The enemies of trust

Researchers have established that trust is critical to organizational effectiveness. Being trustworthy yourself, however, does not guarantee that you are capable of building trust in an organization. That takes old-fashioned managerial virtues like consistency, clear communication, and a willingness to tackle awkward questions. It also requires a good defense: You must protect trust from its enemies. Any act of bad management erodes trust, so the list of potential enemies is endless. Among the most common enemies of trust, though, are inconsistent messages from top management, inconsistent standards, a willingness to tolerate incompetence or bad behavior, dishonest feedback, a failure to trust others to do good work, a tendency to ignore painful or politically charged situations, consistent corporate underperformance, and rumors. Fending off these enemies must be at the top of every chief executive's agenda. But even with constant vigilance, an organization and its leaders will sometimes lose people's trust. During a crisis, managers should enlist the help of an objective third party--chances are you won't be thinking clearly--and be available physically and emotionally. If you "go dark" in the face of a crisis, employees will worry about the company's survival, about their own capacity to cope, and about your abilities as a leader. And if trust has broken down so badly that your only choice is to start over, you can do so by figuring out exactly how the breach of trust happened, ascertaining the depth and breadth of the loss, owning up to the loss instead of downplaying it, and identifying as precisely as possible the specific changes you must make to rebuild trust.     

The Performance Effect of Feedback Frequency and Detail: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Customer Satisfaction

This paper presents the results from a field experiment that examines the effects of nonfinancial performance feedback on the behavior of professionals working for an insurance repair company. We vary the frequency (weekly and monthly) and the level of detail of the feedback that the 800 professionals receive. Contrary to what we would expect if these professionals conformed to the model of the Bayesian decision maker, more (and more frequent) information does not always help improve performance. In fact, we find that professionals achieve the best outcomes when they receive detailed but infrequent (monthly) feedback. The treatment groups with frequent feedback, regardless of how detailed it is, perform no better than the control group (with monthly and aggregate information). The results are consistent with the information in the latest feedback report being most salient and professionals in the weekly treatments overweighting their most recent performance, hampering their ability to learn.     

Competition,Loan Rates,and Information Dispersion in Nonprofit and For‐Profit Microcredit Markets

We describe the competitive environment of microcredit markets globally and we study the effects of competition on loan rates of microfinance institutions (MFIs). We use a new database from rating agencies, covering 379 for‐profit and nonprofit MFIs in 67 countries over 2002–2008. Controlling for interest rate ceilings and other country‐specific factors, we first find that nonprofits are relatively insensitive to industry‐wide concentration changes, while for‐profits charge significantly lower rates in less concentrated markets. Second, we find spillover effects between the for‐profit and nonprofit segments. Third, we show that the effects of concentration are consistent with an information dispersion mechanism.     

Finance and the Business Cycle: International, Inter-Industry Evidence

By considering yearly production growth rates for several manufacturing industries in more than 100 countries during (roughly) the last 40 years, we show that industries that are more dependent on external finance are hit harder during recessions. The observed difference in the behavior of industries is larger when financial frictions are thought to be more prevalent, linking the result directly to the financial mechanism hypothesis. In particular, more dependent industries are more strongly affected in recessions when they are located in countries with poor financial contractibility, and when their assets are softer or less protective of financiers.     

Legal Traditions and Initial Endowments in Shaping the Path of Financial Development

This paper finds remarkable heterogeneity in the relationship between legal traditions and finance in former colonies. The effect of the British common law on financial development is conditioned by the level of initial endowments. In former colonies with low precolonial population density, the common law has promoted high financial development, but where endowments were abundant, this legal tradition has not worked well. In contrast, the effect of the French civil law on finance is invariant to endowments. British common law countries do not exhibit greater financial development levels than French civil law countries when endowments are sufficiently high.     

A von Neumann–Morgenstern representation result without weak continuity assumption

In the paradigm of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947), a representation of affine preferences in terms of an expected utility can be obtained under the assumption of weak continuity. Since the weak topology is coarse, this requirement is a priori far from being negligible. In this work, we replace the assumption of weak continuity by monotonicity. More precisely, on the space of lotteries on an interval of the real line, it is shown that any affine preference order which is monotone with respect to the first stochastic order admits a representation in terms of an expected utility for some nondecreasing utility function. As a consequence, any affine preference order on the subset of lotteries with compact support, which is monotone with respect to the second stochastic order, can be represented in terms of an expected utility for some nondecreasing concave utility function. We also provide such representations for affine preference orders on the subset of those lotteries which fulfill some integrability conditions. The subtleties of the weak topology are illustrated by some examples.     

Hedging and liquidity

This article develops a model for evaluating alternative hedgingstrategies for financially constrained firms. A key advantageof the model is the ability to capture the intertemporal effectsof hedging on the firm's financial situation. We characterizethe optimal hedge. A wide range of alternative hedging strategiescan be specified and the model allows us to determine in eachcase if the hedging strategy raises or lowers firms value andby how much. We show that hedging firm value, hedging cash flowfrom operations and hedging sales revenue are not optimal. Thearticle highlights the fact that every hedging strategy comespackaged with a borrowing strategy which requires careful consideration.