Entrepreneurship through Bricolage: a study of displaced entrepreneurs at times of war and conflict

ABSTRACT

War and conflict brings about adverse changes for those who are displaced. How do entrepreneurial individuals respond to such adversity to either set-up, or continue with their existing entrepreneurial endeavours that would improve their own livelihood or that of others who have been affected? Whilst previous studies have found local knowledge, networks and resources to be crucial in the development of ventures in the war and conflict context, alienation from mainstream society within the host location often means that to succeed, those who are displaced require alternative strategies and approaches. Through examining the entrepreneurial ventures of six internally displaced entrepreneurs in Pakistan, our study identifies that entrepreneurial individuals find different ways to adapt to the new order, with both internal and external bricolage becoming the key strategies deployed to either re-establish their previous businesses or to develop new endeavours in the host location. To compensate for lack of local knowledge, networks and resources, we found that entrepreneurs followed closely their previous paths in their bricolage attempts, relying on reconfigurations of their pre-existing competencies, as well as utilizing pre-established and clandestine networks.     

Nondisclosure and adverse disclosure as signals of firm value

We present a model in which some of the firm's information ('news')can be disclosed verifiably and some information ('type') cannot,to show that some firms may voluntarily withhold good news anddisclose bad news. We describe an equilibrium in which high-typefirms withhold good news and disclose bad news, whereas low-typefirms disclose good news and withhold bad news. Under some parametervalues, this equilibrium exists when other more traditionalequilibria are ruled out by standard equilibrium refinements.The model explains some otherwise anomalous empirical evidenceconcerning stock price reactions to disclosure, provides somenew empirical predictions, and suggests that mandatory disclosurerequirements may have the undesirable consequence of makingit more difficult for firms to reveal information that cannotbe disclosed credibly.