A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Thailand Taxpayer Survey

We investigate whether more resources should be devoted to a Thai tax enforcement program which is aimed at bringing small businesses into the tax system. We show that the appropriate criteria for determining whether more resources should be devoted to tax enforcement is whether the Atkinson–Stern condition for the optimal provision of a publicly-provided good is satisfied, or equivalently, whether the marginal cost of finds obtained through additional tax enforcement, SMCF_p, is less than the marginal cost of funds obtained through raising tax rates, SMCF_t. In our base case scenario, the SMCF_p is 11.60 which exceeds our estimate of the SMCF_t for an across-the-board increase in income tax rates on wage earners. The use of pro-poor distributional weights makes expanding the survey less attractive if the alternative way of obtaining additional tax revenue is an across-the-board income tax rate increase, while aversion to tax evasion makes it more attractive.     

The Thai Rural Credit System: Public Subsidies, Private Information, and Segmented Markets

Thailand has sought to increase farmers' access to credit bygovernment intervention. In 1966 it created a government agriculturalbank to lend solely to farm households, and beginning in thelate 1970s it required commercial banks to lend heavily in therural sector, either directly or by making deposits in the agriculturalbank. The result was an enormous expansion of credit in therural sector. But because formal lenders were either unableor unwilling to solve the information problems involved in thebroad range of rural credit transactions, the informal creditsector (which charged interest rates many times higher thanthe formal sector) continued to thrive. Using household surveysand surveys of moneylenders, this article provides a detailedanalysis of the ways in which lenders in the informal sectorhave solved the information problems of providing credit. Theauthors argue that the informal sector is competitive, and thathigh interest rates reflect high information costs, not thescarcity of funds.     

The New Competition Law in Thailand: Lessons for Institution Building

The new competition law in Thailand, which replaces the totally ineffective 1979 anti-monopoly law, aims to enhance the competitive process by improving the enforcement mechanism. Unfortunately, the Trade Competition Commission's rulings on the first two complaints about allegedly illegal conduct by two large companies with obvious market power were disappointing. Although political pressure was a significant factor affecting the decisions, this paper argues that there were also other important issues. The complex legal, business, and economic problems in both cases, the weakness of the competition law, poor institutional design, inadequate resources and lack of experience among the officials involved have all contributed to the unfortunate decisions, and will certainly affect the performance of competition law enforcement in the future.     

The meaning of “social safety nets”

In Southeast Asia, the issue of “social safety nets” (SSNs) has emerged more prominently since the financial crisis. Despite the increased interest in social safety nets, there is still considerable confusion among scholars and national and international organizations regarding the use and meaning of the term. This article considers the different definitions of the term—particularly as it was used during the Asian Financial Crisis—and to attempt to clarify its meaning and proper use.The safety net analogy is drawn from high-wire walkers who are protected by a safety net if they fall. The safety net prevents any walker who falls—unexpectedly or not—from hitting the floor and incurring catastrophic injuries. Following this line of reasoning, it is not surprising to learn that some organizations and scholars use the term SSN such that it encompasses private and public mechanisms that assist individuals in maintaining a minimum level of consumption.The term “social safety net” (SSN) began to be used by Bretton Woods’ institutions in connection with structural adjustment programs related to their lending programs. Developing countries introduced SSNs to mitigate the social impact of structural adjustment measures on specific low-income groups. They were initially formulated to serve three objectives: poverty alleviation, to make adjustment programs more politically acceptable, and institutional reform. During the Asian Financial Crisis, there was a great deal of confusion regarding the content and consequent identification of SSN programs.Public SSN programs can be classified into formal and informal safety nets. Formal and informal safety nets are, generally, distinguished by law enforcement: formal safety nets are those which legally guarantee individuals access to economic or social support whereas informal safety nets provide likelihood of support to individuals to assure them of attaining or remaining above the designated minimum standard of living but with no legal guarantee.Informal SSNs can be divided into private and public ones. Examples of private informal SSNs include transfers from family members, friends, neighbors and community members and institutions, including NGOs, while those of public informal SSNs refer to the support which individuals can hope for from the government, through programs which generate assets or employment, transfer income, or provide basic social services, as a means of helping affected individuals from falling below the designated minimum standard of living. The difference between formal and informal public SSNs is whether there exists a formal legal support of the assistance.The article has provided more discussion on the definitions of SSN used by the World Bank, ESCAP, ILO and TDRI.In conclusion, the authors note that the tremendous variation in the use of the term invites confusion and makes it virtually useless as a technical concept. The very nature of the metaphor invokes a vision of a large net that encompass a number of different types of programs. In many cases it is not even possible to list specific programs that are included, as the particular forms of these programs could, of course, vary with place, time and circumstances. Complicating things further, the term is sometimes used in a very narrow sense. Given the low probability that usage of the term will ever be standardized, economists and national/international organizations might be well served by avoiding the term completely and instead using its component parts.