Experimental Tests of Self-Selection and Screening in Insurance Decisions

A major characteristic of insurance markets is information asymmetry that may lead to phenomena such as adverse selection and moral hazard. Another aspect of markets with asymmetric information is self-selection, which refers to the pattern of choices that individuals with different personal characteristics make when facing a menu of contracts or options. To combat problems of asymmetric information, insurance firms can use screening. That is, they can offer the clients a menu of choices and infer their characteristics from their choices.This article reports the results of several studies that examined the degree to which people behave according to the notions of self-selection and screening. Subjects played the role of either insurance buyers or sellers. The results of these studies provide partial support for the hypothesis that subjects use self-selection and screening in insurance markets. Our study also points at the importance of learning in experimental studies. In one-stage experiments where subjects did not get feedback, screening was not detected. When multistage experiments were conducted, and the subjects learned from experience and were also taught the relevant theories, their decisions were more aligned with screening.     

Pathways from discovery to commercialisation: using web sources to track small and medium-sized enterprise strategies in emerging nanotechnologies

This paper presents results from a pilot study of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) based on a web-scraping and content analysis of current and archived nanotechnology enterprise websites. We use this approach to explore nanotechnology SMEs transitions from discovery to commercialisation and understand how transitions vary by SME characteristics, technology and market sectors. Our findings suggest that although the idealised linear innovation model is present, important instances of divergence exist. Cluster analysis uncovered sectoral differences but even more distinctions based on the age, funding source, and research intensity.     

Entering new markets: The effect of performance feedback near aspiration and well below and above it

Research summary : This study draws on the resource‐based view and the behavioral theory of the firm to gain new insights about the effect of performance relative to aspiration level (i.e., performance feedback) on the decision to enter new markets. Results show an inverted U‐shaped relationship between performance both below and above aspiration level, and the probability of firms to enter new markets. That is, when firms are well below or well above their aspiration level, they significantly change their behavior. This article develops a theoretical framework to clarify and organize these findings. Managerial summary : This study examines the effect of performance feedback, and particularly, large discrepancies between firm performance and aspiration level on the decision to enter new markets. It provides support to the role of performance feedback in affecting the decision to enter new markets, a factor that has received relatively little attention in the extensive literature that has examined the inducements of such moves. Results show that, as performance falls below or rises above aspiration, a firm's probability of entering new markets increases up to a certain point after which this relationship decreases. This shows that the tendency to enter new markets is different for firms that are in the neighborhood of aspiration level compared to those that are well below or above it. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Effect of CFO Personal Litigation Risk on Firms’ Disclosure and Accounting Choices

In Gantler v. Stephens (2009), the Delaware Supreme Court makes explicit that corporate officers owe the same fiduciary duty to the firm and shareholders as do board members. The decision increased the risk of non‐board‐serving officers being added as named defendants to investor litigation but did not change the risk of corporate litigation. Analyzing the effect of the Gantler ruling on non‐board‐serving CFOs, we find a significant change in their behavior as well as in their firms’ disclosure and accounting choices. Specifically, speech tone during earnings calls of non‐board‐serving CFOs becomes more negative when compared to board‐serving CFOs and the firm's CEO, and non‐board‐serving CFO firms disclose bad news earlier and report more conservatively. Results are stronger for firms incorporated in Delaware. Our findings suggest that CFOs respond to personal litigation risk over and above corporate litigation risk.     

The ‘flexible accelerator’ and optimization with a finite horizon

So-called ‘flexible accelerator’ or partial adjustment models can be derived from dynamic optimization under convex adjustment costs. However, even with time-invariant adjustment costs and constant discount rate, constancy of the speed of adjustment requires infinite horizon planning. Using a simple production model, it is shown here that for finite horizons, the adjustment may nevertheless be approximately constant for much of the time if the discount rate is high enough and if the marginal adjustment cost is sufficiently small.     

Acquirer Internal Control Weaknesses in the Market for Corporate Control

This paper examines how disclosures regarding internal controls, required by sections 302 and 404 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), affect the market for corporate control. We hypothesize that acquirers with internal control weaknesses (ICWs) make suboptimal acquisition decisions based on poor‐quality information generated by their ineffective controls over financial reporting. We expect that such acquirers will be more likely to misestimate the value of their targets or the potential synergies from mergers, thereby overpaying for completed deals. Using a treatment sample of acquisitions made by acquirers that have disclosed ICWs and two matched control samples without ICW disclosures, we document that ICW acquirers experience a substantially more negative market response to acquisition announcements and have lower future performance than the two matched control samples without ICW disclosures. Overall, our results suggest that ineffective internal controls hinder decision making related to mergers and acquisitions (M&A).