Endogenous codetermination

This research introduces endogenous codetermination in a Cournot duopoly. Unlike the received literature (Kraft, 1998), this work assumes that firms bargain with their own union bargaining units under codetermination if and only if they can choose an ad hoc bargaining effort by maximising profits (three-stage non-cooperative game). There are remarkable differences compared with the main findings of the exogenous codetermination literature. Indeed, there may exist asymmetric multiple (Pareto efficient) Nash equilibria in pure strategies. Mandatory codetermination, therefore, is Pareto worsening. Each firm can then use the union bargaining power as a strategic device in a Cournot setting.     

A model of growth with inherited tastes

This research aims at studying a general equilibrium closed economy with overlapping generations and inherited tastes (aspirations), as in de la Croix (Econ Lett 53(1):89–96, 1996). It shows that the interaction between the intensity of aspirations and the elasticity of substitution of effective consumption affects the qualitative and quantitative long-term dynamics from both local and global perspectives. The related literature is extended by showing that (1) the Neimark–Sacker bifurcation found by de la Croix (1996) does not necessarily give rise to fluctuations and (2) endogenous (long-lasting) fluctuations occur through the emergence of period-doubling bifurcations.     

Growth maximizing government size,social capital,and corruption

Our paper intersects two topics in growth theory: the growth maximizing government size and the role of Social Capital in development. We modify a simple overlapping generations framework by introducing two key features: a production function à la Barro together with the possibility that public officials steal a fraction of public resources under their own control. As underlined by the literature on corruption, Social Capital affects public officials' accountability through many channels which also affect the probability of being caught for embezzlement and misappropriation of public resources. Therefore, in our endogenous growth model such probability is taken as a proxy of Social Capital. We find that maximum growth rates are compatible with Big Government size, measured both in terms of expenditures and public officials, when associated with high levels of Social Capital.     

From volatility smiles to the volatility of volatility

Decisions in Economics and Finance - The paper reviews models of the option surface and reduced-form models for stochastic volatility in continuous time, under the risk-neutral measure. It defines...     

Codetermination,Price Competition and the Network Industry

This research develops a tractable two‐stage non‐cooperative game with complete information describing the behaviour of price‐setting firms that must choose to be profit maximisers or bargainers under codetermination in a network industry with horizontal product differentiation. The existing theoretical literature has already shown that codetermination might arise as the endogenous market outcome in a strategic competitive quantity‐setting duopoly. In sharp contrast with this result, the present article shows that codetermination does never emerge as a Nash equilibrium in a price‐setting non‐network duopoly. Then, it aims at highlighting the role of network externalities in determining changes of paradigm of the game and letting codetermination become a sub‐game perfect Nash equilibrium when prices are strategic substitutes or strategic complements. This equilibrium may be Pareto efficient. Results allow distinguishing between mandatory codetermination and voluntary codetermination. The article also proposes a model of endogenous codetermination according to which every firm may choose to bargain with its own corresponding union bargaining unit only whether the firm's bargaining strength is exactly the profit‐maximising one. The equilibrium outcomes emerging in this case range from a uniform Nash equilibrium, in which both firms are codetermined, to mixed Nash equilibria, in which only one of them chooses to be codetermined. These results are ‘network depending’ and do not hold in a non‐network duopoly.     

Light fuel demand and public policies in Brazil, 2003–2013

The main objective of this article is to evaluate determinants of demand for light fuels in Brazil between 2003 and 2013. Through a vector autoregression analysis, an effort was made to identify and quantify the impact of different economic variables and public policy measures adopted during this period on the surprising increase in energy consumption by Brazil’s light-vehicle fleet. The results suggest that demand for energy by the light-vehicle fleet was influenced by an increase in income, by a decrease in fuel prices associated with a policy designed to prevent increases in the price of gasoline from pushing the inflation rate up, by a higher availability of credit for buying vehicles, and by a drop in the real price of those goods, with emphasis on countercyclical measures to waive the tax on industrialized products levied on new vehicles during economic downturns in the automotive industry.     

Economic growth and stability with public pay-as-you-go pensions and private intra-family old-age insurance

This paper compares the steady-state and dynamic outcomes of two historical alternatives as a means of old-age insurance, namely, voluntary intra-family transfers from young to old members versus pay-as-you-go public pensions, in a general equilibrium overlapping generations model with children as a desirable good. We show that the shift from a private system of old-age support to public pensions increases the gross domestic product (GDP) per worker. Moreover, although in both cases the steady-state stock of capital, under myopic expectations, may be (globally) unstable depending on the size of the inter-generational transfer, we show that the existence of public pensions rather than private intra-family gifts considerably reduces the possibility of cyclical instability.     

Child policy ineffectiveness in an overlapping generations small open economy with human capital accumulation and public education

Motivated by the recent decrease in the number of children experienced in several developed countries, in this paper we consider a small open economy model with overlapping generations, endogenous fertility and human capital formation through public education, and look at the role the government can play in affecting fertility through the widely used child allowance policy. Contrary to conventional view, we show that the public provision of child allowances is fertility-neutral in the long run, that is it is not effective as a pro-natalist policy, while also reducing human capital accumulation. In contrast, the financing of the public education system is beneficial to both fertility and human capital. These results hold in the cases of both fixed and time cost of children.     

A Note on Loadings and Deductibles: Can a Vicious Circle Arise?

In a recently reprinted paper Borch wonders whether an increase in insurance loadings, together with the consequent increase in customers' deductibles, may be the start of a vicious circle, in which higher deductibles produce higher loadings and vice versa, ad infinitum. This paper rules out the possibility of a vicious circle, in a model à la Borch. First of all, increases in costs of the type considered by Borch are not necessarily followed by increases in loadings. Second, increases in loadings are not necessarily followed by increases in deductibles, since in equilibrium insurance may be Giffen. Last but not least, loadings do not increase with deductibles, because the only viable equilibrium is a Stackelberg one.     

A STRUCTURAL RISK‐NEUTRAL MODEL FOR PRICING AND HEDGING POWER DERIVATIVES

We develop a structural risk‐neutral model for energy market modifying along several directions the approach introduced in Aïd et al. In particular, a scarcity function is introduced to allow important deviations of the spot price from the marginal fuel price, producing price spikes. We focus on pricing and hedging electricity derivatives. The hedging instruments are forward contracts on fuels and electricity. The presence of production capacities and electricity demand makes such a market incomplete. We follow a local risk minimization approach to price and hedge energy derivatives. Despite the richness of information included in the spot model, we obtain closed‐form formulae for futures prices and semiexplicit formulae for spread options and European options on electricity forward contracts. An analysis of the electricity price risk premium is provided showing the contribution of demand and capacity to the futures prices. We show that when far from delivery, electricity futures behave like a basket of futures on fuels.