排序方式: 共有6条查询结果,搜索用时 140 毫秒
1
1.
Denis Larocque 《International Journal of Technology and Design Education》2002,12(3):271-271
Other Index
Index 相似文献2.
3.
Stephannie A. Larocque Melissa A. Martin Beverly R. Walther 《Contemporary Accounting Research》2020,37(2):741-772
We investigate the extent to which market participants use compensation payouts released in the DEF 14A proxy statement (DEF14A) to assess future firm performance by examining sell-side analysts' earnings forecasts. Consistent with prior work, we confirm that CEO compensation unexplained by current observable economic factors is positively associated with future firm performance. We find that both the likelihood that analysts revise their forecasts following release of the DEF14A and the magnitude and direction of analysts' forecast revisions are positively associated with unexplained CEO compensation. These associations are stronger after the SEC required additional compensation-related disclosures in late 2006 but lower if the firm has weak corporate governance or more precise other information. Analysts' reactions are not complete, however. Analysts' forecast errors measured months after the DEF14A release are associated with past unexplained compensation, especially in the pre-2006 period and for analysts who do not revise at the DEF14A release. Taken together, our results suggest that compensation payouts released in the DEF14A contain useful forward-looking information that is recognized by at least some sophisticated market participants and that the increased disclosure regulations assisted market participants in incorporating this information. 相似文献
4.
Stephannie Larocque 《Review of Accounting Studies》2013,18(1):135-166
This study investigates the relation between analysts’ forecast errors and cost of equity capital estimates implied from analysts’ earnings forecasts and price. My analysis predicts and removes forecast errors from analysts’ earnings forecasts on an out-of-sample basis and then uses these adjusted analysts’ forecasts to reverse-engineer cost of equity capital estimates. While the correction for predictable analysts’ forecast errors meaningfully lowers each of three firm-level implied COEC estimates employed in this study and commonly used in the literature, I do not find that this correction improves their association with realized returns. 相似文献
5.
We examine whether greater transparency leads to improved evaluation and rewarding of management. We posit that disclosure improves board effectiveness at monitoring executives and in strengthening the link between pay and performance. We use management guidance as our empirical proxy for disclosure and document the following. We predict and find higher sensitivity of CEO compensation to performance (both accounting and stock returns) for firms that issue management guidance than for firms that do not. Our results are robust to multiple tests that address the potential endogeneity of management’s decision to issue guidance (using a Heckman self-selection model, employing a matched-sample approach, and identifying a subsample of firms in which increased disclosure is likely to be exogenous), tests that control for alternative explanations, and tests that use conference calls as an alternative disclosure metric. 相似文献
6.
1