The effect of corruption on the manufacturing sector in India

This article investigates the effects of corruption on the performance of the manufacturing sector at the state level in India. We employ conviction rates of corruption-related cases as an instrument for the extent of corruption, address the underreporting problem, and examine the impact of corruption on the gross value added per worker, total factor productivity, and capital-labor ratio of three-digit manufacturing industries in each state. Our estimation results show that corruption reduces gross value added per worker and total factor productivity. Furthermore, we show that the adverse effects of corruption are more salient in industries with smaller average firm size.     

Transboundary pollution,tax competition and the efficiency of uncoordinated environmental regulation

Under capital tax competition, surprisingly, Ogawa and Wildasin (2009) find that uncoordinated policymaking leads to a first‐best outcome even in the presence of transboundary pollution. However, I show that if the level of environmental regulation is endogenized, the regulation level becomes too loose compared with the optimum (“race to the bottom”). Thus, despite the efficiency result of Ogawa and Wildasin (2009), efforts to achieve international environmental policy coordination are needed. I then examine the dependence of this result on the level of decisive voter's capital endowment. The regulation is inefficiently loose in many cases, but it can be too strict if the decisive voter's capital endowment is above the average. Thus, the possibility of “race to the top” cannot be eliminated. The inefficiency result does not generally depend on the timing of policymaking, although the efficiency may be restored in the limit case where the decisive voter has no capital at all.     

Arthur L. Norberg. Computers and Commerce: A Study of Technology and Management at Eckert-Mauchly Computer Company, Engineering Research Associates, and Remington Rand, 1946-1957. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005. x + 347 pp. ISBN 0-262-14090-X, $40.00 (cloth).

Arthur Norberg’s Computers and Commerce is a much-neededstudy of the technical and business history of the Eckert-MauchlyComputer Corporation (EMCC) and Engineering Research Associates(ERA). Although there have been many historical studies aboutIBM, there have been relatively few accounts describing thefirm’s primary competitors or of the early formation ofthe industry. Norberg’s study offers valuable insightsinto the latter by providing a detailed history of the technicaldecisions and financial strategies of the two entrepreneurialfirms that     

Equally-distributed equivalent utility,ex post egalitarianism and utilitarianism

We provide an axiomatization of expected equally-distributed equivalent-utility social welfare functions in the context of Harsanyi?s impartial observer theorem. For this family of social welfare functions, we show what additional axiom is necessary and sufficient for the observer to exhibit aversion to ex post inequality. We also relate this axiomatization to our axiomatization in a companion paper of generalized utilitarian social welfare functions. Given certain richness assumptions, the only social welfare functions that belong to both families are the utilitarian.     

Market competition,differences in technology,and productivity improvement: An empirical analysis based on Japanese manufacturing firm data

In this paper we examine empirically the effect of market competition on firm productivity improvements using data drawn from the Japanese manufacturing sector. We find that a non-linear relationship between competition and productivity growth induced by R&D activity as suggested by Aghion et al. (2005) holds for Japanese manufacturing firms. We also show that greater market competition widens technology differences across firms, and firms facing more intense competition are more productive than other firms. Our empirical results imply that productivity improvement through R&D activity depends on not only a competitive environment but also technological differences between firms.     

Who has benefited from the health services system for the elderly in Japan?

This paper examines the demand and supply of medical services for the elderly in the health services system characterized by per-month fixed copayment and selective capitation fee scheme for outpatients with chronic diseases. The results indicate that the beneficiary, in particular the household dependent, visits a physician more frequently because the actual copayment decreases for the household dependent, but is nearly the same for the head of the household. Physicians, however, provide more services to the beneficiary partly because of the lowered copayment and partly because of the capitation fee scheme, which they will select instead of the fee-for-service scheme only when capitation is more profitable than Fee-for-Service. As a result, physicians as well as the insured benefit from the health services system.     

JOINT BIDDING,GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC PROCUREMENT COSTS:A CASE OF ROAD PROJECTS*

ABSTRACT *** : To utilize public resources efficiently, it is important to take advantage of competition in public procurement auctions to the maximum extent. Joint bidding is a common practice that potentially facilitates competition. By pooling financial and experiential resources, more firms are expected to enter the market, but it will also directly reduce competition if more than one bidder who is solely qualified makes a coalition. In theory joint bidding may or may not be beneficial to auctioneers, depending on the model. The paper empirically examines the impacts of joint bidding on firms' entry as well as bidding behaviour, using data on public road projects in developing countries. It shows that coalitional bids, in particular by local firms, would be competitive, but foreign joint ventures would undermine competition. It is also found that good governance can encourage firms' entry into the tendering and facilitate joint bidding practices.     

Multidimensionality and Renegotiation: Evidence from Transport-Sector Public-Private-Partnership Transactions in Latin America

Multidimensional auctions are a natural, practical solution when governments pursue more than one objective in their public-private-partnership transactions. However, multi-criteria auctions seem difficult to implement and vulnerable to corruption and opportunistic behavior of both parties involved. Using data from road and railway concessions in Latin America, the paper examines the probability of renegotiation in connection with the selected award criteria. It shows that auctioneers tend to adopt the multidimensional format when the need for social considerations, such as alleviation of unemployment, is high. But more renegotiations would likely happen when the multidimensional format is used. Good governance, particularly regulatory quality and anti-corruption policies, can mitigate the renegotiation problem.     

Potential Welfare Criteria and the Choice of Large Projects

This note compares project evaluation rules for large projects by Negishi (1962) and Harris (1978) and points out that the extensions by Harris depend on his implicit weakening of the criterion for potential welfare improvement compared with Negishi's original welfare criterion.
JEL Classification Number: D61.