Transboundary pollution,tax competition and the efficiency of uncoordinated environmental regulation

Under capital tax competition, surprisingly, Ogawa and Wildasin (2009) find that uncoordinated policymaking leads to a first‐best outcome even in the presence of transboundary pollution. However, I show that if the level of environmental regulation is endogenized, the regulation level becomes too loose compared with the optimum (“race to the bottom”). Thus, despite the efficiency result of Ogawa and Wildasin (2009), efforts to achieve international environmental policy coordination are needed. I then examine the dependence of this result on the level of decisive voter's capital endowment. The regulation is inefficiently loose in many cases, but it can be too strict if the decisive voter's capital endowment is above the average. Thus, the possibility of “race to the top” cannot be eliminated. The inefficiency result does not generally depend on the timing of policymaking, although the efficiency may be restored in the limit case where the decisive voter has no capital at all.     

Dynamic managerial capabilities: Scale development and validation

Studies on dynamic managerial capabilities still have a rather theoretical nature, and there is great difficulty in finding a valid, reliable instrument to measure this construct. The present study contributes to solving this problem: It aims to develop and validate a scale to measure dynamic managerial capabilities. In this investigation, we develop a scale for three factors related to dynamic managerial capabilities: human capital, managerial cognition (already described in the literature), and relationship networks. The prominent finding in this research is the factor that is referred to here as relationship networks.     

Do vertical spillovers differ by investors’ productivity? Theory and evidence from Vietnam

Developing countries are eager to host foreign direct investment to receive positive technology spillovers to their local firms. However, what types of foreign firms are desirable for the host country to achieve spillovers best? We address this question using firm‐level panel data from Vietnam to investigate whether foreign Asian investors in downstream sectors with different productivity affect the productivity of local Vietnamese firms in upstream sectors differently. Using endogenous structural breaks, we divide Asian investors into low‐, middle‐, and high‐productivity groups. The results suggest that the presence of the middle group has the strongest positive spillover effect. The differential spillover effects can be explained by a simple model with vertical linkages and productivity‐enhancing investment by local suppliers. The theoretical mechanism is also empirically confirmed.     

A One-Factor Conditionally Linear Commodity Pricing Model under Partial Information

A one-factor asset pricing model with an Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process as its state variable is studied under partial information: the mean-reverting level and the mean-reverting speed parameters are modeled as hidden/unobservable stochastic variables. No-arbitrage pricing formulas for derivative securities written on a liquid asset and exponential utility indifference pricing formulas for derivative securities written on an illiquid asset are presented. Moreover, a conditionally linear filtering result is introduced to compute the pricing/hedging formulas and the Bayesian estimators of the hidden variables.     

Arthur L. Norberg. Computers and Commerce: A Study of Technology and Management at Eckert-Mauchly Computer Company, Engineering Research Associates, and Remington Rand, 1946-1957. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005. x + 347 pp. ISBN 0-262-14090-X, $40.00 (cloth).

Arthur Norberg’s Computers and Commerce is a much-neededstudy of the technical and business history of the Eckert-MauchlyComputer Corporation (EMCC) and Engineering Research Associates(ERA). Although there have been many historical studies aboutIBM, there have been relatively few accounts describing thefirm’s primary competitors or of the early formation ofthe industry. Norberg’s study offers valuable insightsinto the latter by providing a detailed history of the technicaldecisions and financial strategies of the two entrepreneurialfirms that     

Jean Tirole,Nobel Prize Winner

The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for 2014 to Jean Tirole, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), Toulouse, France ‘for his analysis of market power and regulation’. What commonly characterizes Jean Tirole's work is a combination of rigorous scientific analysis of markets and provision of useful scientific insights and policy guidance for regulation and competition policy in such markets. This paper focuses on two of Tirole's papers, both co-written with Jean-Charles Rochet, which probably best exemplify his policy-oriented research. It summarizes and then explains how the theory that these papers develop led to the implementation of a new policy regulating the payment card industry in the European Union.     

The effect of corruption on the manufacturing sector in India

This article investigates the effects of corruption on the performance of the manufacturing sector at the state level in India. We employ conviction rates of corruption-related cases as an instrument for the extent of corruption, address the underreporting problem, and examine the impact of corruption on the gross value added per worker, total factor productivity, and capital-labor ratio of three-digit manufacturing industries in each state. Our estimation results show that corruption reduces gross value added per worker and total factor productivity. Furthermore, we show that the adverse effects of corruption are more salient in industries with smaller average firm size.     

Who has benefited from the health services system for the elderly in Japan?

This paper examines the demand and supply of medical services for the elderly in the health services system characterized by per-month fixed copayment and selective capitation fee scheme for outpatients with chronic diseases. The results indicate that the beneficiary, in particular the household dependent, visits a physician more frequently because the actual copayment decreases for the household dependent, but is nearly the same for the head of the household. Physicians, however, provide more services to the beneficiary partly because of the lowered copayment and partly because of the capitation fee scheme, which they will select instead of the fee-for-service scheme only when capitation is more profitable than Fee-for-Service. As a result, physicians as well as the insured benefit from the health services system.     

The End of Lifetime Employment in Japan?: Evidence from National Surveys and Field Research

Using both quantitative data from national surveys and qualitative data from our recent field research, this paper provides evidence on the recent transformation of Japan's celebrated practice of lifetime employment (or implicit long-term employment contracts for the regular workforce). Overall, contrary to the popular rhetoric of the end of lifetime employment, evidence points to the enduring nature of this practice in Japan. Specifically, we find little evidence for any major decline in the job retention rates of Japanese employees from the period prior to the burst of the bubble economy in the late 1980s to the post-bubble period. In general, our field research corroborates the main finding from the job retention rates by describing vividly that large firms in Japan have been trying to accomplish their restructuring and downsizing targets by relying heavily on transfers of their employees to their subsidiaries and related firms and hiring cuts, thus avoiding layoffs. Last, the burden of downsizing appears to fall disproportionately on young workers and middle-age workers with shorter tenure. J. Japan. Int. Econ., December 2001, 15(4), pp. 489–514. Department of Economics, Colgate University, Hamilton, New York 13346; Center on Japanese Economy and Business, Columbia Business School, New York; and TCER. © 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: J63, J64, J41, O53.