Assessment of Consumer Behavior Towards Environmental Responsibility: A Structural Equations Modeling Approach

This paper analyses the factors impacting consumer environmental responsibility using a structural equation modeling approach. Consumer environmental responsibility is the intention of a person to act towards remediation of environmental problems not as an individual user with economic interests but as a responsible citizen having concerns about the social and environmental wellbeing of society. Therefore, awareness of environmental problems and knowledge of remedial alternatives will help individuals to pursue their chosen action and bolster a genuine desire to act and determine the measures for alleviation of environmental challenges. The four dimensions of an environmentally responsible consumer – opinion and beliefs, willingness, awareness, and an ability to act – are analysed. During the analysis, the dimension of ‘ability to move’ is found to be critical, because it has a direct influence on the capacity of the consumer to act. This research is intended to guide policy‐ and decision‐makers of regulatory bodies in understanding consumer behavior towards improving environmental performance index. It also helps organizational managers to make their supply chains green, and competitive, which in turn improves brand image and overall organizational performance. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment     

Institutional quality,investment efficiency,and the choice of public–private partnerships

We examine a sample of 625 public–private partnership (PPP) firms from 1980 to 2015 that straddle nine countries with varying degrees of economic development and PPP markets. We find that the motivations of the firms that undertake PPP investments vary. While private sector firms in economies with low institutional quality choose to engage in PPPs to alleviate capital constraints attributed to underinvestment, those in economies with high institutional quality participate in PPPs to solve the problem of overinvestment due to an abundant cash flow. In the long run, the benefits of lower capital constraints through PPP investments are more pronounced in economies with high institutional quality.     

On the Choice of Superannuation Funds in Australia

Using a sample of Australian retail and wholesale superannuation funds to proxy for choice and limited choice alternatives, respectively, we investigate the costs and benefits of providing choice to investors. We find that investors who have choice don't respond to fees. Also, loads - typical of the choice environment - are likely to be a dead-weight loss borne by investors. Employees who involuntarily contribute to (employer) funds, tend to pay the lowest fees. Given these results, the advantages of choice become questionable. Our results show that managers of limited choice funds achieve greater positive abnormal returns than retail fund managers. The analysis of flows provides insight into why choice funds do not perform better than limited choice funds. Investors are not responding to historical performance as predicted.     

Auctioning the Airwaves: The Contest for Broadband pcs Spectrum

The House and Senate of the United States Congress recently passed legislation that directs the FCC to establish a system for using auctions to allocate the use of radio spectrum for personal communications services. There is a unique and unprecedented set of issues that arise in this context, which are of interest to economists, industry analysts, regulators, and policymakers. We discuss these issues and evaluate their likely impact on the outcome of the spectrum auctions. In addition, we argue that there may be pitfalls in the auction procedure adopted by the FCC, and we discuss possible alternative procedures.     

A characterization of egalitarian equivalence

Summary Consider a solution (an allocation rule) for an economy which satisfies the following criteria: (1) Pareto efficiency, (2) monotonicity, in the sense that if the set of attainable allocations of the economy becomes larger then the solution makes no consumer worse-off, (3) a weak and primitive notion of fairness with respect to some commodity, say commodityh, in the sense that in an exchange economy in which the aggregate endowment consists only of commodityh, the solution is equal division. We show that in the class of economies which includes non-convex technologies the only such solution is egalitarian equivalence with respect to commodityh. It is also shown that this characterization of egalitarian equivalence holds in convex exchange economies if we add a weak version of a positive association requirement.We are grateful to William Thomson and three anonymous referees for extensive comments on an earlier version. We also acknowledge helpful comments of the participants of the Social Choice and Welfare Conference held in Caen, June 1992.     

Farsighted network formation

This paper studies a model of dynamic network formation when individuals are farsighted: players evaluate the desirability of a “current” move in terms of its consequences on the entire discounted stream of payoffs. We define a concept of equilibrium which takes into account farsighted behavior of agents and allows for limited cooperation amongst agents. We show that an equilibrium process of network formation exists. We also show that there are valuation structures in which no equilibrium strategy profile can sustain efficient networks. We then provide sufficient conditions under which the equilibrium process will yield efficient outcomes.     

Cost monotonicity, consistency and minimum cost spanning tree games

We propose a new cost allocation rule for minimum cost spanning tree games. The new rule is a core selection and also satisfies cost monotonicity. We also give characterisation theorems for the new rule as well as the much-studied Bird allocation. We show that the principal difference between these two rules is in terms of their consistency properties.     

On Endogenously Staggered Prices

Taylor's model of staggered contracts is an influential explanation for nominal inertia and the persistent real effects of nominal shocks. However, in standard imperfect competition models, if agents are allowed to choose the timing of pricing decisions, they will typically choose to synchronize. This paper provides a simple model of imperfect competition which produces stable staggering. Our argument relies on strategic interaction at two levels—between firms within an industries, and across industries—and produces a continuum of staggered price equilibria. These equilibria are strict, and hence stable under a simple adaptive learning process.