Modelling Currency Crises in Emerging Markets: A Dynamic Probit Model with Unobserved Heterogeneity and Autocorrelated Errors*

The paper investigates the causes of currency crises in emerging markets. We estimate the probability of a currency crisis by applying maximum smoothly simulated likelihood to a dynamic LDV model. This approach allows us to take explicit account of the existence of intertemporal links between crises. The results show that currency crises are influenced by real, monetary, debt and global variables. Past banking crises are significant determinants of the probability of currency crises. Moreover, countries that sharply devalued in the past are less prone to experience another currency crisis. We find evidence of unobserved heterogeneity, which may reflect differences in the countries’ institutional/historical background. Finally, the determinants of currency crises differ by type of exchange rate regime.     

HUMAN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AND LABOR MARKET EQUILIBRIUM*

We analyze an equilibrium labor market with on‐the‐job search and experience effects (as workers learn by doing). The analysis yields a Mincer wage equation with worker fixed effects and endogenously determined firm fixed effects. Equilibrium sorting—where over time more experienced workers also tend to move to better paid employment—has a significant impact on wage inequality.     

JOB SEARCH WITH BIDDER MEMORIES*

This article revisits the no‐recall assumption in job search models with take‐it‐or‐leave‐it offers. Workers who can recall previously encountered potential employers in order to engage them in Bertrand bidding have a distinct advantage over workers without such attachments. Firms account for this difference when hiring a worker. When a worker first meets a firm, the firm offers the worker a sufficient share of the match rents to avoid a bidding war in the future. The pair share the gains to trade. In this case, the Diamond paradox no longer holds.     

AN EQUILIBRIUM SEARCH MODEL WHEN FIRMS OBSERVE WORKERS' EMPLOYMENT STATUS*

This article considers an equilibrium search model, where firms post wages using information on workers' employment status. Earnings differentials between workers of different employment statuses are driven by firms' ability to discriminate workers' reservation wages. I study how these wage policies depend on firms' and workers' characteristics, and how these policies affect the wage distribution. The model delivers new predictions for the amount of wage dispersion that can be generated with search models and provides a better representation of the left tail of the wage distribution in the presence of a legal minimum wage than standard equilibrium search models.