Managerial compensation and incentives in for-profit and nonprofit hospitals

Differential economic behavior of for-profit and nonprofit institutionscan be manifest in both output and input markets. When behaviorin output markets is difficult to observe, behavior in inputmarkets can be useful proxies. We examine monetary compensationand its composition between base salary and bonus, and the associatedincentive structures, in the U.S. hospital industry. Our datapermit controlling for interinstitutional differences in thescope and complexity of jobs having the same titles, as wellas differences in organization size and other variables. Wefind (1) total monetary compensation for the two top executivejobs is substantially higher in the for-profit sector; and (2)the composition of compensation as between base salary and bonusdiffers materially across forms of organization, bonuses beingabsolutely and relatively greater in the for-profit sector.Particularly noteworthy is the finding that for-profit hospitalsutilize compensation mechanisms that, by involving larger contingentcomponents, provide stronger incentives - greater rewards -as compared with nonprofit hospitals, for performance that ismore easily monitored. While our findings are consistent withmore than one model of comparative organizations differ in theirgoals and, hence, in the kinds of managers they demand and thereward structures they offer. Nonprofit organizations may pursueobjectives that reflect greater concern about collective goodsor other outputs that are more difficult to measure and reward.Alternatively, nonprofits, confronted by a nondistribution constrainton the payout of profit to managers, may lack incentives forefficiency, and so may pursue other goals such as a quiet life.Such differential objective functions, together with the differentialconstraints on the distribution of profit to managers, havetwo kinds of implications. (1) Nonprofit and for-profit organizationsmay attract different kinds of managers, especially at the toplevels, because nonprofits prefer working for a nonprofit organizationand, hence, may offer a lower supply price to them. (2) Thetwo types of organizations can be expected to offer differentialcomposition of compensation as between base salary and performance-basedbonus, providing different incentives for managers. Our analysisis positive in character, the goal being to identify systematicdifferences in organization behavior.     

The specialist's discretion: stopped orders and price improvement

When a market order arrives, the NYSE specialist can offer aprice one tick better than the limit orders on the book andtrade for his own account. Alternatively, the specialist can'stop' the market order, which means he guarantees executionat the current quote but provides the possibility of price improvement.My model shows that specialists can use stops to sample thefuture order flow before making a commitment to trade. I presentempirical evidence that both stops and immediate price improvementimpose adverse selection costs on limit order traders.     

Does purchasing power parity hold in African less developed countries? Evidence from a panel data unit root test

This study tests for long-run relative purchasing power parityamong a sample of 27 African less developed countries. For thispurpose, a new test advocated by Im and co-workers is employedwhich allows one to test for unit roots in heterogeneous paneldatasets. This is known as the t-bar test, by which purchasingpower parity is confirmed or rejected on the basis of whetheror not the average augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic based ondemeaned data is significantly different from zero. Using quarterlydata covering the period 1974-97, purchasing power parity isgenerally rejected using individual country unit root testsbut support is found using the t-bar test. This suggests thatlow power problems in testing for purchasing power parity canbe overcome using this panel data procedure. The findings alsosupport the view that purchasing power parity is most likelyto be found among high inflation less developed countries andthat the half-life of a one-off random shock to parity is approximatelysix quarters. These results are generally confirmed for the1960-73 period.     

The mandatory disclosure of trades and market liquidity

Financial market regulations require various 'insiders' to disclosetheir trades after the trades are made. We show that such mandatorydisclosure rules can increase insiders' expected trading profits.This is because disclosure leads to profitable trading opportunitiesfor insiders even if they possess no private information onthe asset's value. We also show that insiders will generallynot voluntarily disclose their trades, so for disclosure tobe forthcoming, it must be mandatory. Key to the analysis isthat the market cannot observe whether an insider is tradingon private information regarding asset value of is trading forpersonal portfolio reasons.     

