Delay two-sector economic growth model with a Cobb–Douglas production function

Decisions in Economics and Finance - This study demonstrates the possibility of cyclic capital accumulation in the case in which there are delays in capital implementation and estimation of capital...     

Mobile money,risk sharing,and educational investment: Panel evidence from rural Uganda

We examine the impact of the rapidly expanding mobile banking service “mobile money” on rural households' ability to smooth investment in schooling after a negative shock. We find that a negative shock induces a 9.3‐percentage point decrease in per school‐age child educational expenditure for households who do not use mobile money compared to an 8.3‐percentage point decrease for households that have adopted mobile money. The underlying mechanism is an increase in remittance receipt and the diversity of senders owing to the reduction in transactions cost provided by mobile money. We show that our results are robust to alternative mechanisms. We use the expansion in mobile money agent network as an exogenous variation in access to mobile money.     

Mixed duopoly: Differential game approach

This study formulates a dynamic mixed oligopoly model, in which a state‐owned public firm competes against a private firm over multiple periods. We adopt a differential game formulated by Fershtman and Kamien [Econometrica 55 (1987), pp. 1151–1164] and investigate how the dynamic competition affects the optimal privatization policy. We characterize the open‐loop Nash equilibrium (OLNE) and Markov‐perfect Nash equilibrium (MPNE). We show that in the MPNE, an increase in the degree of privatization has a nonmonotonic effect on the price, increasing it in a wide range of parameter spaces, which is in sharp contrast to the result in the OLNE or static analyses. We also find that the optimal degree of privatization is higher in the MPNE than that in the OLNE and static equilibrium. These results suggest that intertemporal strategic behavior changes the optimal privatization policy.     

The effects of the raising-the-official-pension-age policy in an overlapping generations economy

This paper studies how economic variables are affected by raising the official pension age. Although it is said that such a policy increases output, this paper shows that such a statement is not necessarily true. Moreover, the paper finds that the social security benefit can decrease, which implies that it might be impossible to sustain the same level of benefit only by such a policy.     

Is silence golden? An empirical analysis of firms that stop giving quarterly earnings guidance

We investigate firms that stop providing earnings guidance (“stoppers”) either by publicly announcing their decision (“announcers”) or doing so quietly (“quiet stoppers”). Relative to firms that continue guiding, stoppers have poorer prior performance, more uncertain operating environments, and fewer informed investors. Announcers commit to non-disclosure because they (i) do not expect to report future good news or (ii) have lower incentives to guide due to the presence of long-term investors. The three-day return around the announcement is negative. Stoppers subsequently experience increases in analyst forecast dispersion and decreases in forecast accuracy but no change in return volatility or analyst following.     

Welfare effects of bubbles in an endogenous growth model

This paper examines welfare effects of asset bubbles in an endogenous growth model with overlapping generations. In our model, a steady-state equilibrium with bubbles exists only if the presence of bubbles raises the welfare level of the initial generation. Bubbles can be beneficial to generations born at relatively early dates, whereas they reduce the welfare level of sufficiently distant future generations. Increasing the rate of supply of the useless asset improves the lifetime utilities of future generations.     

Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information

We investigate the adverse selection problem where a principal delegates multiple tasks to an agent. We characterize the virtually implementable social choice functions by using the linking mechanism proposed by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) [20] that restricts the message spaces. The principal does not require any incentive wage schemes and can therefore avoid any information rent and welfare loss. We show the resemblance between the functioning of this message space restriction and that of incentive wage schemes. We also extend the results of the single-agent model to the multi-agent model.     

Measuring the Benefits of Neighbourhood Park Amenities: Application and Comparison of Spatial Hedonic Approaches

The hedonic price method was used to estimate the influence of parks on the rental prices of single-room dwellings in Setagaya Ward, Tokyo, Japan. A simple least squares method is not optimal when the data set contains spatial autocorrelation. To improve the accuracy of estimates, we employed spatial autoregression and kriging models, resulting in a higher validity of the spatial models compared to the least squares model. Kriging models were superior to others particularly in terms of prediction accuracy, indicating that these models should be employed if the objective is superior prediction rather than estimation. The results showed that the effect of parks on property values varied with the buffer distance and park size.