On the design of international environmental agreements for identical and heterogeneous developing countries

I analyze the problem faced by an imperfectly informed supra-nationalgovernmental authority (SNGA) that wishes to design an InternationalEnvironmental Agreement (IEA). The SNGA cannot contract directlywith polluting firms in the developing countries (DCs), andit must deal with such firms through their governments. I findthat the transfers necessary to induce optimal behavior by governmentsand firms are sensitive to the timing of the underlying gameand to the existence of collusion. This analysis suggests thatIEAs are not doomed due to a monitoring and enforcement problemarising from national sovereignty. However, the success of IEAsis contingent on the funds available for environmental protection.     

ASSESSING DAMAGES: THE 1983 ISRAELI BANK SHARES CRISIS

In 1983, Israeli bank shares collapsed following several years during which the banks had actively intervened to promote share prices and thereby contributed to a 300% rise in real terms. During the crisis the government assumed control of the banks, which they did not begin to sell back to the public until 1993. We compare 1993 bank share prices after the banks were partially relisted on the Stock Exchange with 1983 precrisis values. The 1993 time-adjusted market values were $10 billion lower than in 1983, a decline borne by precrisis shareholders ($4 billion) and by taxpayers ($6 billion). Of this latter amount, two-thirds represents a transfer from the government to shareholders, while approximately one-third represents an efficiency loss - and hence a direct cost - resulting from government ownership of the banks for 10 years following the crisis. The results highlight the risk inherent in a banking system that is both concentrated and universal and illustrates the costs associated with sustained government ownership.     

Sales force modeling: State of the field and research agenda

Inspired by Erin Anderson’s contributions to sales force research, this paper focuses on research that utilizes quantitative models to investigate important questions in sales force management. The purpose is to summarize several significant developments in knowledge over the last 40 years and identify major opportunities for impactful theoretical, empirical, and decision model-based research in the future.     

Match your sales force structure to your business life cycle

Although companies devote considerable time and money to managing their sales forces, few focus much thought on how the structure of the sales force needs to change over the life cycle of a product or a business. However, the organization and goals of a sales operation have to evolve as businesses start up, grow, mature, and decline if a company wants to keep winning the race for customers. Specifically, firms must consider and alter four factors over time: the differing roles that internal salespeople and external selling partners should play, the size of the sales force, its degree of specialization, and how salespeople apportion their efforts among different customers, products, and activities. These variables are critical because they determine how quickly sales forces respond to market opportunities, they influence sales reps' performance, and they affect companies' revenues, costs, and profitability. In this article, the authors use timeseries data and cases to explain how, at each stage, firms can best tackle the relevant issues and get the most out of their sales forces. During start-up, smart companies focus on how big their sales staff should be and on whether they can depend upon selling partners. In the growth phase, they concentrate on getting the sales force's degree of specialization and size right. When businesses hit maturity, companies should better allocate existing resources and hire more general-purpose salespeople. Finally, as organizations go into decline, wise sales leaders reduce sales force size and use partners to keep the business afloat for as long as possible.     

Standardised capital stock estimates in Latin America: a 1950-94 update

Capital stock estimates are used extensively in many areas ofeconomic research, in spite of both theoretical and practicaldifficulties with respect to their use, estimation and meaning.The lack of comparable capital stock estimates in Latin Americahas hindered analysis of economic development in the regionand comparisons with other developed and developing countries.Standardised gross and net fixed capital stock estimates forthe 1950-94 period are presented for seven Latin American countries:Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela.The methodology employed is the 'perpetual inventory method'which estimates capital stocks as a weighted sum of past investmentflows. Several methodological issues are discussed, especiallydepreciation and service life estimation. Capital stocks havebeen disaggregated in machinery and equipment, non-residentialand residential structures with services lives of 15, 40 and50 years respectively.     

Informal retailing through home-based micro-enterprises: The role of spaza shops

The informal trade sector constitutes an important part of the South African economy, with estimated sales of R32 billion in 2002. Its emergence is largely attributed to the divergence between the growth in population, especially the urban population, and employment growth in the formal economy. Growth of informal enterprises, especially in the retail sector, is also thriving on the demand of less affluent households, whose household needs for unsophisticated and affordable products are aptly supplied by the informal sector. The aim of this article is to focus on one of the prominent sub-sectors of informal retailing, namely spaza or tuck shops, defined as small retail businesses which operate from a residential stand or home. Particular attention is paid to the size, role and characteristics of spaza trade in South Africa, which is estimated to account for nearly 3 per cent of South Africa's retail trade.