Lock‐In Effects in Relationship Lending: Evidence from DIP Loans

Do prior lending relationships result in pass‐through savings (lower interest rates) for borrowers, or do they lock in higher costs for borrowers? Theoretical models suggest that when borrowers experience greater information asymmetry, higher switching costs, and limited access to capital markets, they become locked into higher costs from their existing lenders. Firms in Chapter 11 seeking debtor‐in‐possession (DIP) financing often fit this profile. We investigate the presence of lock‐in effects using a sample of 348 DIP loans. We account for endogeneity using the instrument variable (IV) approach and the Heckman selection model and find consistent evidence that prior lending relationship is associated with higher interest costs and the effect is more severe for stronger existing relationships. Our study provides direct evidence that prior lending relationships do create a lock‐in effect under certain circumstances, such as DIP financing.     

Determinants of Regular and Occasional Consumers' Intentions to Buy Organic Food

This study analyzes the impact of ethical motivations, food safety and health‐related concerns on purchasing intentions of habitual and less frequent consumers of organic food. A sample of 291 subjects was surveyed through a paper‐and‐pencil questionnaire and classified either as “regular” or “occasional” purchasers of organic food according to their buying frequency. Results show different determinants of intention for the two groups of subjects: ethical motivations affect the purchase intentions of regular consumers, whereas food safety concerns influence the purchase intentions of occasional consumers. Implications are discussed.     

Cheap Credit,Lending Operations,and International Politics: The Case of Global Microfinance

The provision of subsidized credit to financial institutions is an important and frequently used policy tool of governments and central banks. To assess its effectiveness, we exploit changes in international bilateral political relationships that generate shocks to the cost of financing for microfinance institutions (MFIs). MFIs that experience politically driven reductions in total borrowing costs hire more staff and increase administrative expenses. Cheap credit leads to greater profitability for MFIs and promotes a shift toward noncommercial loans but has no effect on total overall lending. Instead, the additional resources are either directed to promoting future growth or dissipated.     

The Effect of Business Risk on Corporate Capital Structure: Theory and Evidence

Under corporate and personal taxation, we demonstrate that the relation between optimal debt level and business risk is roughly U-shaped. This result follows from the fact that the tax liability is an option portfolio that is long in the corporate tax option and short in the personal tax option. Therefore, the net effect of a change in business risk on the optimal debt level depends upon the relative magnitudes of the resultant marginal changes in the values of these two options. Results of empirical tests offer support for the predicted U-shaped relationship.     

Yield Approximations: A Historical Perspective

This paper traces the historical developments of the efforts to find simple and accurate methods of approximating an annuity's implicit yield and a bond's yield to maturity. It is shown that the little known history of yield approximations is nevertheless very rich, with contributions dating as far back as the late seventeenth century. It is also shown that the standard textbook approximation formula for the bond's yield to maturity is the least accurate of a large family of formulas, some of which were suggested as early as 1855.     

On the Contagion Effect in the US Banking Sector

By using the spatial econometrics methodology, this paper investigates the contagion of the risk taking by banks in the US banking sector during 2001 to 2012. In addition, the contagion signals up to the Subprime crisis in 2008 are analyzed and different channels of contagion are studied in order to identify fragile groups of banks. Our analysis reveals that there is no significant contagion transmitted to the whole banking system. However, we observe that the bank contagion is significantly spread locally and for the group of banks that share similar characteristics related to size and bank regulations.     

Bad Apples: Political Paralysis and the Quality of Politicians

Why do elected officials often suffer from political paralysis and fail to implement the best policies available? This paper considers a new and intuitive explanation that focuses on the quality of the politicians competing for office. The key insight is that a “good” incumbent with preferences identical to those of a representative voter will want to keep rent‐seeking politicians out of office; he may do so by distorting his policy choices to signal his type and win reelection. The value of signaling and staying in office increases with the fraction of rent‐seeking types in the population of politicians. Electing good types may therefore not be enough to ensure that the best policies are implemented, especially when rent seeking is widespread. This provides a new explanation for why political failure is particularly severe in corrupt democracies.     

Seasonality in the Risk-Return Relationship: Some International Evidence

We report evidence of seasonality in the Fama and MacBeth estimate of the CAPM-based risk premium in four stock exchanges: the NYSE and the London, Paris, and Brussels exchanges. Specifically, we found that, in Belgium and France, risk premia are positive in January and negative the rest of the year. There is no January seasonal in the U.K. risk premium. Instead, we observed in this country a positive April seasonal and a negative average risk premium over the rest of the year. In the U.S., the pattern of risk-premium seasonality coincides with the pattern of stock-return seasonality. Both are positive and significant only in January. We also found that the January risk premium in the U.S. is significantly larger than those observed in the European markets. Interestingly, the reported patterns of risk-premium seasonality in European equity markets do not fully coincide with the observed patterns of stock-return seasonality in these markets. For example, in the U.K., average stock returns are significant and positive in January and April, whereas the market risk premium is significantly positive only in April. A possible interpretation of this phenomenon is presented in the paper.