The role of corporate governance in meeting or beating analysts’ forecast

Meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts is a topic of considerable interest in the academic and business communities. Some studies indicate a favorable market response when firms meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts, but others suggest managers opportunistically manage earnings to achieve earnings targets. We investigate the relation between corporate governance mechanisms and meeting or exceeding analysts’ expectations and find that attributes of corporate governance are related to the likelihood of consistently meeting or exceeding consensus forecasts. We extend current literature by showing that some attributes of strong corporate governance mechanisms lower agency costs associated with consistently meeting or beating analysts’ expectations. We also find that compensation committees reward managers for consistently meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts.     

Predictive versus opportunistic earnings management,executive compensation,and firm performance

We examine the association between earnings management and an important component of corporate governance, the incentives provided through compensation. We argue that firms with predictive (opportunistic) earnings management, in which discretionary accruals do (do not) relate to future cash flows, provide a more (less) ideal setting for the use of compensation as incentives. Our empirical tests show that CEO compensation levels (measured by salary, bonus, and other forms of compensation) are positively related to predictive earnings management and negatively related to opportunistic earnings management. We also find that predictive earnings management is positively associated with future returns, whereas opportunistic earnings management is negatively associated with future returns. Overall, our results suggest that firms provide more incentives if their earnings are also more informative because of discretionary accruals.