How Effective Is Foreign Aid at Improving Health Outcomes in Recipient Countries?

Since the United Nations’ establishment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000 the world has observed an increasing trend in foreign aid provided by more affluent countries to developing nations. This paper examined whether foreign aid (total foreign aid and health sector aid) has been effective in improving the health of citizens in recipient nations since establishment of the MDGs. Five facets of population health were examined: infant mortality, life expectancy, the annual death rate, and immunizations against measles and diphtheria. Using a panel data set covering 90 developing countries, observed annually over 2001–2015, fixed-effects multivariate regressions with alternative specifications were estimated for each of these measures. The findings reveal that foreign aid has had little to no effect on population health since 2000. We found some evidence that foreign aid has improved life expectancy in developing countries, however, the effect is very small. In light of these findings, continued monitoring of the relationship between foreign aid and health outcomes would be both valuable and prudent.

     

The Effectiveness of Technical Trading for Arab Stocks

In this paper, we examine the profitability of technical analysis for a cross section of individual Arab stocks. Our analysis, undertaken from the perspective of an Islamic investor, reveals that technical trading rules do not yield economically or statistically significant returns. While our results uncover some scant statistical evidence of technical trading rule profitability, risk adjusting the returns weakens the evidence in favor of predictability. Furthermore, break-even transaction costs do not exceed estimated transaction costs or bid-ask spreads in the markets examined.     

Insider trading with product differentiation

This paper investigates the effect of product differentiation on the real and financial decisions of a publicly-owned firm, competing $\grave{a}$ la Cournot with another privately-owned firm. The results show that the degree of product differentiation affects the stock price coefficients (i.e. the market maker’s response to the real signal and to the total order flow signal) and the output of the publicly-owned firm. It also appears to have a detrimental effect on the manager’s profits and compensation scheme. The paper then proposes an extension of the benchmark model to incorporate Cournot and Stackelberg competition between two insiders in the financial market. The type of the financial competition adopted has also an effect on the results of the benchmark model that sometimes depend on the degree of product differentiation.     

Insider trading in a two-tier real market structure model

This paper investigates the real and financial effects of insider trading in the spirit of Jain and Mirman (2000). Unlike the existing literature, the production of one real good is costly and depends mainly on the price of an intermediate good produced locally by a privately owned firm. The results show that the output level of the final good chosen by the insider as well as the price of the intermediate good set by the privately owned firm are both higher than it would be in the absence of insider trading. Furthermore, the parameters of both real markets affect the stock price. Next, a second insider, operating in the firm producing the final good, is added to the benchmark model. Competition among insiders decreases the production of the final good by the publicly owned firm and the price of the intermediate good with respect to the benchmark model. Moreover, it affects the insiders’ trades and increases the amount of information revealed in the stock price.     

Corporate governance and long run performance of seasoned equity issuers

This paper examines the effect of corporate governance on the likelihood of issuing Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEO) between 1990 and 2005. It also examines the long-run post-issue performance using operating and stock return measures. Our results suggest that well-governed firms are less likely to issue equity. Nevertheless, when they do so, they outperform both matching non-issuers and issuers with minimal shareholders’ rights from pre- to post-issue—with the highest operating out-performance occurring in the two post-issue years. A negative correlation exists between the post-issue performance and the anti-takeover measures, primarily, the protection associated with management entrenchment. Nonetheless, measures of board structure do not appear to affect the post-issue operating performance. Overall, corporate governance appears to be an effective internal control mechanism that restrains managers’ incentives to either take an SEO issuance decision that does not serve the interests of shareholders or invest the capital raised in value-destroying projects.     

Asset market equilibrium with short-selling and differential information

We introduce differential information in the asset market model studied by Cheng J Math Econ 20(1):137–152,1991, Dana and Le Van J Math Econ 25(3):263–280,1996 and Le Van and Truong Xuan J Math Econ 36(3): 241–254, 2001. We prove an equilibrium existence result assuming that the economy’s information structure satisfies the conditional independence property. If private information is not publicly verifiable, agents have incentives to misreport their types and therefore contracts may not be executed in the second period. We also show that under the conditional independence property equilibrium contracts are always executable.     

Applying economic methodology to the war on terrorism

The application of economic methodology to the problem of terrorism is discussed. Theoretical and empirical results are discussed with particular focus on the September 11 attack and the retaliatory response by the United States. Economists have relied on the rational agent model to derive testable hypotheses regarding the behavior of terrorists. The rational agent model postulates that terrorists respond to incentives, including media publicity, and the model predicts that when the net marginal benefit from one type of terrorist activity is diminished, terrorists will substitute into alternative modes of terrorism. Empirical results demonstrating that such substitutions indeed occur are discussed. Therefore, policy designed to reduce a particular form of terrorism, such as increased airport security to prevent airplane hijackings, may simply result in terrorists choosing alternative modes of terrorism. Empirical evidence demonstrating that terrorism is cyclical in nature is also discussed. Evidence on substitution and cycles suggests that following temporary reduction in terrorist activity after retaliation against terrorists and their infrastructure, terrorists are able to successfully regroup and attack using alternative means. Therefore, the current US focus on fighting terrorism on all fronts and over the long haul is the correct approach.     

Keeping up with the Joneses? Evidence from Peer Performance in the Banking Industry

This paper traces the reaction of US banks to ROE underperformance on liquidity creation, equity capital, and loan loss provisions. We find that banks change their structures in the subsequent quarter after underperformance by increasing their on-balance and off-balance sheet liquidity creation to increase profitability. Banks tend to increase their equity capital and improve their loan quality by lowering non-discretionary loan loss provisions to become safer. Banks signal their ability to overcome underperformance by increasing their discretionary loan loss provisions. Our results reveal that large banks rely mainly on off-balance sheet liquidity creation as their primary tool to recover from underperformance while medium-size and small banks adjust their equity capital to increase their safety.     

Environmental taxation,information precision,and information sharing

We analyze how environmental taxes should be optimally levied in a sequential game in which regulators and firms face costs uncertainties. First, the regulator chooses the intensity of emissions taxes to reduce externalities. Then, facing common and private information with noisy signals, firms compete in the marketplace and choose outputs. We show that, under nonuniform quality of signals across firms, the regulator may calibrate differentiated tax policy. We also show that the social impact of more precise private signals hinges largely and fundamentally on the value of the ratio of the slopes of the marginal damage and the marginal consumer surplus. Finally, we investigate information sharing between polluters and its impacts on welfare. We stress that, when there are threats of severe environmental damages under deep uncertainties, collusion is welfare reducing and may jeopardize the regulatory process. Regulators need to set an appropriate precautionary policy. Numerical simulations illustrate the results that the model delivers.