Big Five Audits and Accounting Fraud*

We examine the association between Big Five audits and the incidence of accounting frauds allegedly committed by U.S. public companies between 1981 and 2001. Many commentators argue that the prominent financial reporting failures that led to major corporate governance reforms cast serious doubt on whether the large public accounting firms continue to supply relatively high‐quality audits, especially in recent years. However, in unmatched and matched samples, we provide strong, robust evidence that fraudulent financial reporting becomes less likely with the presence of a Big Five auditor. Importantly, time‐series tests suggest that the Big Five are consistently associated with a lower incidence of fraudulent accounting, including in the last five years of our sample period when the number of frauds soared. Moreover, we find evidence implying that these relations are causal rather than an artifact of endogeneity in auditor choice.     

Opening Up the “Black Box” of Audit Firms: The Effects of Audit Partner Ownership on Audit Adjustments

Audit firms need to provide high-quality audits but they also need to please their clients. We argue that these conflicting incentives become manifest when comparing the incentive effects of equity ownership on engagement quality (EQ) reviewers and audit engagement partners. We predict that EQ reviewers monitor audit quality more closely when they hold greater ownership. In contrast, we expect that equity ownership has conflicting effects on the incentives of engagement partners because they need to please their clients as well as provide high-quality audits. Consistent with these predictions, we find that the associations between audit adjustments and partner equity ownership are (1) significantly positive for EQ reviewers, (2) significantly negative or insignificant for audit engagement partners, and (3) significantly more positive for EQ reviewers than engagement partners. Our findings suggest that larger ownership stakes motivate EQ reviewers to monitor audit quality more closely, whereas larger ownership stakes do not motivate engagement partners to deliver higher quality audits.     

The Probability of Leaving Unemployment: The Influence of Duration,Destination and Demographics*

This paper examines the influences of a number of demographic characteristics and the duration of unemployment on the probability of leaving unemployment. This probability is found to decrease as the duration of unemployment increases, with married females having the highest probability of exit. Various measures of average completed duration suggest that the longest spells of unemployment are incurred by older males. These appear to be longest for males withdrawing from the labour market. The relationship between the duration of unemployment and the probability of exit is important for labour market policy. Some relevant considerations are also explored in the paper.     

Strategies for Modelling Nonlinear Time-Series Relationships*

Building models of nonlinear relationships are inherently more difficult than linear ones There are more possibilities, many more parameters and thus more mistakes can be made. It is suggested that a strategy be applied when attempting such modelling involving testing for linearity, considering just a few model types of parsimonious form and then performing post-sample evaluation of the resulting models compared to a linear one. The strategy proposed is a ‘simple-to-general’ one and the application of a heteroskedasticity correction is not recommended     

Audits des Cinq Grands et fraude comptable

Les auteurs examinent le lien entre les audits des Cinq Grands et l’incidence des fraudes comptables présumées de sociétés ouvertes des États‐Unis entre 1981 et 2001. Selon bon nombre de commentateurs, les défaillances retentissantes de l’information financière qui ont menéà des réformes radicales de la gouvernance d’entreprise soulèvent de sérieux doutes quant à savoir si les grands cabinets d’expertise comptable continuent d’offrir des audits d’une qualité relativement élevée, en particulier depuis quelques années. Toutefois, dans des échantillons non appariés et appariés, les auteurs relèvent des données solides et robustes permettant de conclure que la publication d’information financière frauduleuse est moins probable en la présence d’un auditeur des Cinq Grands. Fait important, les tests des séries chronologiques laissent supposer qu’il existe un lien caractérisé entre les Cinq Grands et l’incidence plus faible de la fraude comptable, y compris dans les cinq dernières années de la période d’échantillonnage, au cours desquelles le nombre de fraudes a monté en flèche. De plus, les auteurs recueillent des preuves que ce lien est de nature causale et n’est pas un simple facteur endogène dans le choix de l’auditeur.     

Management Ownership and Audit Firm Size*

The finance literature identifies two agency problems between managers and outside shareholders. First, there is a divergence‐of‐interests problem as management ownership falls. Second, there is an offsetting entrenchment problem when management ownership increases within intermediate regions of ownership. Agency problems are mitigated through contracting, but contracts are often based on accounting numbers prepared by management. Because accounting numbers must be reliable for contracts to be enforced, agency theory predicts a demand for higher‐quality auditors when agency problems are more severe. However, extant studies find no significant or robust relation between management ownership and audit firm size. In contrast to extant research, this study samples unlisted companies rather than listed companies for two reasons. First, the monitoring value of auditing may be higher in unlisted companies because they are less vulnerable to takeover and they are required to disclose much less nonaccounting information to shareholders. Second, unlisted companies have greater variation in management ownership, which permits more powerful tests of the demand for auditing as ownership varies between 0 percent and 100 percent. Consistent with a divergence‐of‐interests effect, the association between management ownership and audit firm size is found to be significantly negative within low and high regions of management ownership. The association is flatter and slightly positive within intermediate regions of management ownership, suggesting the existence of an opposite entrenchment effect. The negative association and the nonlinearity is consistent with the finance literature and with the predictions of agency theory.