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Tien-Shih Hsieh Zhihong Wang Sebahattin Demirkan 《Journal of Accounting and Public Policy》2018,37(3):241-253
We investigate how overconfident CEOs and CFOs may interact to influence firms’ tax avoidance. We adopt an equity measure to capture overconfident CEOs and CFOs and utilize multiple measures to identify companies’ tax-avoidance activities. We document that CFOs, as CEOs’ business partners, play an important role in facilitating and executing overconfident CEOs’ decisions in regard to tax avoidance. Specifically, we find that companies are more likely to engage in tax-avoidance activities when they have both overconfident CEOs and overconfident CFOs, compared with companies that have other combinations of CEO/CFO overconfidence (e.g., an overconfident CEO with a non-overconfident CFO), which is consistent with the False Consensus Effect Theory. Our study helps investors, regulators, and policymakers understand companies’ decision-making processes with regard to tax avoidance. 相似文献
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Aysu Sagun Halime Demirkan 《International Journal of Technology and Design Education》2009,19(1):79-99
In this study, the Design Collaboration Model (DCM) was developed to provide a medium for the on-line collaboration of the
design courses. The model was based on the situated and reflective practice characteristics of the design process. The segmentation
method was used to analyse the design process observed both in the design diaries and the redline files that were composed
of the problem domain and the design strategies. In the problem domain, it was observed that high emphasis was given to the
design abstractions in the level of details of a space or sub-space. Also, the critics were more interested in the solution
space than the problem space. As a design strategy, rejecting a solution was more practiced than proposing alternative solutions.
Since the performance score of the students was highly correlated to the number of segments in critiques, it is concluded
that quality rather than quantity of critiques determine the success level of proposed design solutions.
相似文献
Halime DemirkanEmail: |
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We study the pricing of audit services for strategic alliances, a governance structure involving an incomplete contract between separate firms. Since incomplete contracts do not specify all future contingencies, we expect that the nonverifiability of information and potential agency behavior in alliances increase audit complexity, resulting in higher audit fees. Our findings support this prediction. We then separate strategic alliances into joint ventures and contractual alliances, as the latter involve more complexity. We find that our audit fee results are largely driven by contractual alliances. We perform additional tests to rule out the concern that our audit fee results might be attributable to the impact of strategic alliances on distress risk, audit risk, or control risk. Contrary to the distress risk argument, we find that auditors are less likely to issue going‐concern modified opinions when there is an increase in strategic alliances. Contrary to the audit risk argument, we find that an increase in strategic alliances is unrelated to the likelihood of financial misstatements. Contrary to the control risk argument, we find that an increase in strategic alliances is unrelated to internal control weakness opinions. 相似文献
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Strategic alliances are well-established organizational forms and a means of strategy implementation. Despite their growing pervasiveness in the economy, existent literature provides few insights about earnings quality of strategic alliances. This challenge is especially severe in contractual alliances (CAs), where firms do not form a new corporate entity that is separate from the parent organization in comparison to joint ventures (JVs). We investigate how earnings attributes differ depending on involvement in strategic alliances of 8137 CAs and 3026 JVs spanning 1997–2007. We find, in particular, that earnings attributes of firms involved in contractual alliances are broadly reflective of low underlying accounting quality. Relative to JV firms and non-alliance (NA) firms, they have higher levels of discretionary accruals, lower accrual quality, and earnings that are less persistent, less smooth, less relevant, less timely, and less conservative. They also have lower earnings response coefficients. 相似文献
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