Asymmetry,Complementarities, and State Dependence in Federal Reserve Forecasts

Forecasts are a central component of policymaking; the Federal Reserve's forecasts are published in a document called the Greenbook. Previous studies of the Greenbook's inflation forecasts have found them to be rationalizable but asymmetric if considering particular subperiods, for example, before and after the Volcker appointment. In these papers, forecasts are analyzed in isolation, assuming policymakers value them independently. We analyze the Greenbook forecasts in a framework in which the forecast errors for different variables are allowed to interact. We find that allowing the losses to interact makes the unemployment forecasts virtually symmetric, the output forecasts symmetric prior to the Volcker appointment, and the inflation forecasts symmetric after the onset of the Great Moderation.     

Benefits from U.S. Monetary Policy Experimentation in the Days of Samuelson and Solow and Lucas

A policy maker knows two models. One implies an exploitable inflation-unemployment trade-off, the other does not. The policy maker's prior probability over the two models is part of his state vector. Bayes' law converts the prior probability into a posterior probability and gives the policy maker an incentive to experiment. For models calibrated to U.S. data through the early 1960s, we compare the outcomes from two Bellman equations. The first tells the policy maker to "experiment and learn." The second tells him to "learn but don't experiment." In this way, we isolate a component of government policy that is due to experimentation and estimate the benefits from intentional experimentation. We interpret the Bellman equation that learns but does not intentionally experiment as an "anticipated utility" model and study how well its outcomes approximate those from the "experiment and learn" Bellman equation. The approximation is good. For our calibrations, the benefits from purposeful experimentation are small because random shocks are big enough to provide ample unintentional experimentation.     

Robustness and U.S. Monetary Policy Experimentation

We study how a concern for robustness modifies a policymaker's incentive to experiment. A policymaker has a prior over two submodels of inflation‐unemployment dynamics. One submodel implies an exploitable trade‐off, the other does not. Bayes' law gives the policymaker an incentive to experiment. The policymaker fears that both submodels and his prior probability distribution over them are misspecified. We compute decision rules that are robust to misspecifications of each submodel and of the prior distribution over submodels. We compare robust rules to ones that Cogley, Colacito, and Sargent (2007) computed assuming that the models and the prior distribution are correctly specified. We explain how the policymaker's desires to protect against misspecifications of the submodels, on the one hand, and misspecifications of the prior over them, on the other, have different effects on the decision rule.     

Cash Flow News and Stock Price Dynamics

We develop a new approach to modeling dynamics in cash flows extracted from daily firm-level dividend announcements. We decompose daily cash flow news into a persistent component, jumps, and temporary shocks. Empirically, we find that the persistent cash flow component is a highly significant predictor of future growth in dividends and consumption. Using a log-linearized present value model, we show that news about the persistent dividend growth component predicts stock returns consistent with asset pricing constraints implied by this model. News about the daily dividend growth process also helps explain concurrent return volatility and the probability of jumps in stock returns.     

Open Source Software Production,Spontaneous Input,and Organizational Learning

This work shows that the modular organization of voluntary open source software (OSS) production, whereby programmers supply effort of their accord, capitalizes more on division than on specialization of labor. This is so because voluntary OSS production is characterized by an organizational learning process that dominates the individual one. Organizational learning reveals production choices that would otherwise remain unknown, thereby increasing productivity and indirectly reinforcing incentives to undertake collective problem solving.     

VERTICAL RESTRAINTS UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION: ON THE ROLE OF PARTICIPATION CONSTRAINTS*

The impact on vertical contracting of a type‐dependent reservation utility is investigated within a sequential monopolies environment with asymmetric information. The welfare and private properties of contracts controlling both the retail price and the sales level are compared with those restricting only sales. When firms choose contracts non‐cooperatively, retail price restrictions are desirable for the upstream supplier although detrimental to consumers, whenever the retailer reservation utility has a relevant impact on optimal contracts. If this impact is relatively weak and contracts are chosen cooperatively, vertical price control fails to maximize firms' joint‐profit although it would be beneficial to consumers.     

Temperature and Growth: A Panel Analysis of the United States

We document that seasonal temperatures have significant and systematic effects on the U.S. economy, both at the aggregate level and across a wide cross section of economic sectors. This effect is particularly strong for the summer: a F increase in the average summer temperature is associated with a reduction in the annual growth rate of state‐level output of 0.15 to 0.25 percentage points. We combine our estimates with projected increases in seasonal temperatures and find that rising temperatures could reduce U.S. economic growth by up to one‐third over the next century.     

International Asset Pricing with Recursive Preferences

Focusing on data from the United States and the United Kingdom, we document that both the anomaly identified by Backus and Smith, which concerns the low correlation between consumption differentials and exchange rates, and the forward premium anomaly, which concerns the tendency of high interest rate currencies to appreciate, have become more severe over time. Taking into account different capital mobility regimes, we show that these anomalies turn into general equilibrium regularities in a two‐country and two‐good economy with Epstein and Zin preferences, frictionless markets, and correlated long‐run growth prospects.     

Identifying Noise Shocks: A VAR with Data Revisions

We propose a new Vector Autoregression (VAR) identification strategy to study the impact of noise, in the early releases of output growth figures, which exploits the informational advantage of the econometrician. Economic agents, uncertain about the underlying state of the economy, respond to noisy early data releases. Econometricians, with the benefit of hindsight, have access to data revisions as well, which we use to identify noise shocks. A surprising report of output growth produces qualitatively similar but quantitatively smaller effects than a demand shock. We also illustrate how a noise shock cannot be identified unless ex‐post information is used.     

Bid–Ask Price Competition with Asymmetric Information between Market-Makers

This paper studies the effect of asymmetric information on the price formation process in a quote-driven market. One market-maker receives private information on the value of the quoted asset and repeatedly competes with market-makers who are uninformed. We show that despite the fact that the informed market-maker's quotes are public, the market is never strong-form efficient with certainty until the last stage. We characterize a reputational equilibrium in which the informed market-maker influences and possibly misleads the uninformed market-makers' beliefs. At this equilibrium, a price leadership effect arises, the informed market-maker's expected pay-off is positive and the rate of price discovery increases in the last stages of trade.