Efficiency with costly information: a reinterpretation of evidence from managed portfolios

We investigate the informational efficiency of mutual fund performancefor the period 1965-84. Results are shown to be sensitive tothe measurement of performance chosen. We find that returnson S&P stocks, returns on non-S&P stocks, and returnson bonds are significant factors in performance assessment.Once we correct for the impact of non-S&P assets on mutualfund returns, we find that mutual funds do not earn returnsthat justify their information acquisition costs. This is consistentwith results for prior periods.     

Spreads, depths, and the impact of earnings information: an intraday analysis

For a sample of NYSE firms, we show that wide spreads are accompaniedby low depths, and that spreads widen and depths fall in responseto bigger volume. Spreads widen and depths fall in anticipationof earnings announcements; these effects are more pronouncedfor announcements with larger subsequent price changes. Spreadsare also wider following earnings announcements, but this effectdissipates quickly after controlling for volume. Collectively,our results suggest liquidity providers are sensitive to changesin information asymmetry risk and use both spreads and depthsto actively manage this risk.     

Health and development: The Venda care group organisation

Health is one of the crucial problems confronting the development of Third World countries. Community‐based primary health care is the best instrument for mobilising community development.Development through health, however, can only be achieved if primary health care is implemented in a comprehensive approach in which a supportive environment and living conditions are as important as the provision of health care services. The Venda care group organisation, like other village health workers, is involved in primary health care and community development in the communities of the care groups. Such supportive community‐based organisations are able to alleviate health and development problems at the grass roots provided that programmes and activities are based on community participation, self‐reliance and the development of local decision‐making and leadership skills. The degree of success of the Venda care group organisation in achieving these objectives was investigated.     

Auditor liability: A comparison of judge and juror verdicts

This research examines differences between judges and jurors in rendering liability judgments in auditor litigation cases. While any number of case contexts would allow us to contrast and compare judges and jurors, we chose one that we believed would also address a second timely issue, auditor reliance or non-reliance upon the work of others. Within the general context of litigation of an alleged audit failure, we manipulated, between-participants, external auditor reliance on the work of others (relied on outsourced work, relied on in-house internal auditors’ work or did not rely). Our results show differences in the liability assessments of judges and jurors. Judges assign more liability to auditors that rely on the work of in-house internal auditors, less liability to auditors that rely on outsourced internal auditors and the least liability to auditors that choose not to rely on the work of internal auditors (but re-perform the work themselves) while jurors assess higher liability regardless of the work done by the auditors. Mediation analyses suggests the differences found in the overall liability assessments of jurors and judges are partially driven by their divergent attitudes towards the public accounting profession with jurors’ unfavorable attitudes leading to them assign liability regardless of the work performed. Further analysis suggests juror insensitivity to our reliance manipulations may reflect a strict liability perspective (consistent with prior work by Charron and Lowe (2008)); while judges consider other factors when making liability assessments.     

Investment analysis and the adjustment of stock prices to common information

In this article we are concerned with the effect of the numberof investment analysts following a firm on the speed of adjustmentof the firm's stock price to new information that has commoneffects across firms. It is found that returns on portfoliosof firms that are followed by many analysts tend to lead thoseof firms that are followed by fewer analysts, even when thefirms are of approximately the same size. Many analyst firmsalso tend to respond more rapidly to market returns than dofew analyst firms, adjusting for firm size. This relation, however,is nonlinear, and the marginal effect of the number of analystson the speed of price adjustment increases with the number ofanalysts.     

Information, trade, and derivative securities

Hellwig's (1980) model is used to analyze the value of improvingtrading opportunities by more frequent trading in the underlyingasset, or by trading in a derivative asset. With multiple tradingsessions, uninformed investors behave as rational trend followers,while more informed investors follow a contrarian strategy.As trading becomes continuous, Pareto efficiency is achieved.With trading in an appropriate derivative security, Pareto efficiencymay be achieved in only a single round of trading. All derivativeclaims are then priced on Black and Scholes (1973) principlesand, in the absence of further supply shocks, no trading willtake place in subsequent trading rounds.