Financial safety nets: reconstructing and modelling a policymaking metaphor

This paper explains that financial safety nets exist because of difficulties in enforcing contracts and shows that elements of deposit-insurance schemes differ substantially across countries. It shows that differences in the design of financial safety nets correlate significantly with differences in the informational and contracting environments of individual countries and that a country's GDP per capita is correlated with proxies for a country's level of: (1) informational transparency, (2) contract enforcement and deterrent rights, and (3) accountability for safety net officials. The analysis portrays deposit insurance as a part of a country's larger safety net and contracting environment. This means that there is no universal method for preventing and resolving banking problems and that the structure of a country's safety net should evolve over time with changes in private and government regulators' capacity for valuing financial institutions, disciplining risk taking and resolving insolvency promptly, and for being held accountable for how well they perform these tasks.     

Effectiveness of Capital Regulation at U.S. Commercial Banks, 1985 to 1994

Unless priced and administered appropriately, a governmental safety net enhances risk-shifting opportunities for banks. This paper quantifies regulatory efforts to use capital requirements to control risk-shifting by U.S. banks during 1985 to 1994 and investigates how much risk-based capital requirements and other deposit-insurance reforms improved this control. We find that capital discipline did not prevent large banks from shifting risk onto the safety net. Banks with low capital and debt-to-deposits ratios overcame outside discipline better than other banks. Mandates introduced by 1991 legislation have improved but did not establish full regulatory control over bank risk-shifting incentives.     

Using disaster planning to optimize expenditures on financial safety nets

Using a multiperiod model, this paper offers a benchmark standard for efficient safety net management. This standard embodies a market-mimicking strategy for identifying, preventing, and resolving bank insolvencies. Around the world, governmental reluctance to acknowledge weaknesses in their crisis prevention efforts supports an underinvestment in contingent plans for handling financial disaster. The model features the hypothesis that this underinvestment misserves taxpayers by increasing the ability of stakeholders in insolvent banks to extract implicit and explicit subsidies when and as the threat of an actual crisis intensifies.The William S. Vickrey Distinguished Address presented at the Fiftieth International Atlantic Economic Conference, October 15–18, 2000, Charleston, SC.     

Ratio Analysis Using Rank Transformation

This paper presents an alternate method for transforming financial ratios. Ratios are ranked and scaled into a uniform distribution with boundaries between 0 and 1. Conceptually, we suggest that this method solves a number of methodological problems associated with ratios, including constrained choice of regression models, ratio outliers, negative ratios, and non-normal distributions. Scaled ranks of financial ratios are also conceptually appealing because they appear to capture comparative ordinal data about cross-sectional relationships between firms.The study empirically tests scaled rank transformations by examining the association of the transformations with stock returns. Results show that models using relative ranked accounting ratios have more explanatory and predictive power than untransformed, log-transformed and square-root transformed ratios.     

Employee Relations and the Likelihood of Occurrence of Corporate Financial Distress

Abstract:   In this paper, we investigate the association of employee relations with the occurrence of onset of financial distress. We argue that if adverse economic conditions arise, firms that have maintained good employee relations will be more effective in obtaining temporary labor concessions. As a result, firms with good employee relations, to the extent they are dependent on labor in the conduct of business operations, should be more likely to avoid the onset of future financial distress. The empirical findings we document support this prior.