Exceptional performance of multinational suppliers: theory and evidence

Review of World Economics - This paper focuses on an unexamined area of trade—the behaviour of heterogeneous intermediate suppliers facing final producers of different ability and pursuing...     

Endogenous codetermination

This research introduces endogenous codetermination in a Cournot duopoly. Unlike the received literature (Kraft, 1998), this work assumes that firms bargain with their own union bargaining units under codetermination if and only if they can choose an ad hoc bargaining effort by maximising profits (three-stage non-cooperative game). There are remarkable differences compared with the main findings of the exogenous codetermination literature. Indeed, there may exist asymmetric multiple (Pareto efficient) Nash equilibria in pure strategies. Mandatory codetermination, therefore, is Pareto worsening. Each firm can then use the union bargaining power as a strategic device in a Cournot setting.     

Trade policy substitution: theory and evidence

Review of World Economics - With the help of a political economy model, we show that the extent of ‘trade policy substitution’—namely, substitution of tariffs with non-tariff...     

Switching generalized autoregressive score copula models with application to systemic risk

Recent financial disasters have emphasized the need to accurately predict extreme financial losses and their consequences for the institutions belonging to a given financial market. The ability of econometric models to predict extreme events strongly relies on their flexibility to account for the highly nonlinear and asymmetric dependence patterns observed in financial time series. In this paper, we develop a new class of flexible copula models where the dependence parameters evolve according to a Markov switching generalized autoregressive score (GAS) dynamics. Maximum likelihood estimation is performed using a two‐step procedure where the second step relies on the expectation–maximization algorithm. The proposed switching GAS copula models are then used to estimate the conditional value at risk and the conditional expected shortfall, measuring the impact on an institution of extreme events affecting another institution or the market. The empirical investigation, conducted on a panel of European regional portfolios, reveals that the proposed model is able to explain and predict the evolution of the systemic risk contributions over the period 1999–2015.     

Growth maximizing government size,social capital,and corruption

Our paper intersects two topics in growth theory: the growth maximizing government size and the role of Social Capital in development. We modify a simple overlapping generations framework by introducing two key features: a production function à la Barro together with the possibility that public officials steal a fraction of public resources under their own control. As underlined by the literature on corruption, Social Capital affects public officials' accountability through many channels which also affect the probability of being caught for embezzlement and misappropriation of public resources. Therefore, in our endogenous growth model such probability is taken as a proxy of Social Capital. We find that maximum growth rates are compatible with Big Government size, measured both in terms of expenditures and public officials, when associated with high levels of Social Capital.     

Consumption,asset wealth,equity premium,term spread,and flight to quality

We link transitory deviations of consumption from its equilibrium relationship with aggregate wealth and labor income to equity returns on the one hand, and to two characteristics of bond investors—the premium demanded to hold long‐term assets, and “flight to quality” behavior—on the other hand. Using a panel of 10 euro area countries over the period 1984Q1–2017Q4, we show that a rise in the consumption–wealth ratio predicts both higher equity returns and the future term spread, while a fall in the consumption–wealth ratio explains a large fraction of the rise in the spread between the “risky” and the “safe‐haven” bond.     

Markups,import competition and exporting

This paper analyses the relationship between markups and international trade at the firm level using a large sample of French manufacturing firms for the period 1995–2007. In particular, the paper investigates the effect of increasing import competition from China on firms' price–cost margins and the way in which exporting interacts with this effect. The results show robust evidence that firms in more direct competition with Chinese imports decrease their markups. However, firms that become exporters experience a smaller reduction in their price–cost margins. Consistent with these findings, the results also show that firms facing tougher competition from China are more likely to start exporting to avoid such competitive pressures.     

Knowledge distance and R&D collaboration in Cournot oligopoly

A Cournot collaboration game is complemented with the hypothesis that the cost of R&D collaboration depends on firm’s directed knowledge distance with respect to potential R&D partners. The further hypothesis that directed distance may be non‐uniform and pair‐wise asymmetric reconciles theoretical predictions with qualitative evidence about concentration and multiplicity of components in industrial R&D networks. The welfare properties of sparse stable networks are also affected.     

Codetermination,Price Competition and the Network Industry

This research develops a tractable two‐stage non‐cooperative game with complete information describing the behaviour of price‐setting firms that must choose to be profit maximisers or bargainers under codetermination in a network industry with horizontal product differentiation. The existing theoretical literature has already shown that codetermination might arise as the endogenous market outcome in a strategic competitive quantity‐setting duopoly. In sharp contrast with this result, the present article shows that codetermination does never emerge as a Nash equilibrium in a price‐setting non‐network duopoly. Then, it aims at highlighting the role of network externalities in determining changes of paradigm of the game and letting codetermination become a sub‐game perfect Nash equilibrium when prices are strategic substitutes or strategic complements. This equilibrium may be Pareto efficient. Results allow distinguishing between mandatory codetermination and voluntary codetermination. The article also proposes a model of endogenous codetermination according to which every firm may choose to bargain with its own corresponding union bargaining unit only whether the firm's bargaining strength is exactly the profit‐maximising one. The equilibrium outcomes emerging in this case range from a uniform Nash equilibrium, in which both firms are codetermined, to mixed Nash equilibria, in which only one of them chooses to be codetermined. These results are ‘network depending’ and do not hold in a non‐network duopoly.