WICKEDNESS IN SOCIAL CHOICE

In an article from 1973, Rittel and Webber distinguished between ‘tame’ or ‘benign’ problems on the one hand and ‘wicked’ problems on the other. The authors argued that wicked problems occur in nearly all public policy issues. Since different groups adhere to different value-sets, solutions can only be expressed as better or worse. By no means can they be viewed as definitive or objective. In this paper we consider, from this very angle, the theory of social choice which is about the aggregation of individual preferences with the aim to derive a consistent social preference. We show that collective choice offers wicked problems of various types which differ in their degree of severity. We hereby concentrate on welfare functions and voting schemes of different kinds and discuss these in the light of various criteria such as Arrow's independence condition, Condorcet consistency, monotonicity, manipulability, and other properties.     

The Influence of Ownership and Compensation Practices on Charitable Activities

Recent accounting research provides evidence that similar profit‐based compensation incentives are used in for‐profit and nonprofit hospitals. Because charity care reduces profits, such incentives should lead for‐profit hospital managers to reduce charity care levels. Nonprofit hospital managers, however, may respond differently to the same incentives because they face a different set of institutional pressures and constraints. We compare the association between pay‐for‐performance incentives and charity care in for‐profit and nonprofit hospitals. We find a negative and significant association between charity care and our proxy for profit‐based incentives in for‐profit hospitals, and no significant association in nonprofit hospitals. These results suggest that linking manager pay to profitability does not appear to discourage charity care in nonprofit hospitals. Apparently, the nonprofit mission, institutional pressures, and ownership constraints moderate the potentially negative effects of profit‐based incentives. Because this evidence partially alleviates concerns over nonprofit compensation arrangements that mirror those used in for‐profit hospitals, it should be of interest to regulators and policymakers. In addition, this study provides insights into accounting researchers about institutional and organizational influences that affect managerial responses to financial incentives in compensation contracts.     

Taxonomic Model of Withdrawal Behaviors: The Adaptive Response Model

This article presents and develops a theoretical model (The Adaptive Response Model; ARM) that proposes how employees adapt to the organization following changes in organizational policies that are perceived as dissatisfying. The ARM combines several streams of theoretical and empirical research in IO-Psychology. It suggests that different type of employees (i.e., institutionalized stars, citizens, lone wolves, and apathetics) resort to different behaviors to adjust to dissatisfying events. Institutionalized stars tend to exercise voice, lone wolves tend to exit, citizens tend to accept, and apathetics tend to resort to alternative forms of withdrawal (e.g., lateness, absenteeism, and theft). Implications for the management of each employee type as well as suggestions for future research are discussed.     

The Effects of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 on Defined Benefit Pension Contributions*

This study examines the effect of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA) on corporate defined benefit pension contributions. The TCJA decreases the corporate tax rate from 35 percent in 2017 to 21 percent in 2018 and thereafter. This change incentivizes firms to increase 2017 pension contributions to take advantage of tax deductions at a higher rate. Consistent with this incentive, we find firms increase defined benefit pension contributions by an average of 25 to 31 percent in 2017 compared with earlier years. We also find that taxpaying firms are the primary contributors. Further, taxpaying firms with high levels of pension-related deferred tax assets contribute over three times as much as taxpaying firms with low levels of pension-related deferred tax assets. We also find firms that increase pension contributions in 2017 reduce 2018 contributions, consistent with intertemporal income shifting rather than a permanent change in pension funding strategy.     

Overconfidence and Corporate Tax Policy

Review of Accounting Studies - Using a sample of firms experiencing exogenous CEO departures, we investigate whether firms with overconfident CEOs avoid more tax. We find robust evidence of a...     

Never choose the uniquely largest a characterization

Summary In this paper we characterize choice behaviour that picks the second largest element if there is a uniquely largest; otherwise, the largest elements are picked. Having defined our choice function, we offer a complete characterization of the latter in terms of pure choice function conditions. Similarities to and divergences from conventional choice theory are explained. We discuss the motivations underlying our exercise and provide several examples for the axiomatized choice behaviour.Helpful discussions with R. Deb, M. R. Johnson, P. K. Pattanaik, A. Sen, Y. Xu, and participants at a seminar on individual and social choice in Osnabrück, November 1993, are gratefully acknowledged. One of the authors wishes to thank the British Council and the University of Osnabrück for financial support. We are also grateful to the Department of Economics at Queen Mary and Westfield College, London, for its hospitality.     

Perceptions of Equity across Cultures and over Time: A Questionnaire-Experimental Approach

We discuss the results of investigations where students from several countries were confronted with questionnaires describing hypothetical situations. All situations start from the preference structure which underlies an equity axiom based on Rawls’s difference principle. We ask whether respondents satisfy the equity axiom by supporting the worst-offs and how often they revise their initial decision when more people join the side of the more advantaged. Moreover, we control for context-dependency and investigate whether there are major differences across countries and cultures. The available data also allow us to consider changes of justice evaluations over time.