Natural resource rents and internal conflicts: Can decentralization lift the curse?

We study how natural resource rents affect the risk of internal conflict within countries and how the federal structure of countries influences this relationship. Natural resource abundance may induce excessive rent-seeking and thus increase the risk of internal conflict. Fiscal and political decentralization as an institutional arrangement for rent-sharing and political codetermination of regions within a country may limit the destructive effect of natural resource rents on internal stability. Using cross-country and panel data from more than 90 countries covering the period 1984–2004, we find evidence that natural resource rents indeed increase the risk of internal conflict, but this relationship is significantly mitigated by political decentralization.     

Net foreign asset positions and appreciation expectations on the Swiss franc and the Japanese Yen

The paper shows that currencies of countries with persistent current account surpluses and high foreign-currency denominated assets, such as the Swiss franc and the Japanese yen, are under persistent appreciation pressure, particularly when the centres of the world monetary system follow expansionary monetary policies. This limits the choice of exchange rate regime. Given flexible exchange rates, a negative risk premium on the domestic interest rate can emerge. Empirical estimations provide mixed evidence for a negative impact of net foreign asset positions and exchange rate uncertainty on interest rates of international creditor countries at the periphery of the world monetary system.     

Inflationsziel und Inflationsmessung in der Eurozone im Wandel

Wirtschaftsdienst - Viele Menschen im Euroraum haben zunehmend das Gefühl, dass der allgemeine Kaufkraftverlust des Geldes sehr viel höher ist als die offiziell gemessenen...     

Inter-temporal savings,current account trends and asymmetric shocks in a heterogeneous European Monetary Union

This paper contributes to the discussion on the European current account imbalances by analysing the intra-European trends since 1990 based on the theory of optimum currency areas. The authors show that German unification was the origin of not only the 1992–93 EMS crisis but also rising intra-European current account imbalances since 1999 that led to the European debt crisis. They argue that a reduced German current account surplus is in the interest of German taxpayers to contain financial risk, but that it would also impose austerity on the rest of Europe unless money supply expands even further.     

Reverse Causality in Global and Intra‐European Imbalances

The paper discusses global current account imbalances in the context of an asymmetric world monetary system. It identifies the USA and Germany as center countries with rising/high current account deficits (USA) and surpluses (Germany). These are matched by current account surpluses of countries stabilizing their exchange rates against the dollar (dollar periphery) and current account deficits of countries stabilizing their exchange rates against the euro or members of the euro area (euro periphery). The paper finds that changes of world current account positions are closely linked to the monetary policy decision patterns both in the centers and peripheries. Whereas in the centers current account positions are affected by monetary policies, in the peripheries exchange rate stabilization cum sterilization matters. In specific, monetary expansion in the USA as well as exchange rate stabilization and sterilization policies in the dollar periphery are found to have contributed to global imbalances.     

Rezensionen

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Dynamic order submission strategies with competition between a dealer market and a crossing network

We analyze a dynamic microstructure model in which a dealer market (DM) and a crossing network (CN) interact for three informational settings. A key result is that coexistence of trading systems generates systematic patterns in order flow, which depend on the degree of transparency. Further, we study overall welfare, measured by the gains from trade of all agents, and compare it with the maximum overall welfare. The discrepancy between both measures is attributable to two inefficiencies. Due to these inefficiencies, introducing a CN next to a DM, as well as increasing the transparency level, not necessarily produces greater overall welfare.