Estimating the market value of Steve Jobs using an event study

Using an event study approach, we seek to estimate the value investors placed on Steve Jobs by investigating the stock market reactions to his death. In the three-day window surrounding his death, the estimated cumulative abnormal returns are ?5.76%. Given the market capitalization of Apple at the time, it can be inferred that investors valued Steve Jobs at 20 billion dollars. While tragic, the news about Jobs’ death is greeted favourably by Apple’s competitors. The competitors appear to be convinced that, without Steve Jobs, they can compete with Apple better.     

Capital structure and corporate governance quality: Evidence from the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)

Grounded in agency theory, this study explores how capital structure is influenced by aggregate corporate governance quality. We measure governance quality using broad-based comprehensive governance metrics provided by the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). The empirical evidence reveals a robust inverse association between leverage and governance quality. Firms with poor governance are significantly more leveraged. It appears that leverage substitutes for corporate governance in alleviating agency conflicts. Further, we utilize empirical methods that control for endogeneity and show that poor governance quality likely brings about, and does not merely reflect, higher leverage. Our results are important as they show that the overall quality of corporate governance has a material impact on critical corporate decisions such as capital structure choices.     

LIQUIDITY AND QUOTE CLUSTERING IN A MARKET WITH MULTIPLE TICK SIZES

We analyze market liquidity (i.e., spreads and depths) and quote clustering using data from the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE), where the tick size increases with share price in a stepwise fashion. We find that stocks that are subject to larger mandatory tick sizes have wider spreads and less quote clustering. We also find that liquidity providers on the KLSE do not always quote larger depths for stocks with larger tick sizes. Overall, our results suggest that larger tick sizes for higher priced stocks are detrimental to market liquidity, although the adverse effect of larger tick sizes is mitigated by lower negotiation costs (i.e., less quote clustering).     

Leverage-reducing exchange offers and bondholder–stockholder wealth transfers: A re-evaluation

This paper re-examines the intersecurity wealth effects of leverage-reducing exchange offer (LREO) announcements. We show that previous studies may have been confounded by not distinguishing between two types of LREOs – swaps and exchange offers – and by the limited availability of bond data to properly test the wealth transfer effect. Contrary to extant research, we find evidence supportive of the wealth transfer hypothesis in the case of exchange offers but not swap offers. More detailed analysis of LREO exchange offers reveals a systematic relationship between bond returns and certain attributes that capture managerial inclination to accede to bondholder interests, consistent with a wealth transfer effect.     

Managerial Talent and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): How Do Talented Managers View Corporate Social Responsibility?

Motivated by the ongoing debate on the costs and benefits of corporate social responsibility (CSR), we explore how talented managers view CSR investments. Based on nearly 20,000 observations across 17 years, our evidence reveals a nonmonotonic effect of managerial talent on CSR. Exploiting a novel measure of managerial ability, we find that talented managers view CSR investments favorably. However, only those with especially strong talent are in favor of CSR investments. For executives ranked above the 75th percentile in terms of managerial talent, an increase in managerial ability leads to more CSR investments, suggesting that these strongly talented managers perceive CSR as enhancing firm performance. In contrast, for those with weaker talent, CSR investments are negatively associated with managerial ability, implying that these weakly talented managers view CSR as a wasteful deployment of resources. Further evidence shows that our conclusion is unlikely confounded by endogeneity.