Cross‐Border Auction Cycle Effects of Sovereign Bond Issuance in the Euro Area

We provide evidence for the euro area of spillovers from foreign public debt auctions into domestic secondary‐market auction cycles. We also confirm existing evidence of such spillovers from domestic issues into the domestic secondary market. Consistent with a theory of primary dealers’ limited risk‐bearing capacity, we find that auction cycles from domestic issues are stronger during the recent crisis period, whereas cross‐border effects are stronger in the precrisis period, but this evidence is not strong. This finding likely reflects the opposing effects of reduced sovereign bond market integration during the crisis and higher yield covariances caused by more market volatility.     

BRETTON WOODS, THROUGH THE LENS OF STATE-OF-THE-ART MACROTHEORY AND THE EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM

‘Le moyen d'avoir raison dans l'avenir est, á certainesheures, de savoir se résigner a etre démodé’(E. Renan. 1882, p. 56).     

Favoritism in Mutual Fund Families? Evidence on Strategic Cross‐Fund Subsidization

We investigate whether mutual fund families strategically transfer performance across member funds to favor those more likely to increase overall family profits. We find that “high family value” funds (i.e., high fees or high past performers) overperform at the expense of “low value” funds. Such a performance gap is above the one existing between similar funds not affiliated with the same family. Better allocations of underpriced initial public offering deals and opposite trades across member funds partly explain why high value funds overperform. Our findings highlight how the family organization prevalent in the mutual fund industry generates distortions in delegated asset management.     

FROM BUDGETARY FORECASTS TO EX POST FISCAL DATA: EXPLORING THE EVOLUTION OF FISCAL FORECAST ERRORS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

This paper splits the ex post error in the budget balance, defined as the final budget figure minus the planned figure, into implementation and revision errors, and investigates the determinants of these errors. The implementation error is the difference between the nowcast, published toward the end of the year of budget implementation, and the planned budget, while the revision error is the difference between the final figure and the nowcast. The split takes account of differences in reporting incentives at the different budgeting stages. The predictive content of fiscal plans is important, because it determines the reliability of the budget, while that of the nowcasts is important also because these figures are an input for the next budget and may contain important signals about the fiscal stance. Implementation and revision errors may arise for political and strategic reasons. Our results suggest that an improvement in the quality of institutions, whether measured by the tightness of national fiscal rules, the medium‐term budgetary framework or budgetary transparency, increases the quality of budgetary reporting at both the planning and the nowcast stage. This supports the recently adopted requirements on national fiscal frameworks. It also strengthens the case for a close monitoring by the European Commission of national budgeting. (JEL E6, H6)     

Outsourcing in the International Mutual Fund Industry: An Equilibrium View

We study outsourcing relationships among international asset management firms. We find that, in companies that manage both outsourced and in‐house funds, in‐house funds outperform outsourced funds by 0.85% annually (57% of the expense ratio). We attribute this result to preferential treatment of in‐house funds via the preferential allocation of IPOs, trading opportunities, and cross‐trades, especially at times when in‐house funds face steep outflows and require liquidity. We explain preferential treatment with agency problems: it increases with the subcontractor's market power and the difficulty of monitoring the subcontractor, and decreases with the subcontractor's amount of parallel in‐house activity.     

ON THE ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECT OF EXCLUSIVE DEALING WHEN ENTRY BY MERGER IS POSSIBLE*

We extend the literature on exclusive dealing by allowing the incumbent and the potential entrant to merge. This uncovers new effects. First, exclusive dealing can be used to improve the incumbent's bargaining position in the merger negotiation. Second, the incumbent finds it easier to elicit the buyer's acceptance of exclusivity. Third, despite allowing the more efficient technology to find its way into the industry, exclusive dealing reduces welfare because (i) it may trigger entry through merger whereas independent entry would be socially optimal and (ii) it may deter entry altogether.     

THOMAS TOOKE AND THE INFLUENCE OF THE RATE OF INTEREST ON PRICES: IMPLICATIONS FOR DISTRIBUTION THEORY

Thomas Tooke included money interest among the determinantsof normal money production costs, together with money wagesand production techniques. This inclusion permitted him to explainthe existence, in actual fact, of a direct relationship betweenthe rate of interest and the level of prices. He did not developthe implications for distribution theory of his view of theinfluence of the rate of interest on the price level. In thepresent article it is maintained that the rate of interest emergesfrom Tooke's analysis as the regulator of the ratio of pricesto money wages, with the corollary that there is implicit init a causal relationship between money interest and normal profitthat goes from the former to the latter. This may be connectedwith Sraffa's suggestion of a determination of the rate of profitby the money rate of interest and lend it the support of Tooke'sscrupulous analysis of facts.     

Game-theoretic definitions of fairness and the contractualistic foundations of justice

We discuss game-theoretic interpretations of Rawls's theory of justice with special reference to the choice of the most appropriate solution concept. We show that Core-like solution concepts, as the one proposed by Laden (1991,Philosophy and Public Affairs,20, 189–222), have undesirable implications in this context. The “Bargaining Set” has more satisfactory properties for any contractualistic approach.     

Party Formation and Policy Outcomes under Different Electoral Systems

I introduce a model of representative democracy with strategic parties, strategic candidates, strategic voters and multiple districts. If policy preferences are similar across districts and not too concentrated within districts, then the number of effective parties is larger under proportional representation (PR) than under plurality, and both electoral systems determine the median voter's preferred policy. However, for more asymmetric distributions of preferences the Duvergerian predictions can be reversed , and the policy outcome with PR is more moderate than the one with plurality. Sincere voting induces more party formation, and strategic voting can be observed more often under PR.