Disclosure incentives when competing firms have common ownership

This paper examines whether common ownership – i.e., instances where investors simultaneously own significant stakes in competing firms – affects voluntary disclosure. We argue that common ownership (i) reduces proprietary cost concerns of disclosure, and (ii) incentivizes firms to “internalize” the externality benefits of their disclosure for co-owned peer firms. Accordingly, we find a positive relation between common ownership and disclosure. Evidence from cross-sectional tests and a quasi-natural experiment based on financial institution mergers help mitigate concerns that our results are explained by an omitted variable bias or reverse causality. Finally, we find that common ownership is associated with increased market liquidity.     

The Impact of Ambiguity on Managerial Investment and Cash Holdings

Standard finance theory suggests that managers invest in projects that, in expectation, produce returns that justify the use of capital. An underlying assumption is that managers have the information necessary to understand the distributional properties of the pay‐offs underlying the decision. This paper examines firm investment behavior when managers are likely to find it more challenging to develop expectations of pay‐offs, namely during periods of increased macroeconomic ambiguity. In particular, we examine how macroeconomic ambiguity – proxied by the variance premium (Drechsler, 2010 ) and the dispersion in forecasts of corporate profits from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (Anderson et al., 2009 ) – impacts managerial capital investment and cash holdings. Consistent with ambiguity theory, we find that macroeconomic ambiguity is negatively associated with capital investment and positively associated with cash holdings. These results are robust to alternative explanations related to risk, investor sentiment and economic conditions. Moreover, consistent with recent theoretical real options literature, we find that ambiguity reduces the value of investment opportunities, while risk increases the value of such opportunities. Overall, these findings provide initial empirical evidence on the economic distinction between ambiguity and risk with respect to managerial investment and cash holdings.     

The Relation between Aggregate Earnings and Security Returns over Long Intervals*

This paper provides a theoretical explanation and consistent empirical evidence for the increase in the contemporaneous correlation between returns and aggregate earnings as the return interval is lengthened. Consistent with intuition and with Easton, Harris, and Ohlson 1992, the analysis shows that aggregation over time renders the lag in accounting recognition relatively less important and thus improves the returns‐earnings R². Interestingly, the analysis also reveals that aggregating earnings over longer periods increases the positive covariance between aggregate earnings and the accounting lag, which may further increase the R². This positive covariance can lead to an earnings coefficient greater than one over some range of aggregation, which is consistent with the findings of Easton et al. that over the 10‐year interval the returns‐earnings regression slope coefficient is greater than one (1.7). The empirical results highlight the fact that the slope coefficient, which is greater than one and increasing with the interval, accounts for much of the increment to the returns‐earnings R². In fact, constraining the slope coefficient to be one results in an R² of 11 percent for the 10‐year interval, which is considerably lower than the R² of 47 percent when the regression is unconstrained. Hence, the positive covariance between current earnings and the accounting lag, rather than the diminishing effect of the accounting lag, appears to be the dominant explanation for the observed high R² over long intervals.     

The Conservatism Principle and the Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings: An Event‐Based Approach*

We test the asymmetric timeliness hypothesis by using information in extreme events as a measure of good/bad news. Our focus on extreme events is motivated by two arguments. First, the accounting concept of materiality in conjunction with litigation risk influences managers and auditors to make more conservative choices with respect to material events. Second, focusing on extreme shocks minimizes the probability that accounting slack may obscure the effect of asymmetric timeliness (Beaver and Ryan 2005). We identify individual events using short‐window extreme returns, since long‐window returns would aggregate the effect of multiple events and thus limit our ability to detect the asymmetry. Taken together, these features of our research design provide a more powerful test of asymmetric timeliness. Consistent with prior studies, we document that the correlation between bad news and concurrent earnings is significantly higher than that between good news and concurrent earnings. Our analysis of extreme events also enables us to document higher correlation of good news with earnings two or more quarters ahead. This is in contrast to prior studies that were unable to document asymmetry in the relation between returns and subsequent earnings in the opposite direction to that between returns and concurrent earnings. Our paper contributes to the growing literature on conservatism by modifying the Basu methodology to enhance the power of the test of asymmetric timeliness.     

