New Geographies of Residential Capitalism: Financialization of the Turkish Housing Market Since the Early 2000s

The post‐2001 financial crisis era in Turkey gave rise to twin booms in housing construction and credit markets, both of which suffered from the subsequent debt crisis. The financial transformation of the economy in conjunction with state‐led urban legislation reform had significant effects on the housing market in terms of commodification of housing, countrywide construction activities and substantial increases in household debt and construction company loans. The changing role and function of the state as a direct provider of housing can be regarded as actually existing neoliberalism providing favourable conditions for financialization, as it ushered in the commodification of housing. The Turkish government, together with the government‐backed housing agency, metropolitan municipalities and publicly owned real‐estate investment company, has been active in nationwide housing construction and urban regeneration projects. This article argues that there is a lack of synchrony between the commodification of housing and the financialization of the household sector owing to the institutional setting of the mortgage system and structural macroeconomic problems. Rather, housing commodification has been accompanied by the financialization of the corporate sector through a steep rise in the external debt burden of construction companies.     

Assessment of blockchain applications in travel and tourism industry

Quality & Quantity - Blockchain technology (BCT) is a network-based system, which is developed to create secure, smart and transparent distributed ledgers. Recently, BCT has been gaining more...     

Are Small Firms Really Less Productive?

Small and medium-sized establishments (SMEs) account for a large proportion of industrial employment and production in almost all countries. Moreover, the recent literature emphasizes the role SMEs play in nurturing entrepreneurship and generating new products and processes. Although SMEs could be a source of new ideas and innovations, there are substantial productivity differences between small and large establishments. In this paper, we analyze three sources of productivity differentials: technical efficiency, returns to scale, and technical change. Our analysis on the creation, survival, and growth of new establishments in Turkish manufacturing industries in the period 1987–1997 shows that all these three factors play a very important role in determining the survival probability and growth prospects of new establishments.     

Flexible technology and industrial structure in the U.S.

This paper analyzes the development over the postwar period of output, employment, and the number of plants in manufacturing in the United States. It is shown that the distribution of flexible technology in the form of machine tools (NCMTs) shifted markedly toward small plants during the 1980s. It is found that the probability of adoption and the penetration rate of NCMTs are higher in large than in small plants, even though the number of NCMTs per worker is much higher in small plants. This apparent paradox is explained. It is also suggested that the shift of output towards smaller plants is correlated with the increased use of flexible technology, and that this reflects changes in the division of labor among plants of various sizes, as well as changes in the composition and organization of production in large plants.The authors would like to thank Bennett Harrison, an unknown referee, and the editors of this Journal for valuable comments. Any remaining errors are the responsibility of the authors.     

Concentrated Ownership, No Dividend Payout Requirement and Capital Structure of REITs: Evidence from Turkey

This paper studies empirically the capital structure of Turkish REITs as they offer unique and so far untested angles. They do not have to pay out dividends, yet enjoy the exemption from paying corporate taxes since their legal foundation in 1998. Several financial meltdowns occurred in the last three decades, keeping investors with a doubt about Turkey??s financial and political stability. The last meltdown in 2001 is part of the sample period. Findings show that Turkish REITs employ little long-term debt in their capital structure. The legal requirement that a leader entrepreneur be present with a minimum equity position of 25% introduces the agency problem between the majority and minority owners. The leader entrepreneurs, as non-taxable institutional investors, appear to dictate Turkish REITs?? dividend and debt policies and deplete REITs?? dividends, causing them to go to the long-term debt market. The financial meltdown of 2001 exerts negative short-term and positive long-term influence on the debt ratios while inflation??s effect is negative. Firm size, REITs?? engagement in development and stock market development influence debt ratios positively; tangibility and a few firm, ownership, and country-specific determinants appear to have either mixed or no influence on Turkish REITs?? debt policies.     

Tracking the Evolution of Idiosyncratic Risk and Cross-Sectional Expected Returns for US REITs

This paper adopts the methodology in Bali and Cakici (Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis, 43, 29–58, 2008) in tracking the evolution of the relation between equity REITs’ idiosyncratic risk and their cross-sectional expected returns between 1981 and 2010. In addition to the full sample period, we study this relation for (i) January 1981–December 1992, (ii) January 1993–September 2001, (iii) November 2001–August 2008 and (iv) November 2001–December 2010 and produce empirical results for (i) all sample REITs, (ii) REITs with a price greater than $10 or (iii) REITs with a price greater than $5. Each period represents different dynamics (including the Global Financial Crisis) in the life of the REIT industry and leads to a different hypothesis. Further, we present comparative results based on the Fama-French 3- and 4-factor models. Overall, we document a negative relation between idiosyncratic risk and cross-sectional expected returns and demonstrate that this negative relation changes over time. These findings amplify the “idiosyncratic volatility puzzle,” as reported in the recent finance literature. Interestingly, REITs with a price of $5-to-$10 do well in 2009 and 2010. Further, the momentum factor appears to be influential since the first-ever listing of a REIT in the S&P500 Index in early October 2001.     

Labor market institutions and industrial performance: an evolutionary study

This study investigates the impact of labor market institutions on industrial performance from a Schumpeterian perspective. We suggest that labor market institutions play a very important role in the process of creative destruction, because they may create an environment that encourages and enforces innovation, and help to reallocate resources, most importantly labor, through swift elimination of weak performers. We specifically look at the effects of the quantity of labor market regulations and inter-industry wage differentials on labor productivity for a panel of 44 countries for the period 1965–1999. Our findings suggest that those countries that introduce more regulations on conditions of employment and wages achieve higher levels of productivity. Moreover, wage compression raises productivity by reallocating resources to productive activities.     

The Impact of Trade Unions on the Diffusion of Technology: The Case of NC Machine Tools

This paper reports the results from an econometric analysis of the impact of unionism on the diffusion of technology. It is found that the extent of unionism does not have any significant influence on the diffusion rate of NC machine tools in the US engineering industries in the period of 1979-83.     

Samuelson's Fallacy of Large Numbers and Optional Stopping

Accepting a sequence of independent positive mean bets that are individually unacceptable is what Samuelson called a fallacy of large numbers. Recently, utility functions were characterized where this occurs rationally, and examples were given of utility functions where any finite number of good bets should never be accepted. ¹ 1 Ross, 1999 .
Here the author shows how things change if you are allowed the option to quit early: Subject to some mild conditions, you should essentially always accept a sufficiently long finite sequence of good bets. Interestingly, the strategy of quitting when you get ahead does not perform well, but quitting when you get behind does. This sheds some light on more possible behavioral reasons for Samuelson's fallacy, as well as strategies for handling a series of sequentially observed good investments.