排序方式: 共有13条查询结果,搜索用时 234 毫秒
1.
Venture Capitalists, Business Angels, and Performance of Entrepreneurial IPOs in the UK and France 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Salim Chahine Igor Filatotchev Mike Wright 《Journal of Business Finance & Accounting》2007,34(3-4):505-528
Abstract: Using a unique sample of 444 entrepreneurial IPOs in the UK and France, this paper analyses the investment patterns and the stock-market performance effects of two types of early stage investors: venture capitalists (VCs) and business angels (BAs). Extending existing research, we identify important endogeneity and institutional effects. Our findings indicate that UK IPOs have a higher retained ownership and lower participation ratio by BAs, but a lower retained ownership and participation ratio by VCs than in France. BA and VC investments are substitutes, and they are endogenously determined by a number of firm- and founder-related factors, such as founder ownership and external board 'interlocks', and underwriter reputation. UK VCs are effective third-party certifying agents who reduce underpricing in UK IPOs, whereas in French IPOs they increase it by appearing to engage in grandstanding. This certification effect is more significant in UK IPOs involving both high VC and BA ownership. Finally, underpricing increases with VC participation ratio, where the higher exit of VCs seems to increase the risk premium required by outside investors, in particular in the UK. 相似文献
2.
Salim Chahine Jonathan D. Arthurs Igor Filatotchev Robert E. Hoskisson 《Journal of Corporate Finance》2012,18(1):179-192
This study examines the extent to which principal–principal agency conflicts within venture capital (VC) syndicates lead to additional principal–agent conflicts in IPO firms in two institutional contexts. Using a matched sample of 274 VC-backed IPOs in the US and the UK, it shows that the diversity of a VC syndicate increases pre-IPO discretionary current accruals, used as a proxy for earnings management, but the impact of such diversity is higher in the US. There is also evidence of higher underpricing and lower aftermarket performance in firms with higher earnings management and VC diversity, and these negative performance effects are also higher in the US. Our findings indicate that local and informal institutions have a significant effect on multiple agency conflicts in IPO firms and performance outcomes. 相似文献
3.
4.
Igor?FilatotchevEmail author Salim?Chahine Mike?Wright Mufit?Arberk 《The International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal》2005,1(4):419-439
Using a unique sample of 444 entrepreneurial IPOs in the UK and France this paper examines links between founders' characteristics,
venture capital (VC) syndication and the development of effective boards in entrepreneurial firms. It argues that VC-backed
IPOs suffer from two sets of agency problems which are related to principal-agent and principal-principal relationships between
the founders and members of the VC syndicate. The empirical evidence shows that there is a curvilinear relationship between
the intensity of founders' external ties and VC syndication. Founders' retained share ownership is negatively associated with
VC syndication. We also find that in syndicated IPOs there is a higher involvement of passive private equity firms and “business
angels” investing alongside VC firms, both in terms of their number and equity presence. VC-syndicated IPOs have more independent
boards than IPOs with no VC involvement. Board independence is negatively associated with founders' retained equity. These
results are consistent with the assumption that board independence is used to mitigate agency costs associated with VC involvement
in IPO firms. Our findings also identify significant differences in governance characteristics between the UK and France.
While French IPOs have less independent boards, they involve more VC backing in general and syndicated VC funding in particular,
than UK IPOs. 相似文献
5.
Marc Goergen Salim Chahine Chris Brewster Geoffrey Wood 《Journal of Business Finance & Accounting》2013,40(5-6):589-619
This is a study of variations in trust relationships according to institutional setting. A wide body of comparative institutional literature within economics and finance engages with trust. However, as most of this literature uses macro‐level data and/or stylistic ideal types, it normally neglects intra‐firm trust. This paper redresses this lacuna by using both macro‐level data and comparative firm‐level evidence. We found that both country trust and firm trust increase firm performance, but that there is a trade‐off between the two as high levels of both reduce performance. Finally, both employee rights and investor rights are negatively correlated with country trust. 相似文献
6.
This paper examines performance effects of ownership concentration and two types of private equity investors (venture capitalists and business angels) in firms that have recently undergone an initial public offering (IPO) in the United Kingdom and France. We expand and contextualize nascent understanding of multiple agency theory by examining heterogeneity of private equity investors and by suggesting that multiple agency relationships are affected by different institutional contexts. We employ a unique, hand‐collected dataset of 224 matched IPOs (112 in each country). Controlling for the endogeneity of private equity investors' retained share ownership, we find support for the agency theory argument that concentrated ownership improves IPOs' performance. The research also shows that the two types of private equity investors have a differential impact on performance, and the legal institutions in a given country moderate this impact. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
7.
Salim Chahine 《European Accounting Review》2013,22(3):403-429
ABSTRACT This study provides new evidence that both differential interpretations and private information production spur trading volume for a sample of 144 preliminary earnings announcements in the French markets. After partitioning the sample into preliminary announcements that convey good news versus bad news, I find that good news stimulates more production of private information, whereas bad news leads to more differential interpretations. I further find that increased production of private information (but not differential interpretations) helps explain trading volume around good news preliminary earnings announcements. In contrast, differential interpretations (and not private information) help explain trading volume around bad news preliminary earnings announcements. 相似文献
8.
We investigate the effect of pre‐offer publicity on ownership, pricing, and aftermarket performance for equity carve‐outs (ECOs) and two‐stage spin‐offs (COSOs). Contrary to ECOs, for COSOs the parent firm's shareholders end up with free shares in the subsidiary. As the value of large share blocks is likely to be negatively affected by the emergence of new blocks after the divestiture, we hypothesize that parent firms undertaking COSOs may conduct more pre‐offer publicity to attract more retail investors, keeping outside ownership diffuse and inflating aftermarket performance until the distribution of the free shares. We find empirical support for our hypotheses. 相似文献
9.
This paper examines the impact of CEO IPO option grants on IPO underpricing. Contrary to Lowry and Murphy (2007) who do not find a relationship between the two, this paper finds such a relationship when board independence, the power of the CEO and venture capitalists (VCs) are taken into account. The results are threefold. First, powerful CEOs are able to reap substantial gains from IPO options, to the detriment of the shareholders. Second, young, powerful VCs use IPO option grants to bribe the CEO to agree to an early IPO which will leave more of the existing shareholders' money on the table. Finally, IPO options only work as a value-enhancing incentive in the presence of strong boards. 相似文献
10.
This paper examines the effect of strategic information disclosure and corporate governance on the stock market performance of initial public offering (IPO) firms in France. It argues that information disclosure and board independence mitigate agency problems between the IPO firm and investors, thus reducing the IPO discount defined as the difference between the offer price and the intrinsic value of the firm. However, extensive disclosure may damage the firm's competitive advantage and lead to a curvilinear (an inverted U‐shape) relationship between information disclosure and the IPO discount. Further analysis suggests that it is not necessarily the quantity of information, but rather the type of information, that causes the IPO discount to increase with the amount of disclosure. 相似文献