Influences on software piracy: Evidence from the various United States

Examining socio-economic influences on software piracy in the United States, we find a negative relationship between software piracy and income, tax burdens, and economic freedom. A 1% increase in per-capita income correlates with a 0.25% reduction in piracy.     

NAFTA as a Means of Raising Rivals' Costs

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was designed to reduce tariff rates between Mexico, Canada and the U.S.A. over a period of ten years. However, lower tariff rates are only available to firms that comply with complicated and costly NAFTA filing regulations. Such regulations raise costs of small firms relative to large firms in a domestic industry which engages in trade between NAFTA countries. This implication of NAFTA regulations can lead to increased concentration in domestic industries, an hypothesis which can be tested as the transition period comes to an end. Finally, our model suggests an explanation for why the levels of trade from the U.S.A. to Mexico have been lower than general expectations.     

Television-Induced Tourism: Evidence from Croatia

Atlantic Economic Journal - This paper analyzes the extent to which the filming of the popular television show Game of Thrones affected tourism in the Croatian city of Dubrovnik. Using monthly data...     

Career duration in the NHL: pushing and pulling on Europeans?

Using a panel of National Hockey League players from 2000 through 2013, we analyse the determinants of career length in the league. In our analysis, we include both performance variables and nationality of origin to determine their importance in determining career length. We find that European-born players have shorter careers than North American-born players holding performance constant and Russian-born players have even shorter careers than other Europeans. We further find that Russian-born players have even shorter careers than other players after the 2005 lockout. These shorter careers are consistent with both exit discrimination against European and Russian players who are pushed out of the league as well as voluntary exit by European and Russian players who are pulled out of the league due to opportunities in their home countries.     

The strategic nature of advertising in segmented markets

We develop a simple model in which firm-specific advertising has cooperative and predatory effects. Our model is set in a static market where firms are naturally segmented into two distinct submarkets: several large firms located in the core, with small firms operating as a fringe. We test the net effect of opposing market size (cooperative) and market share (predatory) effects of both fringe and core firm advertising on the advertising decisions of large firms in several US consumer industries. Empirically, fringe firm advertising leads to an increase in advertising efforts by large firms, implying strategic complementarity. On the other hand, increased advertising by core firms in an industry decreases advertising expenditures of other core firms, indicating they are strategic substitutes. Our findings imply that equilibrium levels of advertising can be greater with asymmetric, rather than symmetric, strategic interactions.     

Free-Agency and the Competitiveness of Major League Baseball

I investigate whether the removal of the reserve clause in professional baseball affected the competitive nature of the industry in the context of whether the distribution of team wins has been affected by free-agency. Unlike previous studies which use the standard deviation of winning percentage, I use a more sensitive measure of parity. I calculate the deviations of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of team wins from the competitive ideal during 1920 to 1996 and relate them to player-talent distribution and structural changes in the industry. I isolate the structural effect of free-agency and find that it has adversely affected the parity of the American League but that it has had no statistical influence on the parity of the National League.     

EVOLUTION OF COMMUNITY DETERRENCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE

Community and specialized enforcement are recognized as important components of deterring antisocial behavior. To provide insights on the interplay between deterrence methods, we examine the empirical evolution of fighting and scoring in the National Hockey League using time series data. We identify structural changes that correlate with changes in player behavior and rules. In particular, we find that player behavior related to fighting changed 4 or 5 years prior to most rule changes aimed at reducing fighting. We conclude that the decline in fighting in hockey was more closely associated with a change in community rather than specialized deterrence methods. (JEL Z22, D71, L83)     

Football transfer fee premiums and Europe's big five

This article studies the transfer market for international football players. Analyzing a sample of 5,760 player transfers over 14 years, we provide evidence that clubs in English football pay larger transfer fee premiums compared to clubs in the top leagues of France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. While the popular press often mentions the English premiums, we empirically demonstrate both their existence and their causal source. Using annual data, we show that the dramatic increase in English premiums is causally linked to the 2012 television contracts the EPL signed with domestic and international broadcasters. These findings have policy implications for the clubs, players, and governing bodies of European football, as well as indirect consequences for export‐oriented football clubs.     

WAGE DISPARITY,TEAM PERFORMANCE,AND THE 2005 NHL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT

This paper provides an empirical analysis of salary disparity and team performance in the National Hockey League during the first decade of the twenty‐first century. We find that the 2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) reduced average salaries immediately after it was introduced but did not change the trajectory of average salaries nor did it alter the salary disparity on the average team. Salary disparity harms overall team performance primarily through reduced defensive performance and this relationship was not altered by the 2005 CBA. (JEL J31, J42, L83)     

Exploiting the “Win But Does Not Cover” Phenomenon in College Basketball

Wolfers (2006) was the first to document that heavy favorites in college basketball win but fail to cover the pre‐game point spread at a statistically higher rate than expected. We generate a hedged strategy to exploit the “win but does not cover” phenomenon using two wagers: a bet on the underdog sides line and a bet on the favorite money line. While one bet is guaranteed to win regardless of the outcome, both bets win if the favorite wins but does not cover. We show that the minimum‐variance portfolio best exploits this anomaly, yielding an average return of 0.34% per game and a positive return in five of the seven seasons of college basketball analyzed.