Peer Effects among Swimmers

We develop a novel identification strategy and examine various aspects of peer effects using swimming data. We find that the performance of adjacent competitors positively influences swimmers' performances. In particular, swimmers are influenced by slower‐lane peers, suggesting that being chased improves one's performance. We use absenteeism data to directly compare the performances of swimmers with and without peers. We have found that swimmers swim faster with peers swimming behind them than when swimming alone, but that they swim slower with peers swimming ahead. Finally, we find that observability is a key determinant of peer effects, by comparing freestyle and backstroke competitions.     

Labor supply response and preferences specification: Estimates for prime-age males in Japan

In this paper, we estimate labor responses of Japanese prime-age males by taking into consideration the Japanese income tax system and utilizing a large micro-data set. We employ three maximum likelihood methods: (i) a modified version of [Hausman, 1979] and [Hausman, 1981] , which assumes a linear labor supply function; (ii) that given by Zabalza (1983), which assumes CES preferences; and (iii) that given by Van Soest (1995), which employs the translog utility function and assumes discrete labor hour choice. While the estimates based on the Hausman and Zabalza methods fare poorly, those based on the Van Soest method result in more plausible labor responses. However, these responses are larger than those of the North American and European counterparts.     

Payment card rewards programs and consumer payment choice

By using a unique data set that contains detailed information about consumer payment choice and consumers’ attitudes toward each payment method, we estimate the effects of payment card rewards on consumer choice of payment methods. Our approach allows us to control for consumer heterogeneity. We find the effects of rewards to be statistically significant across five retail types. Our policy experiments suggest that for the sub-population who hold both credit and debit cards, removing rewards would increase their share of paper-based payment methods (i.e., cash and checks), measured in terms of in-store transactions, by no more than 4 percentage points.     

Expenditure Inequality in Indonesia, 2008–2010: A Spatial Decomposition Analysis and the Role of Education

Based on the 2008–2010 Susenas panel data, this study examines expenditure inequality from spatial perspectives in Indonesia, using three decomposition methods: (i) a conventional Theil index decomposition; (ii) an alternative Theil index decomposition proposed by Elbers et al. (2008); and (iii) the Blinder?Oaxaca decomposition. Our results show that overall inequality in per capita expenditure increases between 2008 and 2010, which coincides with a rising trend in the official Gini coefficient. The contribution of inequality within urban and rural areas to total inequality is larger than that of inequality between urban and rural areas. Looking within urban and rural areas, urban inequality is significantly higher than rural inequality. Java‐Bali in particular records very high urban inequality. Overall, urban inequality increases, urban–rural inequality remains stable, rural inequality decreases, and inequality at the national level increases. Although urban–rural inequality has a relatively low share in overall inequality, the share is not small enough to ignore its impact. Furthermore, when using the alternative decomposition method, the contribution of urban–rural inequality increases substantially. The present study also found that educational differences appear to have played an important role in expenditure inequality within urban areas and between urban and rural areas.     

An empirical analysis of intergovernmental tax interaction: the case of business income taxes in Canada

Both federal and provincial governments in Canada levy corporate taxes on businesses in their jurisdictions, which potentially gives rise to horizontal and vertical tax externalities within the federation. Using a simple model of interdependent tax choices, we estimate tax-setting functions for the federal government, Ontario, Quebec, and an aggregate of the remaining eight provinces. We find evidence of significant vertical and horizontal tax interactions. Provincial tax rates respond negatively to the federal tax rate, while at least some provinces increase their tax rates in response to increases in the tax rates of other provinces. JEL Classification: H25, H7
Une analyse empirique de l'interaction fiscale entre gouvernements: le cas des impôts sur les revenus d'affaires au Canada. Au Canada, les gouvernements fédéral et provinciaux collectent des impôts sur le revenu de sociétés sous leur jurisdiction. Voilà qui peut donner lieu à des effets externes horizontaux et verticaux à l'intérieur de la fédération. A l'aide d'un modèle de choix fiscaux interdépendants, les auteurs calibrent les fonctions d'imposition du gouvernement fédéral, des gouvernements du Québec et de l'Ontario, et d'une entité composée des huit autres provinces. On montre que les effets verticaux et horizontaux d'interaction fiscale sont significatifs. Les taux d'imposition des provinces réagissent négativement au taux d'imposition fédéral, mais certaines provinces accroissent leur taux d'imposition en réponse à des accroissements dans les taux d'imposition d'autres provinces.     

