The economics of nonprofit organisations' governance

We determine theoretically when we can expect agency problems amenable to shirking agents to arise in nonprofit organisations and derive the conditions for governance measures to remedy these. Agents' private benefits of shirking need to be considered combined with the effect of their efforts on the probabilities of being successful in fundraising and production. If this effect is large, agency problems can more easily be avoided. Sufficient conditions for governance measures to reduce agency problems are derived. The empirical literature fits a number of the results derived and shows important gaps, especially w.r.t. the role of success probabilities.     

Trade Credit, Corporate Groups, and the Financing of Belgian Firms

We investigate the role of trade credit as a source of financing. Using a sample of 661 large non-financial Belgian firms for the 1989–1991 period, we find that the amount of trade credit a buyer takes is determined by his need for funds and the internally available funds. Trade credit is primarily used to finance short-term assets. As such, it seems to be an important alternative not only for short-term bank debt but also for long-term financial debt, including intragroup debt. We find no evidence that the amount of trade credit taken is influenced by affiliation with the supplier.     

THE EFFECTS OF LENIENCY PROGRAMS AND FINES ON CARTEL STABILITY

Using a stylized oligopoly model, we analyze the effect of cartel deterring fines, taking into consideration exemptions granted to cartel members cooperating with the competition authorities. We conclude that the fines can act as a deterrent to breaking collusive agreements, thus stabilizing the cartel.     

The Effect of ‘State Aid’ on Market Shares: An Empirical Investigation in an EU Member State

This paper empirically investigates the impact of fixed asset subsidies to firms on market shares. By means of a tobit regression on a sample of over 13 000 Belgian firms we find a significant and positive joint influence of all fixed asset subsidies on market shares, acknowledging that this is not the objective of the subsidies. This effect only becomes visible 2 years after the subsidy has been granted. Apparently, even under the current European legislation with regard to State aid, having as one of its aims to prevent distortion of competition, giving subsidies to firms for a variety of reasons still impacts on market shares and hence may not go without consequences for competition.     

Graphical disclosures by charities: clarification or distortion? The case of the Netherlands

• The literature on graph use and graphical distortions in nonprofit organisations is reviewed, highlighting measurement issues. A sample of 50 disclosed annual reports of Dutch charities containing graphs is analysed, leading to the observation of significant graphical distortions. These distortions seem to be related to organisational efficiency, though not in the way one might expect: better performing charities ‘embellish’ the data in their graphical representations, whereas the opposite seems to be the case for the less performing charities.

Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Financing constraints in nonprofit organisations: A ‘Tirolean’ approach

For the first time a stylised model, in the tradition of corporate finance models for profit organisations described by Tirole (2006), is developed in order to understand the existence of financial constraints in nonprofit organisations and their relationship with the presence of agency problems. Financial constraints can be expected to arise when there are no substantial opportunities to increase revenues from fundraising and when nonprofit managers might not be willing to exert high fundraising efforts. Furthermore, under these circumstances more agency problems lead to lower debt levels. In situations without expected financial constraints, more agency problems are shown to go together with higher debt levels.Extending watchdog agencies' assessment methods to include default payments can limit or even eliminate financial constraints. The model also allows to understand why larger and chain affiliated organisations should suffer less from financing constraints.The very scant empirical literature's findings on the matter are shown to be reconcilable with the model's predictions.     

Are the ‘Big Six’ ‘big’ in Belgium?

Studies in the United States, Europe and Australia have shown that the market for audit services is highly concentrated and largely dominated by the same ‘Big Six’ international audit firms. This paper measures the degree of concentration in the Belgian audit market through an empirical study of the number of professionally qualified auditors employed by each audit firm and some characteristics of their clients. Our calculations show that the concentration ratios, however measured, are low when compared with other countries, possibly due to the low value attached to the certification of financial statements by a professionally qualified auditor. This lack of importance can be explained by characteristics of the Belgian environment (e.g. a relatively passive capital market, dominated by a few large holding companies) which may induce companies to chose cheaper (domestic) audit firms. We also calculate Spearman rank correlations between the rankings of the audit firms based upon the different audit firm revenue proxies. All the correlations show it is of no importance which measure is used to rank audit firms.