Aggregative games and oligopoly theory: short-run and long-run analysis

We compile an IO toolkit for aggregative games with positive and normative comparative statics results for asymmetric oligopoly in the short and long run. We characterize the class of aggregative Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly games, and the subset for which the aggregate is a summary statistic for consumer welfare. We close the model with a monopolistically competitive fringe for long-run analysis. Remarkably, we show strong neutrality properties in the long run across a wide range of market structures. The results elucidate aggregative games as a unifying principle in the literature on merger analysis, privatization, Stackelberg leadership, and cost shocks.     

Welfare receipt and the intergenerational transmission of work‐welfare norms

This article investigates the role of welfare receipt in shaping norms regarding work and welfare using unique Australian data from the Youth in Focus Project. We begin by incorporating welfare into a theoretical model of the transmission of work‐welfare norms across generations. Consistent with the predictions of this model, we find evidence that youths' attitudes toward work and welfare may be influenced by socialization within their families. Young people are more likely to oppose generous social benefits and to believe that social inequality stems from individual characteristics if (i) their mothers support these views; (ii) their mothers were employed while they were growing up; and (iii) their families never received welfare. Finally, youths' work‐welfare norms appear to be unrelated to their neighbors' welfare receipt suggesting that socialization occurs primarily within families rather than within neighborhoods.     

By chance or by choice? Biased attribution of others’ outcomes when social preferences matter

Experimental Economics - Decision makers in positions of power often make unobserved choices under risk and uncertainty. In many cases, they face a trade-off between maximizing their own payoff and...     

Distinguishing between stochastic and deterministic behavior in high frequency foreign exchange rate returns: Can non-linear dynamics help forecasting?

This paper investigates the dynamic properties of high frequency foreign exchange rate returns. Using hourly data for four exchanges rates, the British Pound, the Deutschemark, the Japanese Yen and Swiss Franc, we attempt to differentiate between stochastic and deterministic behavior in hourly rates of returns. While the autocorrelation coefficients and the Brock-Dechert-Scheinkman test point to the presence of some non-linear dependence, correlation dimension estimates reveal little evidence in favor of low-dimensional chaos. The analysis appears to support the view that although it is not possible to exploit deterministic non-linear dependence in exchange rate time series in order to improve short-term forecasting, non-linear stochastic models can be used for conditional volatility forecasts.     

Impact of Rebates and Refunds on Contributions to Threshold Public Goods: Evidence from a Field Experiment

We investigate the impact of rebates and refunds on contributions to threshold public goods using evidence from a field experiment conducted in conjunction with an Australian charity, Life Goes On. We find that offering rebates and refunds has a significant positive impact on both participation and average donations in the absence of seed money. Our results suggest that offering rebates and refunds, and the existence of seed money may, to some extent, play substitute roles in encouraging giving behavior. Seed money has a significant positive effect on participation only. Seed money's impact on average donations may be mitigated by a threshold effect.     

Subject pool effects in a corruption experiment: A comparison of Indonesian public servants and Indonesian students

We report results from a corruption experiment with Indonesian public servants and Indonesian students. Our results suggest that the Indonesian public servant subjects have a significantly lower tolerance of corruption than the Indonesian students. We find no evidence that this is due to a selection effect. The reasons given by the subjects for their behaviour suggest that the differences in behavior across the subject pools are driven by their different real life experiences. For example, when abstaining from corruption, public servants more often cite the need to reduce the social costs of corruption as a reason for their actions, and when engaging in corruption, they cite low government salaries or a belief that corruption is a necessary evil in the current environment. In contrast, students give more simplistic moral reasons. We conclude by emphasizing that results obtained from different subject pools can complement each other in illuminating different aspects of the same problem. We would like to thank Charles Noussair and the participants of the Experimental Economics Workshop (2006) at the University of Melbourne for their comments. Daniel Piccinin and Revy Sjahrial have provided excellent research assistance. We are grateful to the Australian Research Council and the World Bank for their financial assistance.     

Propensities to engage in and punish corrupt behavior: Experimental evidence from Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore

This paper examines cultural differences in individual decision-making in a corruption game. We define culture as an individual's accumulated experience, shaped by the social, institutional, and economic aspects of the environment in which the individual lives. Based on experiments run in Australia (Melbourne), India (Delhi), Indonesia (Jakarta) and Singapore, we find that there is a greater variation in the propensities to punish corrupt behavior than in the propensities to engage in corrupt behavior across cultures. Consistent with the existing corruption indices, the subjects in India exhibit a higher tolerance of corruption than the subjects in Australia. However, the subjects in Singapore have a higher tolerance and the subjects in Indonesia have much lower tolerance of corruption than expected. We conjecture that this is due to the nature of the recent institutional changes in these two countries. We also vary our experimental design to examine the impact of the perceived cost of bribery and find that the results are culture-specific.     

Correction to: Putting relational contract theory to the test: experimental evidence

Experimental Economics - A correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-021-09712-z     

Putting relational contract theory to the test: experimental evidence

Experimental Economics - We investigate a number of canonical predictions that arise from relational contract theory. Employing an experimental design with endogenous choice of contract type, we...