and bridge gaps in culture and perception. The ever-changing organizations of the Internet age will need leaders with similar skills. In fact, the authors contend, the integration manager should be considered a prototype for the leader of the future.     

A TEST OF EMPLOYER DISCRIMINATION IN THE NBA

This paper presents a test of an important implication of Becker's theory of employer discrimination: when institutional change enhances labor mobility, employer discrimination falls because it becomes more costly for employers to indulge tastes for discrimination. The test case is the National Basketball Association (NBA). This paper specifically addresses the following question about the NBA: why did black/white player salary differentials vanish by the early 1990s? Previous studies claim that NBA wage gaps in the 1980s are attributable to customer discrimination and monopsonistic wage discrimination. This study argues that employer discrimination was an important source of those gaps and that one reason they vanished was because reduced monopsony power eradicated employer discrimination. Monopsony power fell because the 1988 NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement and the entry of four new teams in the league enhanced player mobility and increased the amount of labor market competition. Using data for the 1985-86 and 1990-91 seasons, employer discrimination was proxied by the race of the team's general manager. Empirical results strongly suggest that a major reason the NBA wage gap vanished in the later period was because of a reduction in employers' ability to discriminate. This is in contrast to earlier literature on the NBA, which has tended to emphasize the role of customer discrimination. (JEL J71)     

INTER-COUNTRY AND INTERREGIONAL COMPARISONS OF INEQUALITY AND POVERTY

Review of Smeeding, T., O'Higgins, M., and Rainwater, L. (Ed.), Poverty, Inequality and Income Distribution in Comparative Perspective
Borooah, V. K., McGregor, P. P. L., and McKee, P. M., Regional Income Inequality und Poverty in the United Kingdom     

Interindustry Wage Differentials and Unobserved Ability: Siblings Evidence from Five Countries

We examine the role of unobserved ability in explaining interindustry wage differentials. By using data on brothers, we account for unmeasured abilities shared by siblings. The data came from four Nordic countries and the United States. In the Nordic countries, only a moderate proportion of the variability in industry wages can be attributed to unobserved ability, while unmeasured factors explain as much as half of the U.S. industry‐wage variation. Accounting for such differences, we show that the U.S. interindustry wage dispersion is similar with that in the Nordic countries.     

The Roles of Corporate Governance in Bank Failures during the Recent Financial Crisis

We analyze the roles of bank ownership, management, and compensation structures in bank failures during the recent financial crisis. Our results suggest that failures are strongly influenced by ownership structure: high shareholdings of lower‐level management and non‐chief executive officer (non‐CEO) higher‐level management increase failure risk significantly. In contrast, shareholdings of banks’ CEOs do not have a direct impact on bank failure. These findings suggest that high stakes in the bank induce non‐CEO managers to take high risks due to moral hazard incentives, which may result in bank failure. We identify tail risk in noninterest income as a primary risk‐taking channel of lower‐level managers.     

Making the deal real: how GE Capital integrates acquisitions

Most companies view acquisitions and mergers as onetime events managed with heroic effort--anxiety-producing experiences that often result in lost jobs, restructured responsibilities, derailed careers, and diminished power. Little wonder, then, that most managers think about how to get them over with--not how to do them better. But even as the number of mergers and acquisitions rises in the United States, studies show the performance of the resulting companies falls below industry averages more often than not. To improve these statistics, executives need to view acquisition integration as a manageable process, not a unique event. One company that has done exactly that is GE Capital Services, which has assimilated more than 100 acquisitions in the past five years alone and, in the process, has developed a formal model for melding new acquisitions into the corporate fold. Drawing on their experiences working with the company to develop the model, consultants Ron Ashkenas and Suzanne Francis, together with GE Capital's Lawrence DeMonaco, offer four lessons from the company's successful run. First, begin the integration process before the deal is signed. Second, dedicate a full-time individual to managing the integration process. Third, implement any necessary restructuring sooner rather than later. And fourth, integrate not only the business operations but also the corporate cultures. These guidelines won't erase all of the discomfort that accompanies many mergers, but they can make the process more transparent and predictable for those involved.     

Why good projects fail anyway

Big projects fail at an astonishing rate--more than half the time, by some estimates. It's not hard to understand why. Complicated long-term projects are customarily developed by a series of teams working along parallel tracks. If managers fail to anticipate everything that might fall through the cracks, those tracks will not converge successfully at the end to reach the goal. Take a companywide CRM project. Traditionally, one team might analyze customers, another select the software, a third develop training programs, and so forth. When the project's finally complete, though, it may turn out that the salespeople won't enter in the requisite data because they don't understand why they need to. This very problem has, in fact, derailed many CRM programs at major organizations. There is a way to uncover unanticipated problems while the project is still in development. The key is to inject into the overall plan a series of miniprojects, or "rapid-results initiatives," which each have as their goal a miniature version of the overall goal. In the CRM project, a single team might be charged with increasing the revenues of one sales group in one region by 25% within four months. To reach that goal, team members would have to draw on the work of all the parallel teams. But in just four months, they would discover the salespeople's resistance and probably other unforeseen issues, such as, perhaps, the need to divvy up commissions for joint-selling efforts. The World Bank has used rapid-results initiatives to great effect to keep a sweeping 16-year project on track and deliver visible results years ahead of schedule. In taking an in-depth look at this project, and others, the authors show why this approach is so effective and how the initiatives are managed in conjunction with more traditional project activities.     

Information Revelation in Decentralized Markets

How does information get revealed in decentralized markets? We test several hypotheses inspired by recent dealer‐network theory. To do so, we construct an empirical map of information revelation where two dealers are connected based on the synchronicity of their quote changes. The tests, based on the euro to Swiss franc spot rate (EUR/CHF) quote data including the 2015 crash, largely support theory: strongly connected (i.e., central) dealers are more informed. Connections are weaker when there is less to be learned. The crash serves to identify how a network forms when dealers are transitioned from no‐learning to learning, that is, from a fixed to a floating rate.