Behavioral agency and corporate entrepreneurship: CEO equity incentives & competitive behavior

Scholars have long studied drivers of entrepreneurial behavior among established firms. Yet little is known about how individual factors shape a firm’s choice to pursue entrepreneurship. We draw on behavioral agency theory to explore the role of equity incentives in driving corporate entrepreneurship. Our findings suggest CEOs avoid corporate entrepreneurial behaviors as their option wealth increases. However industry dynamics also prove to be an important contingency when predicting the effects of both restricted stock and stock options on the likelihood that the CEO engages in corporate entrepreneurship. Our findings provide a theoretical platform for predicting dimensions of entrepreneurial behavior and highlight effects of CEO equity ownership.

     

The role of human resources strategy in export performance: A longitudinal study

This longitudinal study examines the effect of human resources strategy on the export performance of 388 Florida firms. After controlling for differential firm advantages, managerial perceptions and aspirations, and marketing activities, results show that the way human resources are selected, deployed, compensated and motivated will play a significant role in subsequent export performance.     

Executive compensation in North American high-technology firms: a contextual approach

After reviewing the literature surrounding the link between executive compensation and innovation activities of North American firms, we examine two gaps in the area. First, we analyze how contextual factors can affect CEO pay in high-technology companies. In particular, we study three contextual dimensions: political, economic, and social. Second, we consider the specific case of executive compensation in high-technology firms when family ties are present at the helm. Drawing on agency rationale and previous research, we develop a series of instrumental propositions intended to provide the theoretical basis for a future research agenda in the area.     

Structure and process of diversification,compensation strategy,and firm performance

This study tests six hypotheses on the extent to which a match between compensation and diversification strategies affects firm performance. Using both archival and survey data, results generally support the notion that a firm's compensation strategies make a greater contribution to firm performance if these are attuned to extent and process of corporate diversification. The paper concludes with a set of recommendations for future research on compensation-diversification strategy relations and their interactive effect on firm performance.     

Toward a contingency theory of compensation strategy

This paper develops several propositions that link compensation strategy and the effectiveness of the compensation system. The underlying argument is that effectiveness at realizing intended pay strategies depends significantly on the existence of a match between compensation strategies, organization and environment. These propositions are tested in a sample of 33 high tech and 72 non-high tech firms or business units in the Boston Route 128 area. Respondents are managers responsible for compensation policies in these firms or business units. The relationships among compensation strategies, organization characteristics and environment are explored. The findings may help researchers conceptualize, and practitioners manage, the relationship between reward processes and strategy in organizations.     

Matching compensation and organizational strategies

This study examines the impact of organizational strategies (at both the corporate and business unit level) on pay strategies, and their interactive influence on the effectiveness of the compensation system. The empirical findings are based on the survey responses of 192 human resource management executives in business units of large manufacturing firms. Corporate strategy was a significant predictor of pay package design, pay level relative to the market, and pay administration policies. Business unit strategy was a significant predictor of pay package design and pay level relative to the market. The findings are supportive of congruency notions which suggest that the effectiveness of the compensation system is partly a function of the fit between pay strategies and organizational strategies.     

Family Control,Socioemotional Wealth and Earnings Management in Publicly Traded Firms

We examine the unique nature of agency problems within publicly traded family firms by investigating the earnings management decision of dominant family owners relative to non-family. To do so, we draw upon literature demonstrating that family owners are loss averse with respect to the family’s socioemotional wealth, or the affective endowment derived from firm ownership and control. Our theory and findings suggest that potential reputational consequences of earnings management lead family principals to engage in less of this practice relative to non-family firms, and that founder family firms are less likely than non-founder family firms to use earnings management. Moreover, the family-firm effect varies with the firm size, the degree of CEO entrenchment, and the firm’s stock structure. We provide important insights regarding differences between family and non-family principals in the use of unethical accounting practices, thereby extending agency theory and advancing an underdeveloped research area.     

The effect of CEO incentives on deviations from institutional norms in foreign market expansion decisions: Behavioral agency and cross-border acquisitions

CEO incentives have been the subject of great interest for human resource scholars. We explore the institutional context within which the CEO makes sense of their incentives. Our theory suggests that CEO equity incentives interact with institutional norms to influence foreign market entry choices. Specifically, we argue that CEOs will weigh the risk bearing created by equity incentives, along with the consequences of legitimacy loss, when deciding whether to deviate from institutional norms when internationalizing. In doing so, we advance human resource literature by demonstrating that CEO responses to incentives are influenced by institutional norms and that CEOs' decisions to deviate from institutional norms are shaped by their incentives. We find support for our framework in the analysis of the stake taken by acquirers in 4,184 cross-border acquisitions.     

Does Stakeholder Management have a Dark Side?

This article is a first attempt to line out the conditions under which executives might have a real self-interest in pursuing a broad stakeholder management (SM) orientation to enlarge their power. We suggest that managers have wider latitude of action under an SM approach, even when this is instrumental to financial performance. The causally ambiguity of the performance effects of idiosyncratic relationships with stakeholders not only makes SM strategy difficult for competitors to imitate but also increases managerial discretion. When managers use this situation for their own benefit, they can undermine the purported goals of the SM approach. By analyzing some of the factors that might lead to such disfunctionalities, this article advances a theory of the potential dark side of SM.