Measuring efficiency with a linear economic model

This paper modifies and interprets Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) using a linear economic model. This approach is similar to the cone input/output and assurance region approaches to DEA, but it is implemented so that the multipliers are measured in the same units across all linear optimization problems. This approach allows one to interpret alternatives as profit maximizing organizations and the DEA multipliers as prices that are comparable across the alternatives. This is a useful extension of the assurance region concept, but more important, is that our approach enhances communication with decision-makers. The improved communication is illustrated by applying the model to the siting of a long-term health care facility. This application is interesting because the multiplier bounds make practical sense, and because the problem has dimensions that sometimes lead to interpretation problems with the traditional DEA model. For example, the site characteristics do not result from coordinated decisions, some sites exhibit zero values for some variables, and the problem has many variables compared with the number of potential sites. Problems with these dimensions have, at times, been deemed unsuitable for DEA, but they are handled without problem by the linear economic model.     

Externalities of public firm presence: Evidence from private firms' investment decisions

Public firms provide a large amount of information through their disclosures. In addition, information intermediaries publicly analyze, discuss, and disseminate these disclosures. Thus, greater public firm presence in an industry should reduce uncertainty in that industry. Following the theoretical prediction of investment under uncertainty, we hypothesize and find that private firms are more responsive to their investment opportunities when they operate in industries with greater public firm presence. Further, we find that the effect of public firm presence is greater in industries with better information quality and in industries characterized by a greater degree of investment irreversibility. Our results suggest that public firms generate positive externalities by reducing industry uncertainty and facilitating more efficient private firm investment.     

Permanent and Transitory Earnings,Accounting Recording Lag,and the Earnings Coefficient

In this paper, (1) wedefine precisely the terms permanent and transitory earnings;(2) we delineate the effects of the degree of permanence andof accounting recording lag on estimates of the slope coefficientfrom a returns-earnings regression and (3) we examine the relationbetween the estimates of the earnings coefficient and observablevariables that may indicate (i) the extent to which earningsare more or less permanent, and (ii) the extent to which valuerelevant events are recorded in accounting earnings in a timelyfashion. Our main point is that attributing differences in thereturns-earnings relation to one of these effects without controllingfor the other may lead to erroneous conclusions.     

Valuation Implications of Unconditional Accounting Conservatism: Evidence from Analysts' Target Prices

We examine whether financial analysts understand the valuation implications of unconditional accounting conservatism when forecasting target prices. While accounting conservatism affects reported earnings, conservatism per se does not have an effect on the present value of future cash flows. We examine whether analysts adjust for the effect of conservatism included in their earnings forecasts when using these forecasts to estimate target prices. We find that signed target price errors (actual minus forecast) have a significant positive association with the degree of conservatism in forward earnings, suggesting that target prices are biased due to accounting conservatism. Cross‐sectional analysis suggests that more sophisticated analysts and superior long‐term forecasters adjust for conservatism to a greater extent than other analysts. In additional analyses, we explore the mechanism through which conservatism leads to bias in target prices. We first show that analysts' earnings forecasts are negatively associated with the degree of conservatism; that is, analysts include the effect of unconditional conservatism in their earnings forecasts. Based on alternative earnings‐based valuation models that analysts may use, our evidence suggests that analysts fail to appropriately adjust their valuation multiple for the effect of conservatism included in their earnings forecasts when using these forecasts to derive target prices. As a consequence, we find that, for extreme changes in conservatism, the bias in analysts' target prices due to conservatism leads to a distortion of market prices. The evidence highlights the concern that analysts may not appreciate the valuation implications of conservative accounting which could inhibit price discovery.