Attitude toward imprecise information

This paper presents an axiomatic model of decision making under uncertainty which incorporates objective but imprecise information. Information is assumed to take the form of a probability–possibility set, that is, a set P of probability measures on the state space. The decision maker is told that the true probability law lies in P and is assumed to rank pairs of the form (P,f) where f is an act mapping states into outcomes. The key representation result delivers maxmin expected utility (MEU) where the min operator ranges over a set of probability priors—just as in the MEU representation result of Gilboa and Schmeidler [Maxmin expected utility with a non-unique prior, J. Math. Econ. 18 (1989) 141–153]. However, unlike the MEU representation, the representation here also delivers a mapping, , which links the probability–possibility set, describing the available information, to the set of revealed priors. The mapping is shown to represent the decision maker's attitude to imprecise information: under our axioms, the set of representation priors is constituted as a selection from the probability–possibility set. This allows both expected utility when the selected set is a singleton and extreme pessimism when the selected set is the same as the probability–possibility set, i.e., is the identity mapping. We define a notion of comparative imprecision aversion and show it is characterized by inclusion of the sets of revealed probability distributions, irrespective of the utility functions that capture risk attitude. We also identify an explicit attitude toward imprecision that underlies usual hedging axioms. Finally, we characterize, under extra axioms, a more specific functional form, in which the set of selected probability distributions is obtained by (i) solving for the “mean value” of the probability–possibility set, and (ii) shrinking the probability–possibility set toward the mean value to a degree determined by preferences.     

Life cycle and bequest savings A study of Japanese and U.S. households based on data from the 1984 NSFIE and the 1983 survey of consumer finances

This paper investigates whether the elderly save or dissave in light of two newly available sets of cross-section micro data, the 1983 “Survey of Consumer Finance” for the United States and the 1984 “National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure” for Japan. Contrary to dominant earlier findings we find for the United States that families after retirement dissave on average about a third of their peak wealth by the time of death, leaving the rest (mostly their homes) as bequests. For Japan, special handling is made to eliminate possible sample selection bias due to the different economic characteristics of the elderly forming independent households and those living with children. We find that the elderly belonging to both groups continue to save, and moreover, there appear to be significant signs of ongoing wealth transfer between the generations. The data in both countries also show that the elasticity of saving with respect to a life time income measure is significantly greater than unity, and more strongly so within higher age groups. J. Japan. Int. Econ., December 1988, 2(4), pp. 450–491. Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297, and National Bureau of Economic Research.     

Mommy-track backlash

"Please don't tell me that I need to have a baby to have this time off." Those words were still ringing in the ears of Jessica Gonon an hour after a tense meeting with Jana Rowe, one of her key account managers. Jessica, the vice president of sales and customer support at ClarityBase, considered Jana's request for a four-day workweek, for which she was willing to take a corresponding 20% cut in pay. Although the facts seemed simple, the situation was anything but. Just last week, Davis Bennett, another account manager, had made a similar request. He wanted a lighter workload so he could train for the Ironman Triathlon World Championship. Both Jana and Davis were well aware that Megan Flood, another account manager, had been working a reduced schedule for nearly two years. When she was hired, Megan had requested Fridays off to spend time with her two young sons. And since she came highly recommended and the talent pool was tight, Jessica had agreed to the arrangement. The eight account managers at ClarityBase were in charge of helping the company's largest clients install and maintain database applications, which often required no small amount of hand-holding and coddling. Because Megan had an abbreviated schedule, the other account managers were assigned the more difficult clients. But if Jessica agreed to a shorter workweek for Jana and Davis, who would take on the toughest customers? And what would happen if the other account managers started asking for similar deals? How can Jessica maintain the productivity of her department and meet her staff's needs for flexible work schedules while striking an equitable solution for both parents and nonparents? Four experts advise Jessica on her next move in this fictional case study.