Analysis of the US cruise line industry

The cruise line industry has been through a metamorphosis. From being a declining mode of travel in the 1960s, the cruise line industry turned the corner in the 1970s and became one of the fastest growing segments of the wider tourism industry during the 1980s. This paper examines the reasons behind this growth, the current structure of the US cruise industry and the issues facing the industry in the 1990s as it heads towards the next century.     

GAMBLING IN CONTESTS WITH REGRET

This paper discusses the gambling contest introduced in Seel and Strack (2013, Gambling in Contests, Journal of Economic Theory, 148(5), 2033–2048) and considers the impact of adding a penalty associated with failure to follow a winning strategy. The Seel and Strack model consists of n‐agents each of whom privately observes a transient diffusion process and chooses when to stop it. The player with the highest stopped value wins the contest, and each player's objective is to maximize her probability of winning the contest. We give a new derivation of the results of Seel and Strack based on a Lagrangian approach. Moreover, we consider an extension of the problem to a behavioral finance context in the sense of regret theory. In particular, an agent is penalized when her chosen strategy does not win the contest, but there existed an alternative strategy that would have resulted in victory.     

ROBUST BOUNDS FOR FORWARD START OPTIONS

We consider the problem of finding a model‐free upper bound on the price of a forward start straddle with payoff . The bound depends on the prices of vanilla call and put options with maturities T₁ and T₂ , but does not rely on any modeling assumptions concerning the dynamics of the underlying. The bound can be enforced by a super‐replicating strategy involving puts, calls, and a forward transaction. We find an upper bound, and a model which is consistent with T₁ and T₂ vanilla option prices for which the model‐based price of the straddle is equal to the upper bound. This proves that the bound is best possible. For lognormal marginals we show that the upper bound is at most 30% higher than the Black–Scholes price. The problem can be recast as finding the solution to a Skorokhod embedding problem with nontrivial initial law so as to maximize .     

The Benefit of Mean Auditors: The Influence of Social Interaction and the Dark Triad on Unjustified Auditor Trust

Regulators and researchers have expressed concerns that social interaction leads auditors to unjustifiably trust managers, constituting a lack of sufficient professional skepticism. Using both an abstract laboratory experiment and a contextually rich experiment with practicing auditors we predict and find that higher Dark Triad auditors (those with higher levels of the shared core between psychopathy, narcissism, and Machiavellianism) are relatively more resistant to lapses in professional skepticism due to the effects of social interaction. This is likely driven by higher Dark Triad auditors' callousness, lack of empathy, and lack of response to social stimuli. In contrast, while higher social interaction initially increases lower Dark Triad auditors' unjustified trust in managers, this effect reverses in subsequent interactions when lower Dark Triad auditors observe evidence suggesting managers have reported aggressively. These findings add to research on the effect of auditor personality traits, audit-client social interaction, and the interaction of these two variables, and suggest that practitioners and researchers account for the interplay of Dark Triad traits and social interaction and their effect on professional skepticism.     

Trader Participation in Disclosure: Implications of Interactions with Management

Technological advances are creating a shift in the information disclosure environment allowing more investors to interact with management. We examine three key levels of trader-management interaction to assess the accuracy of traders' market-tested value estimates and resulting market price. These data require an engaging experiment and a complex, contextually rich asset, which we create by playing a popular gaming app before the experiment. Participants view financial information, ask management questions, estimate value, and trade. We find that receiving non-personalized question responses improves trader estimates of value and market price efficiency relative to when traders ask questions but do not expect a response. This occurs because traders exert more effort estimating value and trading. However, receiving personalized versus non-personalized responses harms value estimates and market efficiency. This occurs because traders receiving personalized responses fixate on the interaction with management, dividing their attention and diverting it away from valuing and trading the asset.     

Complete Models with Stochastic Volatility

The paper proposes an original class of models for the continuous-time price process of a financial security with nonconstant volatility. The idea is to define instantaneous volatility in terms of exponentially weighted moments of historic log-price. The instantaneous volatility is therefore driven by the same stochastic factors as the price process, so that, unlike many other models of nonconstant volatility, it is not necessary to introduce additional sources of randomness. Thus the market is complete and there are unique, preference-independent options prices.
We find a partial differential equation for the price of a European call option. Smiles and skews are found in the resulting plots of implied volatility.     

Optimal consumption and investment under transaction costs*

In this paper, we consider the Merton problem in a market with a single risky asset and proportional transaction costs. We give a complete solution of the problem up to the solution of a first‐crossing problem for a first‐order differential equation. We find that the characteristics of the solution (e.g., well‐posedness) can be related to some simple properties of a univariate quadratic whose coefficients are functions of the parameters of the problem. Our solution to the problem via the value function includes expressions for the boundaries of the no‐transaction wedge. Using these expressions, we prove a precise condition for when leverage occurs. One new and unexpected result is that when the solution to the Merton problem (without transaction costs) involves a leveraged position, and when transaction costs are large, the location of the boundary at which sales of the risky asset occur is independent of the transaction cost on purchases.     

A multi-asset investment and consumption problem with transaction costs

Finance and Stochastics - In this article, we study a multi-asset version of the Merton investment and consumption problem with CRRA utility and proportional transaction costs. We specialise to a...     

THE RANGE OF TRADED OPTION PRICES

Suppose we are given a set of prices of European call options over a finite range of strike prices and exercise times, written on a financial asset with deterministic dividends which is traded in a frictionless market with no interest rate volatility. We ask: when is there an arbitrage opportunity? We give conditions for the prices to be consistent with an arbitrage-free model (in which case the model can be realized on a finite probability space). We also give conditions for there to exist an arbitrage opportunity which can be locked in at time zero. There is also a third boundary case in which prices are recognizably misspecified, but the ability to take advantage of an arbitrage opportunity depends upon knowledge of the null sets of the model.