The Valuation of Assets under Moral Hazard

The design of managerial incentive contracts is examined in a setting in which economic agents are risk averse, and the actions of managers can affect asset returns which contain both systematic and idiosyncratic risks. It is shown that in the absence of moral hazard, owners of assets will insure managers against idiosyncratic risks, but with moral hazard, contracts will depend on both systematic and idiosyncratic risks. The traditional recommendation of asset pricing models, namely, to focus only on systematic risks, is thus proved to be valid only when there is no moral hazard. The major empirically testable predictions of the model are (1) managerial incentive contracts will generally depend on systematic as well as idiosyncratic risks, (2) idiosyncratic risks will generally be important in investment decisions, (3) the managers of firms with relatively high levels of idiosyncratic risks will have compensations that are less dependent on their firms' excess returns, and (4) the compensations of managers of larger firms will be relatively more dependent on the excess returns of their firms.     

Spreading the Word: Transaction Cost Economics in the Conversation of Economics

Transaction cost economics is a key topic in many conversations in business and economics related disciplines, much as a result of Oliver Williamson's intellectual crusade. By claiming a “distinct worldview,” he develops arguments of association and differentiation to established worldviews, like traditional microeconomics, earlier institutionalism, Austrian and radical economics, and also within the new institutional economics itself, in order to advance his theory. His resourcefulness defies straight argumentative decisions, catering to different audiences whilst trying to break new ground. Surely Williamson has not pleased everyone, but his discourse is greatly responsible for placing TCE in the everyday parlance of economics.